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ABSTRACT: 
INTERPRETATION AND EXPLANATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
STEIN, J., Masters, University of Cape Town, 1991. 
By exploring the logical status of the psychoanalytic object of investiga-
tion, the compromise-formation, this dissertation suggests that although 
Freud's defence of Psychoanalysis as a natural science has been legitimately 
rejected as problematic, the reconstrual of Psychoanalysis as an interpretive 
or hermeneutic knowledge is likewise inappropriate to the psychoanalytic 
object. On the basis of the work of Donald Davidson and Arthur Dante, it is 
argued instead that the nature and status of Psychoanalysis as a knowledge 
is best understood and assessed in terms of a third alternative provided by 
the historical epistemology germane to the psychoanalytic object. In this 
way, the case against Psychoanalysis as a natural science is granted, while 
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INTRODUCTION 
Probably the major debate on psychoanalytic theory of 
recent years is that over the classical metapsychology 
and its concepts, on their explanatory and ontological 
status. This debate relates, of course, to the position of 
Psychoanalysis in the sciences. The problem is: is 
Psychoanalysis an explanatory science of the same kind 
as the natural sciences? Or is it a special dis'Cipline of 
another kind, some sort of science peculiar·to the treat-
ment of human activities, irreducibly different from natural 
science? Arguments that it is a special human science, a 
science of meanings, have come in various forms from 
many and diverse thinkers. (Nigel Mackay, 1981 p.189). 
Psychoanalysis is a part of the mental science of psychol-
ogy .... Psychology, too, is a natural science. What else can it be? 
(Freud, 1940a(1938], p.282). 
1 
Freud's insistent location of the psychoanalytic enterprise within the natural 
scientific framework is generally acknowledged as problematic and perhaps 
even, finally, illegitimate. This is because Psychoanalysis has been found 
wanting as a science for a number of fairly standard reasons. It instantiates 
all those unstable characteristics of a knowledge making claims to the status 
of a science but which is by virtue of its object without recourse to reliable 
experimental evidence and verification. 
Freud's question: "What else can (Psychoanalysis] be?" has therefore been 
taken up seriously in ways which Freud himself might have found surprising. 
Many defer 1ders of Psychoanalysis suggest that Psychoanalysis would be 
better served by being moved out of the natural scientific position and into, 
broadly speaking, a human-scientific or hermeneutic position. By locating 
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Psychoanalysis in this way, that is, as an Interpretive knowledge, its 
adherents have attempted to up-hold the status of Psychoanalysis as a 
legitimate epistemological enterprise, against those who argue that 
Psychoanalysis, because an inadequate science, must be evicted into the 
alternative realm of 11Art11 , or worse still, dismissed outright as 11fiction 11 or 
11myth11 • (Eysenck, 1985, pp.201-2) 
The question of whether psychoanalysis has legitimate claims to the status 
of a knowledge will therefore not be addressed in terms of standard scientific 
criteria or even in terms of the revised criteria of post-positivistic philosophy 
of science. Instead this dissertation will proceed by way of a re-reading of 
that tradition of work which resituates Psychoanalysis within an alternative 
epistemological framework, as a "science of meanings". (Mackay, 1981, 
p.189). 
More specifically, it will suggest that although the interpretive position has 
made substantial advances for psychoanalytic epistemology, it has also 
resulted in an unproductive deadlock. The wholesale relocation of 
psychoanalysis as a 11science of meanings" (ibid) has resulted in. a radical 
circumscription of the psychoanalytic domain. And if Psychoanalysis thus 
still remains a problem for knowledge, then this is because its object 
somehow spans, or falls between, the two mutually-exclusive positions of 
the natural and interpretive sciences. 
11The whale and the polar bear" says Freud, "cannot wage war on each other, 
for since each is confined to their own element they cannot meet11 • 
(1918(1914], p.281). Arguably then, Psychoanalysis is only a problem for 
knowledge in so far as it constitutes that territory on which they can, and do. 
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However, a re-reading of Freud suggests an alternative route which in granting 
the legitimacy of the case against Psychoanalysis as a natural science, 
nevertheless renders the hermeneutic or interpretive circumscription of 
Psychoanalysis premature, and at variance with Freud's overall project~ 
This third route, which is part of a broader movement in contemporary 
analytic philosophy, will be represented primarily by Arthur Danto and Donald 
Davidson, both of whom make direct contributions to psychoanalytic 
epistemology in particular. 
Dante and Davidson's contributions to the definition of the psychoanalytic 
object, the symptom in particular and the compromise-formation in general, 
will be elaborated in order to illustrate that the psychoanalytic object of 
knowledge can be subsumed neither to an entirely natural-scientific, nor to 
an entirely human-scientific epistemology. 
Dante's work on narrative epistemology will then be outlined as a potentially 
productive alternative procedure for delimiting and defining the form of 
verification appropriate to psychoanalytic investigation. In this way, it is 
hoped that the question of the status of Psychoanalysis as a valid 
epistemological enterprise can be formulated most productively. 
However, it will become apparent that this order of exposition has also been 
motivated by a more overriding consideration. 
Debates around the status of psychoanalytic epistemology (as interpretive 
or explanatory), have traditionally privileged either the metapsychology, 
which is seen to instantiate the causal and deterministic language of the 
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natural sciences, or the case-histories, which are seen to demonstrate the 
more clinical and interpretive aspects of psychoanalysis. 
An alternative approach seems more instructive. This involves considering 
the metapsychology, in so far as it is an account of that class of objects called 
symptoms or compromise-formations, as an explanation of the symptomatic 
on a general level alone. The case-histories are then seen as a narrative 
account of the forms and origins of specific symptoms in particular. 
In short, if the Freudian metapsychology is a broad account of the functioning 
of, the psychic apparatus, then this is only in so far as the conditions of 
possibility for the symptomatic are statable on a general level. The 
metapsychological account does not, however, imply that Psychoanalysis 
must be construed along the lines of the natural sciences, at least not in so 
far as natural sciences are necessarily law-like and predictive. It is not in 
terms of the metapsychology, but· in terms of the narrative procedures 
available to the clinic and exemplified in the case-histories, that 
Psychoanalysis operates as a practice and attempts to achieve its 




Since it may be assumed that signifying practices and sign-systems are the 
most appropriate objects of an interpretive knowledge, the first chapter will 
address the question of the extent and nature of the acknowledged and well 
documented role of language in Psychoanalysis. 
This is done by way of a comparative analysis of the work of Paul Ricoeur 
(1970-1978) and Arthur Dante (1978), and the relative productivity of their 
analyses of the role of language in the classical psychoanalytic construal of 
its object, the compromise-formation. 
Ricoeur alternates between describing the psychoanalytic compromise-
formation as a dual-meaning linguistic expression and as a semiotics of the 
perceptual image. Both of these accounts, however, define the compromise-
formation on a broadly linguistic model, i.e., as a significatory event. In this 
way, Ricoeur continues to legitimate his contention that: "Psychoanalysis is 
interpretation from beginning to end. 11 (1974, p.66). 
Dante's account, while equally concerned to illuminate the function of 
language and the image in the psychoanalytic object does not, by contrast, 
define the compromise-formation as a significatory event. 
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Dante maintains that if the compromise is explicable in terms of its relation 
to language at all, then this is only in so far as language itself consists of both 
signs and perceptual images, and in so far as these images can be operated 
as material 11things 11 i.e., to the exclusion of their significat6ry status as 
meanings or signs. If language plays. an important role· in the compromise-
formation then the compromise-formation, is nevertheless not explicable· in 
terms of those aspects of a language which make signification possible. 
According to Dante the compromise-formation is therefore neither entirely 
inside nor entirely outside language, since it must in fact be understood as 
being in a purely negative relation to language's characteristic (significatory) 
function. 
On the basis of this comparative analysis, it becomes apparent that the 
circumscription of Psychoanalysis to interpretation alone which results from 
Ricoeur's analysis of the psychoanalytic object on a linguistic model (as a 
semantic or meaning problematic), is illegitimate. Moreover, Dante's· 
alternative rendition of the operations of language in the psychoanalytic 
object avoids many of the unfortunate epistemological implications which 
Ricoeur's account of Psychoanalysis on an interpretive model entails. These 
will be seen to include: 
The generalization of the psychoanalytic interpretive field on the level of 
content and the concomitant elision of the necessarily specific causal relation 
between disguised material and the compromise-formation in which disguise 
results. Ricoeur's linguistic model will also prove ill-designed in negotiating 
the Freudian topographies, economics and dynamics. 
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Chapter Two 
Arguments around the epistemological status of Psychoanalysis as 
explanation or interpretation also hinge around the problem of the intentional 
status of psychoanalytic symptoms. 
Since Dilthey (1962), it has been common to suggest that because physical 
events are caused whereas human actions are intended or motivated, events 
can be explained, whereas human action can only be interpreted. An account 
of the psychoanalytic symptom as an intentional phenomenon thus also 
precipitates psychoanalytic epistemology into the field of interpretation 
considered appropriate to human action, as opposed to the field of 
explanation considered appropriate to physical events. 
A comparative analysis of the work of Micheal Sherwood (1969) and Adolf · 
Grunbaum (1984), reveals that the nature and status of the symptom as an 
irrational action, i.e., as an action which cannot be understood in terms of 
the agent's intentions, problematizes this bifurcation between actions and 
events, and therefore between interpretation and explanation in 
Psychoanalysis. The problem devolves on whether symptoms are, in the last 
instance; 11chosen 11 on the basis of reasons, or 11caused 11 by psycho-physical 
compulsion. 
Donald Davidson (1982), attempts to resolve the logical problems associated 
with the issue of reasons and causes in psychoanalytic explanation in terms 
of an account of the nature of irrationality. 
8 
Davidson argues that although, in symptomatic action, the logical 
means-ends connection between reasons and actions is distorted or elided, 
so that only the causal relation between them remains, psychoanalytic 
explanation nevertheless allows us to account for the intentional aspects of 
these actions, by postulating a·number of semi-independent structures within 
the mind which, although interacting causally, nevertheless produce 
consequences which must be explained on the principle of intentional 
actions, i.e., in terms of the reasons which produced them. 
In providing an account of the symptom in terms of the Freudian topography, 
Davidson facilitates an understanding of the symptom as that phenomenon 
which slips between characterization as either an action or an event. In doing 
so he provides a thorough elaboration of why it is that psychoanalysis 
consequently straddles the fields of the natural and human sciences. More 
specifically, Davidson's account allows for a causal analysis of objects 
previously confined to interpretive activities .. The novelty of Davidson's 
position is therefore that, like Dante's, it allows us to establish a third term 
between the natural and human sciences. 
Davidson makes it clear that the description of the psychoanalytic symptom 
in terms of intentions does not precipitate Psychoanalysis into a purely 
interpretive field. In this way Davidson avoids the consequences of a 
purely interpretive account of the role of intentionality in psychoanalytic 
epistemology. As in the case of a purely linguistic (i.e., significatory) account 
of the role of language in Psychoanalysis, these will similarly be seen to 
include: 
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The undermining of the necessary role of causal explanation in the under-
standing of the psychoanalytic symptom, and the (witting or unwitting) 
eradication of the very notion of. a split psyche fundamental to the 
psychoanalytic understanding of its object. 
Together the first two chapters lay the groundwork for chapter three, which 
will argue for an explanatory narrative knowledge of the symptom in the clinic. 
Chapter Three 
As the firsttwo chapters describe the symptom on a general or formal level, 
as an object of knowledge logically requiring explanation rather than 
interpretation, it remains to explore the question of whether veridical 
explanatory accounts of the symptom may in fact be achieved. On the basis 
of Freud's explication of his explanatory method in the clinic, it will be argued 
that psychoanalytic epistemology finally devolves upon the question of 
whether historical methodology pertains to the status of explanation, rather 
than interpretation. This is because the characteristic genre of the Freudian 
clinic, the case-history, attempts to account for the symptom by way of a 
particular individual history. The status of Psychoanalysis as a knowledge is 
therefore dependent upon its ability to produce a unique and particular 
causal series to explain the symptoms of any particular analysand. 
In "Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in 
Psychoanalysis 11 (1982), Donald Spence argues that the historical or 
archaeological method of classical Psychoanalysis is illegitimate; both 
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unviable and unnecessary to psychoanalytic technique precisely to the 
extent that it entails causal explanation and veridical historical reconstruction. 
Spence suggests that Psychoanalysis would be better served by being 
construed along the lines of a narrative operation which attempts to achieve 
curative effects along the lines of interpretive coherence and closure. 
On the basis of Arthur Dante's work on the analytical philosophy of history 
"Narration and Knowledge" (1985), it will be argued that although Spence is 
correct in so far as he construes psychoanalytic technique along narrative 
lines, he fails to recognize that the construal of Psychoanalysis as a narrative 
operation does not preclude it from the field .of causal explanation but may, 
rather, be that form of explanation more appropriate to the psychoanalytic 
object than either a natural-scientific or a humanist-interpretive one. Where 
Spence contrasts historical explanation and narrative, Dante shows them to 
be identical operations. 
On the basis of an analysis of the role of general laws in historical, as opposed 
to natural scientific epistemology, Dante also provides the grounds on which 
to argue for a logical distinction between those forms of explanation ap-
propriate to the case-history, and those appropriate to the metapsychology. 
·' 
In this way, the relation of the metapsychology to the case-history is clarified. 
CHAPTER ONE 
LANGUAGE AND IMAGE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Dream Interpretation traces the course taken by the dream-
thoughts, follows the paths which lead from the latent thoughts to 
the dream-elements, reveals the way in which verbal ambiguities 
have been exploited, and points out the verbal bridges between 
different groups of material - owing to all this, we get the 
impression now of a joke, now of schizophrenia, and we are apt to 
forget that for a dream all operations with words are no more than a 
preparation for a regression to things. (Freud, 1917[1915], p.229). 
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The function of language is a theme which runs like a persistent thread 
throughout the entire body of Freud's work. This concern with the question 
of language can be traced from the early monograph "On Aphasia 11 (1891 ), 
and the "Project for a Scientific Psychology11 (1950(1895]), through "The 
Interpretation of Dreams11 (1900), 11The Psychopathology of Everyday Life11 
(1901), 11Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious 11 (1905), until Freud's 
final attempt to resolve the relation of language to the conscious and 
unconscious registers in his definitive metapsychological paper on 11The 
Unconscious11 • (1915a). 
Probably as part of the general intersection between questions of language 
and epistemology characteristic of much contemporary debate, this aspect 
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of Freud's work has recently been picked up to invigorate questions around 
the epistemological status of Psychoanalysis. Certainly, the continued 
presence of Psychoanalysis in philosophical debate today can primarily be 
attributed to the productivity of an essentially linguistic reading of Freudian 
Psychoanalysis now often called "French Freud". (Turkle, 1979). 
Although the linguistic reading of Psychoanalysis is most commonly 
associated with the seminal works of J. Lacan, the epistemological upshot 
of this linguistic appropriation can perhaps most clearly and economically be 
presented by way of a comparative analysis of the work of Paul Ricoeur and 
Arthur Dante. 
As both Ricoeur and Dante share a common conviction in the relevance of 
language to psychoanalytic epistemology, as well as a common body of 
Freudian texts, their work can clearly be compared. 
Paul Ricoeur has written at length over an extended period of time on various 
topics of psychoanalytic interest, during which his views have modified 
considerably. However, this inquiry will focus only on those aspects of his 
work which have epistemological consequences derived from his assess-
ment of the role of language or more broadly, semiotics, in Psychoanalysis. 
Despite the shift in Ricoeur's thinking regarding exactly what constitutes the 
semiotic nature of the compromise-formation - a shift instantiated in his paper 
"Language and Image in Psychoanalysis" (1978) - it will be argued that a 
fundamentally hermeneutic or interpretive construal of Psychoanalysis 
remains consistent across Ricqeur's work. By proposing a semiotic 
reformulation of Psychoanalysis, Ricoeur's explicit project is to legitimate the 
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basic proposition that: "Psychoanalysis is interpretation from beginning to 
end. 11 (1974, p.66). 
In his paper 11 Freudian Explanation and the Language of the Unconscious11 
(1978), Arthur Dante argues, like Ricoeur, that the compromise-formation 
can be rendered intelligible in the psychoanalytic clinic because of its relation 
to language. However Dante's analysis negates Ricoeur's formulations with 
regard to the relation of the compromise-formation to representation and 
interpretation. In consequence, Dante's alternative analysis of the role of 
language in Psychoanalysis does not precipitate Psychoanalysis into the 
position of a purely interpretive knowledge. 
1.n "Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis11 (1980), John Forrester, like 
Dante, recognizes that the operation of language in Psychoanalysis cannot 
be accounted for in terms of a purely interpretive epistemology. If Ricoeur's 
position is contrasted primarily to Dante's then this is only in so far as Dante 
provides a alternative explanatory framework within which to account for the 
role and nature of the operations of language in Psychoanalysis both 
economically, and precisely. 
Likewise, Jean Laplanche and Serge Leclaire's contributions to the question 
of the role of language in Psychoanalysis, especially in "The Unconscious: 
A Psychoanalytic Study11 (1966), cannot but be mentioned. If their work has 
been excluded from this chapter, then this is only for the following reasons: 
Firstly, Laplanche and Leclaire's evaluation of Politzer's construal of the role 
of language and interpretation in Psychoanalysis is equivalent in upshot to 
the evaluation of Ricoeur's hermeneutic approach undertaken in this 
chapter. Thus Laplanche and Leclaire maintain that Politzer's construal of 
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chapter. Thus Laplanche and Leclaire maintain that Politzer's construal of 
the role of language and interpretation in Psychoanalysis, as identical to "the 
explication of a text" results in a radical circumscription of the true import of 
the Freudian notion of the unconscious. (Laplanche and Leclaire, 1966, 
Klaus Reprint 1984, pp.118-124). Secondly, Laplanche and Leclaire's 
alternative rendition of the role of language and interpretation in 
Psychoanalysis parallel's Dante's contribution in all essentials. 
1.1 Lanpage and Image in Ricoeur. 
Although the fundamental object for psychoanalytic intervention is, strictly 
speaking, limited to that which is symptomatic, the psychoanalytic field of 
study is in fact more extensive. It includes all those psychical productions 
called "compromise-formations" in which both an unconscious wish, as well 
as the conflictual demand for defense against that wish, are satisfied 
simultaneously. (Freud, 1916-1917, p.358). This field includes the symptom, 
the joke, the parapraxis and the dream. 
It is however Freud's work on dreams (1900), which lends itself to the study 
of the role of language and interpretation most explicitly. Certainly, it is by 
using the dream as model that Paul Ricoeur consistently characterizes all 
psychical productions in the psychoanalytic field, i.e., 
compromise-formations, as an alternative "discourse" or "text" to be 
interpreted. This constitutes, as he claims, "the central thesis of the linguistic 
formulation of Psychoanalysis 11 • (1978, p.298). 
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More specifically, Ricoeur has characterized the dream and by analogy, all 
other compromise-formations as "communication disturbances" and 
"double-meaning linguistic expressions". (1981, p.24; 1974, p.175). 
These disturbed expressions take the form of "symbolic utterances" where 
the notion of the symbol is restricted to: "Double or multiple expressions 
whose semantic feature is correlative to the work of interpretation that 
explicates their second or multiple meanings." (1971, p.13; cf. 1981, p.261; 
1974, pp.7-8). 
For Ricoeur then, the psychoanalytic compromise-formation can be under-
stood, not only on the model of the linguistic sign, but more specifically, on 
the model of the linguistic symbol - that class of sign in which one sensory 
signifier takes on at least two concepts or meanings, i.e., signifieds. 
Ricoeur thus accounts for the 11communication disturbance 11 instantiated in 
the compromise-formation in terms of the double repertoire of language - its 
capacity to take on two forms of significatory or intentional operation, the first 
denotative or literal, and the second connotative or figurative. This formula-
tion is one which makes a direct connection between textual phenomenon 
and psychoanalytic objects. Firstly, in terms of their mutual reliance on 
resources available within language, in order to account for an alternative, 
i.e., symbolic, form of expression; and secondly, in terms of their parallel 
status as messages which need to be interpreted because their expressive 
or communicative function is never wholly apparent. 
However, an immediate problem for Ricoeur's analysis of the compromise-
formation is presented by his definition of the symbol as a "double-meaning 
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linguistic expression". (1974, p.175). Clearly even the Freudian field of the 
dream on which Ricoeur predicates his discussion cannot be accounted for 
in this way, because the dream involves a transformation of the dream-
thought or meaning into an image or percept, rather than onto another 
meaning hinging directly on words or word-play. Thus even where Freud 
himself makes use of "symbolic" equivalences in the dream, what such 
equivalences, between a sabre and a penis for example, have in common 
could not be further away from a common word or signifier. 
In a later article, one more obviously atuned to the Freudian project, entitled 
11Language and Image in Psychoanalysis" (1978), Ricoeur thus retracts the 
view that the drive, because it remains on the level of the signifier is wholly 
homogeneous with language. He writes: 
That these [unconscious] complexes should have an affinity for 
discourse, that they are sayable in principle, is not to be doubted. 
Therefore the analytic situation itself establishes a semiotic 
aspect. Moreover, that the phenomenon thus brought to light are 
governed by relations of motivation that here take the place of 
what the natural sciences define as a causal relation, .... none of 
this proves that what thus comes to language - or better, is 
brought to language - is or must be language. On the contrary, 
because the level of expression proper to the unconscious is not 
language, the work of interpretation is difficult and constitutes a 
veritable linguistic promotion. (1978, p.312). 
In this article, Ricoeur thus swings from a purely linguistic reading of the 
workings of the dream to a purely non-linguistic one, in terms of an alternative 
11semiotics 11 of the image. The image can become the locus of 11the semiotic 
dimension", because although at best only partially linguistic, it remains 
11fundamentally figurative, but nevertheless significative". (ibid, footnote, 
p.322). 
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Ricoeur assumes this position because, as he points out, a purely linguistic 
construal of the dream-work cannot account for the fact that the dream-
thoughts are expressed in the dream as images, which lack the logical 
relations appropriate to the syntax of our natural languages. (ibid, p.313). 
He therefore argues that it is unfortunate that we remain heirs to a tradition 
that sees the image as a residue of perception or as the trace of an 
impression, because, as a result, we are caught in the following disjunction: 
Either we recognize the function of the image in Psychoanalysis but 
misunderstand the semiotic dimension, or we recognize this semiotic 
dimension but assimilate it too quickly to the realm of language: 
I think it is mistaken to believe that everything semiotic is linguistic. 
At the same time, however, it is also an error to believe that the 
image does not arise from the semiotic order. It is this semiotic 
dimension of the image, therefore, that I will seek to explicate. 
(Ricoeur, ibid, p.311). 
Now clearly, it is mistaken to believe that "everything semiotic is linguistic 11 • 
(ibid). A semiotic in its proper form constitutes two full-blown systems of 
signification, one linguistic and the other non-linguistic, in which the 
non-linguistic system is studied in accordance with the linguistic model. If 
Ricoeur makes this point, that not everything semiotic is linguistic, then this is 
because formerly, his "semiotic11 analysis of psychical productions as symbolic 
operations, i.e., as 11double-meaning lingu_istic expressions11 , was predicated 
upon the assumption that the operations of the dream could be explicated in 
terms of a second order significatory system within language itself. 
However, it remains the case that a semiotic analysis traditionally constitutes 
the attempt to study non-linguistic. processes of signification by way of a 
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linguistic model. Thus, t~e postures of the body, the content and lay-out of 
menu's, fashions and photographs are studied as representational or 
significatory systems within society to be rendered intelligible by way of 
procedures essentially linguistic in form. (Barthes, 1964; Kristeva, 1986; 
Coward and Ellis, 1977). 
Crudally then, Ricoeur is unwilling to make the move which would constitute 
a decisive break with the linguistic. Thus if he repudiates a purely linguistic 
reading of the workings of the unconscious then he replaces it with a happy 
alternative-that ofa visual language or a semiotics of the image. In this way, 
Ricoeur can account for the role of the image in the dream while maintaining 
his commitment to an analysis of the dream and its analogues as 
fundamentally figurative and significative i.e., a symbolics in all essential 
respects. 
Ricoeur himself emphasizes that his analysis of the dream as image will not differ 
in any essential respects to his analysis of the dream as linguistic text since both 
are, "a case in favour of the semiotic aspects of the analytic experience. Rather, 
it will be a case of reorienting the same arguments toward what I shall suggest 
we call a semiotics of the image and a theory of the imagination11 • (1978, p.294). 
If Ricoeur's analysis of the dream as image thus relocates the entire 
conceptual baggage of a semiotics off the sign or word, and onto the image, 
then it remains doubtful whether this alternative fares any better than his initial 
formulation of the dream as text. The issue still devolves upon what the 
semiotic order to which he refers might be, and whether a semiotic 
characterization (be it linguistic or visual) is in fact appropriate to the workings 
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1.1.1 Psychoanalysis and Semiotics 
Minimally, to count as an appropriate object for a semiotic analysis, a 
significatory system must allow three inter-related distinctions to be drawn: 
Firstly, it must sustain a distinction between "langue11 and "parole", i.e., 
between a surface, particular instance as a well-formed utterance, and the 
structural body of rules which makes well-formed utterances possible. This 
is because semiology is based on the assumption that in so far as particular 
instances of human actions or productions convey meaning or function as 
signs, there must be an underlying system of conventions governed by rules 
which makes this meaning intelligible. As Culler points out: "Where there are 
signs there is system." (1976, p.91). 
Secondly, it must be possible to identify within the system both a 
paradigmatic and a syntactic axis, i.e., a horizontal organization of the rules 
of combination for particular signs and a vertical organization governing their 
substitutability or selection. 
And finally, the signs or items making up this system must consist of an 
identifiable perceptual or material item, i.e. "the signifier", in a regular relation 
to a concept or meaning, i.e., "the signified". This relation between signifiers 
and signifieds, however, is only regularized by convention. There is no 
intrinsic or motivated link between them such as a physical similarity or 
semantic appropriacy. 
In considering whether psychoanalytic compromise-formations such as the 
dream and the symptom can be understood in these terms it is necessary 
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to turn to 11The Interpretation of Dreams11 • (Freud, 1900). For if Ricoeur does 
not often explicitly substantiate his contentions in the Freudian corpus, then 
it is this work which he nevertheless has in mind as 11the key document" for 
his discussion (1978, p.298), and which in fact best illustrates his position. 
Ricoeur's use of a semiotic model is clearly derived from the status of the 
dream as a presentation of the dream-thoughts. Thus, the manifest visual 
content of the dream can be seen as the perceptual material (or signifiers) 
in which the concepts or meanings (signifieds) of the latent content is 
expressed. (Ricoeur, 1978, p.302; p.318). Secondly, or more specifically, the 
dream-symbols outlined in chapter six of 11The Interpretation of Dreams" 
seem to provide the necessary lexical items or signs of a language-like 
system ·and to instantiate both the literal and figurative aspects of the sign as 
symbol. (ibid, p.298). Finally, the Freudian account of the dream-work, 
especially the major operations of condensation and displacement, appear 
to provide a grammar which can and often has been closely associated with 
Saussures's syntagmatic and paradigmatic, or more specifically with 
Jakobson's metonymic and metaphoric, axes. (ibid, p.30.6). 
However, these parallels, if tempting, reveal on closer examination more 
differences than similarities between Freud's account of the dream and the 
necessary features of a semiotic system, i.e., a lexicon (or vocabulary) and 
a grammar. Freudian symbols exhibit none of the necessary features of 
significatory items in a semiotic system, and it is the violation of a grammar 
rather than the operation of one which best characterizes the dream-work. 
An examination of condensation and displacement as the supposed parallels 
of a gram~ar reveals that the dream images of the manifest content disguise 
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the propositional content of the latent, precisely because they do not 
instantiate the verticality and the horizontality of the paradigm and the 
syntagm which are the two axes necessary to produce the grammatical 
sentence or the well-formed semiotic utterance. And they cannot be under-
stood by virtue of some possible alternative regular grammatical operation 
either, because far from instantiating or even paralleling the paradigm and 
syntagm positively, condensation and displacement operate in an explicitly 
negative relation to them. 
Ironically however, it is those examples in "The Interpretation of Dreams 11 
(1900) which Freud himself terms "symbolsn, and from which Ricoeur would 
seem to want to draw the strongest support for his position, which defy 
semiotic appropriation most rigorously. The Freudian symbol is suggestive 
of neither the arbitrary relation between signifiers and signifieds (the semiotic 
sign), nor the connotative/denotative operations of the traditional symbol. 
Psychoanalytic symbols are that limited and specifiable group of images with 
a broadly but almost invariably sexual content: 'The range of things which 
are given symbolic representation in dreams is not wide: the human body as 
a whole, parents, children, brothers, sisters, birth, death, nakedness - and 
something else besides. 11 (Freud, 1916-1917(1915-1917], p.153). 
Freud uses the following example to describe the forms which symbolic 
substitution takes more explicitly: "All elongated objects, such as sticks, 
tree-trunks and umbrellas ... may stand for the male organ ... as well as all 
long, sharp weapons." (Freud, 1900, p.354). 
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Clearly sticks, tree-trunks, umbrellas and sabres (not to mention "neck-ties" 
and "nail-files") cannot all "connote" the phallus in Ricoeur's sense. If this 
were true, our linguistic and/or semiotic systems of second-order 
significations would be so poverty-stricken and sexually obsessed that it 
would be impossible to imagine what the creativity and proliferation of art 
and literature might consist in. 
In fact, the Freudian relation between all these diverse objects and the phallus 
is entirely different from that encountered in the semiotic symbol, where the 
double meaning linguistic expression, say, a rose, denotes a flower and 
connotes beauty. It is different, likewise, from the manner in which the colour 
blue in a painting, denotes the wall and connotes sadness. 
What the umbrella has in common with the male-organ is not their second -
order "meanings", but rather their shape and perhaps, in the case of the 
folding umbrella, a certain (projectile) capacity for movement and growth. 
These are qualities which lie in the perceptual field of physical similarity or 
difference alone. Thus the logic of the dream-symbol is one in which the 
manifest or lit~ral and the traditionally symbolic aspects of, for example, the 
umbrella, are elided in favour of one or more perceptual similarity between 
it and another object. 
Whereas not every semiotic system consigns the value of sadness or despair 
to the colour blue or the value of supreme beauty to the rose, anybody, 
regardless of the semiotic system of their culture, can compare and contrast 
long and round objects which, as part of the field of perception, are neither 
historically nor culturally determined. Organizations or comparisons based 
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on perceptual similarity and difference are as it were, non-semiotic. They are 
determined by the nature of the human perceptual apparatus alone. 
And although it is true that a semiotics may encode perceptual regularities 
retrospectively, the Freudian symbol does not legitimate semiotic analysis 
on these grounds either. If Freud argues that symbols are those items in the 
dream that are often not amenable to the accepted psychoanalytic method 
of dream-interpretation, i.e., free-association, and seem instead to allow for a 
certain regularity across interpretation, then he, unlike Ricoeur, nevertheless 
insists that this is not because such symbols are serriiotically or culturally 
encoded, but rather, because they are not. (Freud, 1905, p.155). 
It is this supremely non-semiotic and pre-cultural operation which charac-
terizes, not only the (primary process) logic of the psychoanalytic symbol, 
but likewise the logic of the infantile-researches. It is only a complete 
disregard or incomprehension of either literal or connotative meanings that 
allows for the substitution of two items as manifestly and connotatively 
different as a baby and feaces, simply on the grounds that both issue from 
the mother's body. 
The point is not that the child has no reason to pick out this perceptual relation 
between these particular objects, but simply that the motivated relation 
between a baby and faeces is a logic of affect. More importantly, it is not one 
which culturally encoded semiotic operations produce, nor is it a linguistic 
one. (Freud, 1918(1914], pp. 82-84). 
In any event, Ricoeur himself recognizes that regardless of the fact that 
the dream is made up of images rather than words, it is nevertheless 
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inappropriate to simply replace a semiotic analysis of the dream as text for 
one of the dream as image. 
In certain brief sections of this paper Ricoeur intimates, to his credit, that the 
role of language, i.e., of the words by which we express concepts or ideas, 
in the formation of the dream cannot simply be elided in favour of the image 
either. Thus he writes: 
Here we are at the juncture of image and language, since on the 
one hand the creation of images consists in large part of a 11visual 
representation 11 of the dream processes, and on the other hand 
of a 11pictorial language11 which has to do with the concrete terms 
used. It is with regard to this, moreover, that Freud comments on 
the kinship between the dream and wit, as. he did earlier with 
regard to the rebus and as he will do again a few lines later with 
regard to hieroglyphics. The concept of representability, there-
fore, designates a working level where the kinship between con-
densation, displacement and disguise is affirmed and which joins 
the figtJred aspects of language to the spatial and visual unfolding 
of a spectacle ... a figured language is one that gives a contour 
or a visibility to discourse. Consequently, the problem is not so 
much that we find words in dreams and that the dream-work 
should be close to the 11verbal wit11 which governs jokes, but that 
language functi0ns at a pictorial level which brings it into the 
neighborhood of the visual image and visa versa. (1978, p.315). 
Here Ricoeur comes close to a full analysis of the interconnection between 
the image/percept and the signifier/word operative in the dream~work, which 
will be explicated in the next section. However, Ricoeur does not follow this 
analysis through to its logical conclusion, because he still wishes to argue 
that the image, rather than being related to the sign, is analogous to it: 
constituting a semiotic system of its own. And it will become apparent that if 
Ricoeur recognizes and yet fails to take the necessary implications of the 
dream as 11juncture of image and language11 (ibid) into sustained considera-
• 
tion, then this is because it is only in this way that he can hope to legitimate 
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his explicit assertion that, 11psychoanalysis is interpretation from beginning to 
end" (1974, p.66), or his model of Psychoanalysis as, 11interpretation rather 
than explanation 11 • (1978, p.300, italics inserted). 
1.2 Lan1mai:,e and lmai:,e in Danto 
In an article entitled 11Freudian Explanation and the Language of the Uncon-
scious11 (1978), Arthur Dante provides a coherent (and more useful) analysis 
of the role of both language and the image in the classical psychoanalytic 
account of the operations of disguise by showing that the form of the 
compromise-formation which disguise produces is in fact effected at the 
intersection between word and thing, or concept and percept, rather than 
between two languages or meanings. On the basis of Dante's account it will 
be seen that the role of language and of the image in the formation of the 
compromise are not mutually exclusive, and cannot be substituted for one 
another as they are in Ricoeur's paper 11 lmage and Language in 
Psychoanalysis 11 (1978), because as Ricoeur himself suspects, it is the 
relation of the one to the other which is at stake. And it will be argued that 
by looking at the possible operations of words, as material 11things 11 and as 
conceptual 11signs11 , Dante provides an explanation of the formation of the 
dream and of the symptom which, while accounting for the role of language 
in their formation, does not consequently precipitate Psychoanalysis into the 
field of the interpretation of meanings alone. 
Danto begins his analysis on the premise that Freudian interpretations 
involve, typically, 11a punning transformation of terms, dreams and symptoms, 
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having as their roots plays on words". (1978; p.328). He argues that these 
features of representation figure prominently in Freudian interpretations of 
dreams and symptomatologies because the operations of disguise which 
account for the unintelligibility of compromise-formations have a language 
as their precondition although they are not, finally, of a linguistic order. 
Dante's argument as to what the nature of these operations of disguise 
might be hinges on the understanding that the items in a representational 
system may be deployed in two ways, both as signs and as material 
things, and that these two operations are mutually exclusive. They may 
be deployed conceptually, as signs in the significatory (linguistic or semiotic) 
field, and perceptually, as objects of perception in the material world. Thus, 
it is only possible to produce signification when the rules for the combination 
of representational items are not, governed by operations sustainable on the 
perceptual level. Likewise, operations sustainable on the perceptual level . 
alone cannot produce signification. And Danto argues that in the symptom; 
language operates causally along a route which defies signification because 
in the symptom, representational items operate on the level of their percep-
tual values alone. (Danto, 1978, pp.330-331). 
This analysis is predicated upon one of the basic premises of contemporary 
Saussurian linguistics, in which a clear distinction is drawn between units of 
a linguistic system, on the one hand, and their actual physical manifestations 
on the other. Culler outlines this distinction: 
Le.nguage is a system of signs. Noises count as language only 
when they serve to express or communicate ideas; otherwise they 
are just noise. And to communicate ideas they must be part of a 
system of conventions, part of a system of signs. (Culler, 1976, 
p.111 ). 
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Equally, however, Dante's argument devolves upon Freud's account in "The 
Interpretation of Dreams" (1900) of how, in spite of its highly disguised form, 
a dream may be interpreted. Here Freud maintains that the transfiguration 
of the wish in the manifest content of the dream is not simply that the wish 
is represented as fulfilled, but that the wish as proposition is transformed into 
the form of a picturing. Freud contends, however, that we cannot, in 
consequence, interpret the dream as a pictorial composition: 
A dream is a picture-puzzle ... and our predecessors in the field 
of dream-interpretation have made the mistake of treating the 
rebus as a pictorial composition: and as such it has seemed to 
them nonsensical and worthless .... Suppose I have a picture-
puzzle, a rebus, in front of me. It depicts a house with a boat on 
its roof, a single letter of the alphabet, the figure of a running man 
whose head has been conjured away, and so on. Now I might be 
mislead into raising objections and declaring that the picture as a 
whole and its component parts are nonsensical. A boat has no 
business to be on the roof of a house, and a headless man cannot 
run. Moreover, the man is bigger than the house; and if the whole 
picture is intended to represent a landscape, letters ... are out of 
place in it ... But obviously we can only form a proper judgement 
of the rebus when we put aside criticisms such as these ... [and] 
try to replace each separate element by a syllable or a word. 
(Freud, 1900, pp.277-78, cited in Dante, 1978, pp.341-343). 
A rebus is the sort of puzzle in which words are presented as pictures, and 
in which the solution is a sentence. For example, if the dream-thought 
linguistically encoded in the present tense propositional form characteristic 
of the repressed wish were to be formulated as "I see you", then a dream 
which takes the form of a woman putting on eye-makeup at the sea-side 
while a ewe grazes on a nearby hill could be solved by sounding out the 
homonyms I/eye, see/sea, and you/ewe. Or, to use an example from Freud, 
the image of kissing someone in an automobile somewhat paradoxically 
represents the word "autoerotish" (English: "masturbation"). (1900, pp.408-
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409; 1916-17, p.235). Hanns Sachs (1911) summarizes the operation of the 
rebus very clearly: 
We know from Freud's Interpretation of Dreams that the dream-
work makes use of different methods of giving a sensory form to 
words or phrases. If, for instance, the expression that is to be 
represented is an ambiguous one, the dream-work may exploit 
the fact by using the ambiguity as a switch-point: where one of 
the meanings of the word is present in the dream-thoughts the 
other one can be introduced into the manifest dream. (cited in 
Freud, 1900, p.410). 
Mannoni likewise points out that: 11The dream must not be interpreted as a 
painting would be [that is, as a representation of pictorial values in the world] 
but as the visual representation of the words themselves." (1968, p.54). 
If Freud's analysis of the dream as rebus, rather than as pictorial composition 
is taken into account, it becomes clear that if Ricoeur cannot account for the 
dream in terms of a double meaning linguistic expression because the dream 
is made of images, then he cannot account for the dream by way of an 
alternative semiotics of the image either. The pictures of the dream are not 
explicable - as pictures - because they are in fact explicable in terms of the 
words or signifiers which they represent. The interpretation of the dream in 
terms of its verbal description is not only possible, but necessary, because 
the form of the dream-image is determined by the form of the linguistic 
proposition. It is for this reason that Dante argues that: 11We solve the rebus 
by pronouncing the words that go with the individual pictures, replacing these 
with homonyms, and getting a spoken sentence that makes sense - the 
solution of the rebus. 11 (Danto, 1978, p.341). 
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It also becomes clear why it is that Dante maintains that the way in which 
words operate in the dream is, by the same token, not a linguistic or semiotic 
operation. Language operates in the dream by way of its material features 
rather than as a sign or symbol, the material features of which are necessarily 
suppressed. It is only if the signifieds of 11ewe 11 and 11you 11 are ignored in favour 
of their phonetically similar signifiers that disguise can occur. Thus, it is only 
one of the elements of the sign, namely its signifiers as sounds or marks, 
which allows for the possibility of disguise. And signifiers as sounds or marks 
we produce in speaking or writing are not in themselves units of a linguistic 
system. 
This is because language as a sign system is necessarily predicated upon 
the unmotivated relation between signifier and signified. The significatory and 
communicative role of language and other representational systems is only 
made possible if there is a systematic or habitual, rather than a motivated or 
intrinsic, relation between signifiers and signifieds. In the compromise-
formation, by contrast, words or propositions are confused on the basis of 
their perceptual identities, thereby allowing for the possibility of disguise. 
Through a slippage in the normal operation of language, the propositional 
or significatory content of words can be confused or lost, thereby fulfilling 
the necessary conditions of repression and disguise. 
And Dante maintains that not only the dream-content stands to the dream-
thought as a rebus stands to its solution, but that much the same is true of 
symptoms. As in the dream, disguise in the symptom is made possible by 
language but is not a phenomena within it. This is because in the symptom, 
as in the dream, the material (perceptual or phonetic) features of a language 
( i.e., signifiers), are operated in accordance with the procedures which 
30 
govern their organization in perception, thereby suspe!'lding their relation to 
· meaning or the signified. 
Dante illustrates this with an example from the case of the Rat-Man who, 
during the course of a summer vacation, decided that he was too fat 
(German: 11Dick11). He began to leave the table before pudding, to tear along 
the road without a hat in the blazing heat of the August sun, and to dash up 
a mountain until he could no longer continue. (Freud, 1909, pp.188-9). 
Freud points out thatthe Rat-Man could not explain this senseless behaviour, 
until it suddenly occurred to him that his beloved and her English cousin, of 
whom he was very jealous, were also at the holiday resort. This cousin, 
whose name was "Richard", was known as "Dick". The Rat-Man then, by 
running, had been trying to get rid of "Dick". (Freud, ibid). 
It is plain that it would be absurd to attribute to the Rat-Man, obsessional as 
he was, the conscious or even unconscious belief that by slimming himself, . 
he would somehow eradicate his rival: "Were the matter as simple as that, 
we would have only a wayward premise to rectify, and instruction in the 
technology of rival-riddance would take care of the Rat-Man's therapeutic 
needs." (Dante, 1978, p.344). 
Thus Dante concludes that if getting rid of Dick was the real reason for the 
Rat-Man's running, then the transformation of the Rat-Man's unconscious 
belief into his given one can only be on the basis that the signifiers "Dick" and 
"Dick" are related homonymically, as rebus to resolution. 
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Although here it is two words, rather than a word and an image, as in the 
dream, which are confused, it remains their phonetic and perceptual (i.e., 
material) identity upon which a slippage is nonetheless predicated. The point 
at which the two words overlap has nothing to do with their signifieds or 
reference but only with the form of their signifieds. The result is an arbitrary 
return to their identity on the level of perception. (In fact, there are dream-
images in which the operation of saying to showing, or saying to picturing, 
also takes this route, through two words, rather than between a word and 
an image.) (Freud, 1900, p.413). 
Danto also illustrates his argument with a case of schizophrenia cited 
by Freud in which a girl, after quarreling with her lover, complained 
that "her eyes were twisted". As Danto points out, Freud relates this 
example in illustration of "the meaning and the genesis of schizophrenic 
word-formation", since the German word for deceiver is 11Augenverdreher11 
(eye-twister). (Freud, 1915a, p.198, cited in Dante, 1978, p.349). 
The section in Freud's paper on "The Unconscious" (191 Sa) from which 
Danto draws this example, if dense, is clearly instructive. Certainly, it 
appears at first sight as if Danto is merely emphasizing the distinction 
Freud is himself concerned to draw between the primary process opera-
tions of the system unconscious, which operate on the logic of 11thing-
presentations11 alone, and the secondary process operations appropriate to 
the systems preconscious/conscious, which are characterized by the logic 
of "word-presentations", or a correspondence between word and thing. 
(Freud, 1915a, pp.201-202). However, it becomes apparent that by arguing 
that words may themselves operate both as words (signs) or as things 
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(material items), Dante is not so much re-iterating Freud's analysis, as 
explicating its hidden agenda. 
This is because a problem for Freud's analysis arises at exactly the point 
upon which his argument is predicated, i.e., in the transformation undergone 
in schizophrenic speech. Freud maintains that the words of the 
schizophrenic are effects of the primary psychical processes which operate 
on the level of thing-presentations (i.e., on the level of perceptual identities) 
alone. Yet he also recognizes that, 11what has dictated the substitution [in 
schizophrenic speech] is not the resemblance between the things denoted 
but the sameness of the words used to express them 11 • (Freud, 191 Sa, p.201 ; 
cf. Freud, 1900, p.602). Likewise in 11The Interpretation of Dreams11 , Freud 
writes: 11 lt is true in general that words are frequently treated in dreams as 
though they were things, and for that reason they are apt to be combined in 
just the same way as are the presentation of things. 11 (1900, pp.295-296). 
What is more or less explicit in both of these texts, and substantiated 
consistently across the Freudian corpus as a whole is then, what Dante is 
concerned to demonstrate: The compromise-formation implicates language 
in so far as it operates the primary process logic appropriate to the thing-
presentation across the word, rather than eliding words altogether. Since the 
compromise-formation is defined by Freud as the product of inter-agency 
conflict, rather than as a pure product of the unconscious system alone, this 
account is, moreover, faithful to the spirit of Freud's essential project. 
The notion of a failure in the function of language is also clearly an essential 
feature of Freudian explanation in 1'The Psychopathology of Every-day Life 11 • 
(Freud, 1901). Here, common errors or parapraxes of all sorts are rendered 
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explicable, rather than accidental, in terms of the motives of wish-fulfillment 
and defence. Freud's analyses in this work are all paradigmatic instantiations 
of Dante's analysis of the operation of language in the compromise-
formation, in which the phonetic and perceptual similarities between words 
take precedence over, and undermine, their differential significatory 
contents. Freud writes: 
Not only the motives, but also the mechanisms governing the 
forgetting of names, deserve our interest. In a large number of 
cases a name is forgotten not because the name itself arouses 
such motives, but because - owing to similarity in sound and in 
assonance - it touches upon another name against which these 
motives do operate. (1901, p.32). 
It is not the significatory content of words, but rather their material qualities 
which are foregrounded, and which therefore provide the links between the 
missing name and the repressed topic. Freud uses his "Signorelli" slip in 
order to demonstrate this subsumption of significatory content to perceptual 
identity in the associative links leading to the parapraxis. 
Instead of remembering the name "Signorelli", the names of two other 
painters, 11 8otticelli 11 and 11 8oltraffio 11 occurred to him, although Freud 
immediately recognized these to be incorrect: 
The name Signorelli has undergone a division into two pieces. 
One of the pairs of syllables (elli) recurs without alteration in one 
of the substitute names: while the other, by means of the transla-
tion Signor into Herr, has acquired a numerous and miscellaneous 
set of relations to the names contained in the repressed topic, but 
for this reason is not available for [conscious] reproduction. The 
substitute for it [for Signor] has been arrived at in a way that 
suggests that a displacement along the connected names of 
11Herzegovina and Bosnia" had taken place, without consideration 
for the sense or for the acoustic demarcation of the syllables. Thus 
the names have been treated in this process like the pictograms 
in a sentence which has had to be converted into a picture-puzzle 
(or rebus). Of the whole course of events that have in ways like 
these produced the substitute names instead of the name 
Signorelli no information has been given to consciousness. At first 
sight it seems impossible to discover any relation between the 
topic in which the name Signorelli occurred and the repressed 
topic which preceded it in time, apart from this recurrence of the 
same syllables (or rather sequence of letters). (1901, pp.4-5). 
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On the basis of these and countless other examples, it can be argued, 
contrary to Ricoeur, that although there is a regularity underlying the role of 
language in the formation of the compromise, this regularity is not a second-
order operation within language itself (as in the process of symbolization or 
double-meaning), or a semiotics of the image. Rather, this regularity lies in 
the possible slippage which results when the negation across the relation 
percept- to-word necessary in the production of signification is undermined 
or elided. Dante, unlike Ricoeur, can thus account for both the role of 
linguistic and of perceptual representations in the formation of symptomatic 
psychical productions at once, in terms of his conception of the compromise-
formation as an exchange across the perceptual and significatory aspects 
of natural language - an exchange in which the perceptual is made to do the 
work of the conceptual and vice versa. 
It is perhaps necessary to point out, however, that although Dante's analysis 
of the role of language in the formation of the compromise is clearly and 
consistently substantiated in Freud's texts, it remains the fact that it is not 
always and everywhere the case that the compromise takes its route via a 
slippage in the operation of language. 
Thus, it is also true that the substitution of one image for another can occur 
along the route of pure showing, i.e., in terms of a picturing relation which 
relates directly from thing to thing, rather than because of any relation 
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between the two referents on the level of the material similarity of the words 
which designate them. 
In fact, however, the logic of Dante's analysis can be extended to include 
compromise-formations which do not operate across a slippage between 
. word as concept and word as material thing. It can be extended to include 
compromises which do not implicate any features of language at all. 
What is crucial in Dante's argument is that wherever an accidentai or arbitrary 
connection returns within an already articulated or semiotic system, this 
slippage is necessarily predicated upon the exclusion of the significatory or 
representational values of that item, in favour of its st~tus as object or thing. 
Any significatory or semiotic operation, whether it be linguistic or not, is put 
in check in a compromise-formation by foregrounding a signifier as material 
object rather than as an element within a system which stands in for 
something else. 
This .is born out in Freud's analysis of the fetish in which the efficacy of the 
substitute object is originally that, like a sign, it stands in for the (mother's) 
phallus. The fetishist, for whom underwear, a sort of material, or a shoe, 
for example, stands in for the missing phallus can, however, only be 
distinguished from the non-fetishist, for whom underwear, lace, velvet or 
high-heeled shoes stand, rather, as a sign for the female gender (and not for 
the missing phallus), on the grounds that in the case of the fetishist, the 
substitute or fetishistic object must return to the status of thing, rather than 
retaining the status of a sign, if the disguise of its true role is to be effected . 
. , 
(1927, pp.149-152; 1905, pp.153-155). 
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Thus, where a lover's perfume, or the colour of her eyes, or the type of 
dresses she wears, can stand in for a non-fetishist's desire, a fetishist can 
only be satisfied with a (more or less) specific and non-substitutable object, 
for example, blue velvet. It is only the specificity of the object involved as a 
thing which for the purposes of disguise has lost the status of a sign, that 
can thus serve as the grounds for distinguishing the symptomatic from the 
non-symptomatic in this type of sexual aberration. 
And if there remain examples in the Freudian corpus which cannot b~ 
subsumed to Dante's analysis of the compromise-formation across a 
slippage between the word or image as "meaning" and as material 11thing 11 , 
then it is nevertheless also the case that these instances do not follow 
Ricoeur's model of a double-meaning linguistic or iconic signification either. 
This is because these instances do not implicate the exclusion or disguise 
of the significatory values of the material in question, but operate exclusively 
on the level of the "thing-presentations" appropriate to the unconscious alone 
. and cannot, in consequence, be integrated into the debate around semiotics 
in any way. Examples of such instances include not only the psychoanalytic 
symbol, the content of which is usually invariant, but also, for example, the 
dream-presentation of the Wolf-Man's nursery-maid Grusha as a butterfly 
with yellow stripes. This is clearly not because the wolf-man "signifies" 
Grusha to himself in terms of yellow stripes, but because they occur, as 
shape and colour, on the pear which shares her name. (Freud, 1918(1914], 
p.91). 
In any event, it is not the extent, but rather the manner in which Freudian 
explanation/interpretation involves language with which we are here 
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concerned. In short, this dissertation is by no means concerned to argue 
that all Freudian symptoms implicate language, but rather to explore the way 
in which language does or does not operate in many symptomatic formations 
such that the epistemological consequences of the role of language in 
psychoanalysis may be explored. 
And if it has been seen that Danto provides a more adequate (both more 
consistent and less misleading) account of the role of language in the 
formation of the compromise-formation then it remains to explore the epis-
temological consequences of his, as opposed to Ricoeur's, formulation. 
1.3 Explanation and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis: Danto vs. Ricoeur 
Ricoeur's formulation of the psychoanalytic compromise-formation as a 
semiotic operation is predicated upon a linguistic model in which the relation 
between· the signifier and its signified is necessarily arbitrary. He writes: 
"Freud, it also seems, knew nothing of the idea of language conceived of as 
a group of signifiers defined by their differences within the interior of a 
system." (1978, p.305). · 
Moreover, the capacity of the sign to acquire a dual significatory function 
(i.e., to instantiate the symbolic operation Ricoeur insists on) is likewise 
regulated by cultural convention alone. Thus Ricoeur maintains that 
psychoanalytic symbols are amenable to hermeneutic interpretation 
because hermeneutics. is, "the theory of the rules that preside over an 
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exegesis - that is, over the interpretation of a particular text, or of a group of 
signs that may be viewed as a text11 • (1974, pp.7-8, italics inserted). 
Now clearly, .it is not by virtue of a "rule" which requires hermeneutic 
explication that tigers come to be associated with ferocity, but it is by virtue 
of a convention or rule alone that blue symbolizes sadness, or that roses, 
despite their thorns and rather than tigers or lilies or violets, come to connote 
feminine beauty in our culture in a regular way. Thus if some of the 
connotative or secondary meanings of words may be seen to be originally 
grounded in perceptual associations, then this cannot detract from the fact 
that a symbolic system which is rule-governed is finally determined in terms 
of an essentially arbitrary cultural (linguistic or iconographic) convention 
alone. 
Since there is no necessary or i~herent relation between the dual meanings 
instantiated in those signs which are also symbols, Ricoeur's argument for 
the compromise-formation on the model of the symbol unquestionably 
results in the following implication: Ricoeur cannot argue for certainty across 
psychoanalytic interpretation unless the latent or hidden meanings of the 
compromise are taken to be fixed or culturally encoded. 
By contrast, Danto provides the grounds on which to argue for certainty 
across psychoanalytic interpretation· without the consequence of regularity 
across like instances. 
On the basis of his consideration of the proper implications of Freud's 
discussion on the rebus, Dante maintains that the translation of manifest into 
latent content in the compromise short-circuits the significatory content of a 
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sign-system (including the dual significatory content of those signs 
functioning as symbols) by operating the signifier as material object of 
perception rather than as the arbitrary medium for the transmission of 
specific (if sometimes multiple) signifieds. 
On this model it is not Freud as Ricoeur contends, but rather Freud's patients 
who, "knew nothing of the idea of language conceived of as a group of 
signifiers defined by their differences within the rnterior of the system 11 • 
(Ricoeur, 1978, p.305). Rather than being arbitrary, the form which the 
compromise takes is wholly determined by the perceptual operations of 
identity and difference in general, and (most commonly) limited by the 
material features of a language, in particular. 
Danto therefore maintains that although the aberrant forms of the dream and 
the symptom may have the features of language as their precondition, they 
do not operate as a language but rather, in conflict with its representational 
and communicative functions. The compromise-formation is thus never, 
finally, of a properly linguistic order. 
By defining the operation of disguise in the compromise in this parasitic but 
nevertheless, negative relation to language, Danto thus avoids the implica-
tions of viewing the compromise-formation on a linguistic model, i.e., a model 
which necessarily implies the consequence of (albeit more or less) regular 
interpretation across like instances. 
If Dante's considerations on the role of language (and the image) in 
Psychoanalysis can thus be seen to diverge in many substantial respects 
from Ricoeur's then what is at stake in these discriminations, (above and 
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beyond their fidelity to the original Freudian formulations), is twofold: Firstly, 
Dante's analysis of the role of language in Psychoanalysis on the model of 
the rebus, rather than on the model of a significatory system, allows for the 
recognition that an interpretation can acheive certainty to the extent to which 
it is causally particular and individually specific. Secondly, or by implication, 
if the compromise-formation is understood on the model of the rebus then lt 
can only be 11 interpreted 11 in so tar as it is causally 11explained 11 • These two 
points will be elaborated consecutively. 
1.3.1 Interpretation and Certainty 
Within significatory systems, or between such systems, negotiable inter-
pretation is possible because substitution or paraphrase is possible. There 
is no logical way to guarantee a specific interpretation except through the 
regularization of the interpretive field. Because the rebus, however, does not 
occur within or between languages, it cannot logically be paraphrased, and 
must (logically therefore) be interpreted non-arbitrarily. 
It is for this reason that Freud compares the rebus-like operation of the dream 
and the symptom to' a 11picture-puzzle11 : 
After many attempts, we become absolutely certain in the end 
which piece belongs in the empty gap, for only that piece fills out 
the picture and at the same time allows its irregular edges to be 
fitted into the edges of the other pieces in such a manner as to 
leave no free space and to entail no overlapping. (Freud, 1896a, 
p.205). 
A puzzle, unlike a text, is something for which an answer is either not found, 
or correct. Rather than an 11interpretation 11 , it requires a "solution 11 • If the pieces 
of a puzzle are re-arranged in varying combinations over and over again, 
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then this is not because there are many possible 11 interpretations 11 of its final 
organization, but because many possible patterns must be explored before 
a solution is ultimately achieved. 
In the procedure of biblical exegesis, or in the interpretation of a literary text, 
interpretations are more or less subtle, illuminating or credible, but no 
interpretation can totally rule out any other, and the words 11right 11 or "wrong" 
do not apply. In the case of psychoanalytic interpretation, by contrast, the 
, 
procedure for finding and testing an interpretation may well be tortuous and 
hazardous, and many useful interpretations which seem to hold may 
consequently have to be discarded or altered, but it nevertheless remains 
true that a definitive interpretation may, potentially at least, be achieved. 
This is because if the form of the compromise-formation, like the form of a 
rebus, is determined by the specific, highly individual propositio,nal content 
which it elides, and what is uncovered in an analysis accounts not only for 
the fact of the compromise but for its very form, then the necessary relation 
between that elided content and that resultant symptom, dream or joke is 
guaranteed. 
It is in this sense that we must appreciate Freud's contention that the 
arbitrariness of the patient's associations is foreclosed by the fact that the 
key to verbal disguise are, "generally known and laid down by established 
linguistic usage". (1900, pp.341- 2). 
It is only the fact that 11 Dick11 is the name of the Rat-man's rival and that in 
German, 11 Dick 11 means "weight", combined with the fact that the only explana-
tion available to the Rat-man in explaining his compulsive running is that he 
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must want to lose dick/weight, which together combine to produce certainty 
of interpretation. At the same time however, this certainty is achieved without 
entailing the implication that all joggers have a rival called 11 Dick11 , or that other 
people have not jogged for other reasons, whether these be symptomatic 
or not. 
What is fundamental to this analysis of the compromise-formation on the model of 
the rebus is thus that the interpretation of any given compromise is only necessary 
to the extent to which it is causally particular and individually specific. It is 
for this reason that, once produced, the interpretation of a rebus strikes one 
like a ·joke already heard. Nobody discusses the interpretation of a joke 
because in order to work a joke must, finally, have only one possible 
meaning. 
In hermeneutic or semiotic interpretation by contrast, certainty of interpreta-
tion can only be achieved on the basis of the regularity of a standardly 
encoded connotative meaning. If this model is applied to Psychoanalysis, 
then certainty of interpretation can only be achieved by precipitating 
psychoanalytic interpretation into the field of generality about particular 
compromise-formations such that any one particular symptom, for example, 
hysterical coughing, would have to be interpreted in a fixed and consistent 
way across all instances. In short, a semiotic model of Psychoanalysis could 
only argue for certainty of interpretation by insisting that symptom-formation 
is consistent across all people subject to the same sign-systems. 
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1.3.2 Interpretation and Explanation 
If, on the model of the rebus, the compromise-formation does not have a 
discreet systematic connotative language of its own, with its own rules of 
signification, then Ricoeur's argument for 11 interpretation rather than 
explanation 11 (1978, p.300) is undermined. This is because if the manifest and 
latent content of the dream are not two substitutable or paraphrasable 
systems, then no element of the dream-work can be interpreted, unless at 
the same moment, it is causally explained. In other words, the relation 
between manifest and latent content can only be interpreted once its 
contingent and individual motivation is established, whereas the relation 
between 11dog 11 and 11hund 11 requires no such motivation, but merely an 
English,.German Dictionary. Likewise, the relation 11rose 11 to 11beauty11 merely 
requires a dictionary of symbols or connotations. 
Thus Culler contrasts Freud's psycho~nalytic analyses, which are causal 
explanations despite the fact that they have no predictive force, with 
linguistics. Unlike Psychoanalysis, linguistics: 
... does not pretend to causal analysis: it does not try to explain 
why an individual uttered a particular sequence at a given moment 
but shows why the sequence has the form and meaning it does 
by relating it to the system of the language .... What is especially 
significant here is the move away from historical explanation. To 
explain social [linguistic} phenomenon is not to discover tem-
poral antecedents and to link them in a causal chain but to specify 
the place and function of the phenomenon in a system. (1976, 
p.73, italics inserted). 
Ricoeur is thus right that a relation between languages, or across connotative 
meanings, does not explain; it cannot tell us why a particular individual's 
symptom takes a particular form. However, if the relation between manifest 
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and latent content in the compromise-formation is not a relation between or 
within significatory systems, then this relation must be explained, because it 
is a radically specific and highly motivated one. 
1.4 Elucidation: The Wolf-Man and the Interpretation of Dreams 
Freud's eluCidation of his method of interpretation in the 11Wolf-Man 11 case 
(1914) can be used as an extended illustration of both of these inter-related 
points. Here Freud himself clearly facilitates the recognition firstly, that it is 
only if the form of the compromise is determined by the content of the wish 
that valid interpretation is ensured, and secondly, that this relation between 
(manifest) form and (latent) content must therefore be causally explained, if 
it is to be meaningfully interpreted, in so far as it is a relation which is both 
specific and motivated. 
Early on in his analysis the Wolf-Man recounted to Freud a 11memory11 of early 
childhood. He was chasing 11a beautiful big butterfly with yellow wings which 
ended in pointed projections11 , when he was suddenly seized with terror. This 
memory remained unaccounted for until much later in the course of analysis, 
when the Wolf-Man told Freud that in his language a butterfly was called 
11babushka11 (Russian: 11granny11), and added that butterflies reminded him of 
women and girls, and beetles and caterpillars of boys. (Freud, 1918(1914], 
p.89). Freud writes that at the time, he had suggested that the yellow stripes 
on the butterfly had perhaps reminded the Wolf-man of similar stripes on a 
piece of clothing worn by some woman, and he adds: 
I only mention this as an illustration to show how· inadequate the 
physician's constructive efforts are for clearing up questions that 
arise ... .I may mention the facile suspicion that the points or 
stick-like projections of the butterflies wings might have had the 
meaning of genital symbols. (1918 [1914], pp.89-90, italics 
inserted). 
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Instead, the gradual unfolding of the Wolf-Man's infantile thought processes 
in the process of free-association revealed the sort of word-play described 
in Dante's analysis. Behind the screen-memory of the butterfly lay the 
memory of the Wolf-Man's nursery-maid, whose name was "Grusha", and 
the yellow stripes were not on her dress as Freuo had suggested, but on the 
pear whose name was the same as hers. 
• 
The profound fear caused by the reactivation of the memory of Grusha by 
this butterfly remained, however, unclarified. Freud suggests many possible 
and even likely explanations of it on the basis of material accumulated during 
the course of the analysis, but he nevertheless only considers these 
confirmed by the following dream. 
The Wolf-Man related his dream of "a man tearing off the wings of an Espe", 
and explained, in the face of Freud's incomprehension, that "an 'espe' is an 
insect with yellow stripes on its body, that stings". (Freud, 1918(1914], p.94). 
By confusing a "Wespe" (a wasp) with an "Espe", the Wolf-Man had clearly 
both mutilated the wespe, and produced his own initials: S.P. By giving this 
mutilated wasp yellow stripes however, he also contrived to inflict 
considerable bodily harm on Grusha, the nursery-maid. And if both Grusha 
and the Wolf-Man have thus incurred the damage of having their wings torn 
off, then it is clear why Freud can conclude that this dream provides another 
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indication of the Wolf-Man's fear of mutilation, and a new indication of his 
desire for revenge or reparation in this regard. 
Finally, the original memory of the butterfly, in conjunction with this dream of 
· the wasp, together provide the necessary evidence that both the Wolf-Man's 
fear, and his desire for revenge are in fact attributable to another childhood 
event in which the Wolf-Man's nursery-maid, Grusha, was present, 11teasing 
or scolding him 11 • (ibid, p.91 ). 
Clearly, it was primarily the material similarity between the words 11 8abushka11 
-
11Grusha11 - 11Grusha11 , (butterfly - pear - nursemaid), and 11Wespe 11 - 11Espe11 , 
that allowed Freud to establish the meaning of, and connections between, 
these two memories and the dream which followed their partial yet 
inconclusive analysis, and to thereby ascertain both the fears and desires 
necessary in explaining much of the Wolf-man's later symptomatology. 
However, if the slippage across butterflies, grannies, pears and nursery-
maids; as well as across wasps and patients with the initials 11S.P. 11 , could be 
picked out and illuminated, then this was for two reasons. Freud knew, not 
only the operations necessary to the achievement of disguise and their 
preconditions in language, but also or equally, the specific details of the 
Wolf-Man's childhood history and infantile fantasies as they were related to 
him over the course of an analysis. 
In chapter two of 11The Interpretation of Dreams 11 (1900), Freud makes these 
essential aspects of his interpretive approach even more explicit when he 
contrasts his method of dream-interpretation to two traditional ones: 
The first of these procedures considers the content of the dream 
as a whole and seeks to replace it by another content which is 
intelligible and in certain respects analogous to the original one. 
This is 11symbolic 11 dream interpreting ... The second of the two 
popular methods of interpreting dreams ... might be described as 
the "decoding" method, since it treats dreams as a kind of 
cryptography in which each sign can be translated into another 
sign having a known meaning, in accordance with a fixed key. 
Suppose, for instance, that I have dreamt of a letter and also a 
funeral. If I consult a "dream-book", I find that a "letter11 must be 
translated by "trouble11 and "funeral" by "betrothal" ... It cannot be 
doubted for a moment that neither of the popular procedures for 
interpreting dreams can be employed for a scientific treatment of 
the subject. The symbolic method is restricted in its application 
and incapable of being laid down on general ·lines. In the case of 
the decoding method everything depends on the trustworthiness 
of the "key" - the dreambook, and of this we have no guarantee. 
(1900, p.97). 
47 
In his comprehensive and scholarly study on "Language and the Origins of 
Psychoanalysis" (1980), John Forrester delineates many subtle discrimina-
tions which illuminate, among other things, the importance of Freud's 
differentiation between these interpretive methods and his own. 
If Freud associates his method more closely with the 11decoding 11 than the 
11symbolic11 interpretive methods then this is only, as Forrester points out, in 
so far as both conceive of the dream as a series of ununified elements to be 
interpreted. However, in contrast to both the "symbolic11 and the 11decoding 11 
methods, the psychoanalytic method of elucidating the dream consists in 
placing each element of it into the context of the patient's verbal 
free-associations. (Forrester, 1980, pp.71-73). If Freud later revises "The 
Interpretation of Dreams" to allow for the fact that a certain limited group of 
specifiable objects and actions may be subject to stock interpretation. or 
standard translation in the event of a failure of the free-associative method, 
then there is also no doubt that t11is aspect of psychoanalytic interpretation 
is marginal, and cannot be generalized to the detriment of the role of the 
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radically particular causal aetiologies consistently demonstrated and 
emphasized across the Freudian corpus. 
Freud himself writes that we must always be prepared to find that a single 
piece of content may, "conceal a different meaning when it occurs in various 
people or in various contexts". (1900, p.105). 
Forrester thus maintains that Ricoeur confuses Freud's notion of the 
non-arbitrariness of the role of language in the operations of disguise with a 
(Jungian-type) notion of "collective" symbolism, "when he [Ricoeur] charac-
terizes the shift from the Studies to the Traumdeutung as one in which the 
mechanisms of displacement and condensation have absolute priority in the 
Studies, to the set of 'cultural stereotypes' of The Interpretation of Dreams." 
(Ricoeur, 1970, p.97, cited in Forrester, 1980, p.73). 
And if Ricoeur's latest meditations on the dream in "Language and the Image 
in Psychoanalysis11 (1978) are considered, then it becomes apparent that this 
confusion, if less blatant, remains intact. For Ricoeur maintains that the way 
that dreams are 11typical 11 is: "Not just, as we say, because they are common 
to several dreamers, but because their content is the structural invariant that 
allows a dream and a myth to stand for each other." (1978, p.320). 
What is at stake here, far from being trifling, is fundamental to the most radical 
aspects of classical Psychoanalysis. This is, as Forrester correctly maintains: 
Freud's conviction of the individuality of structure of each 
dream, of each neurosis. Such structures were built up out of 
the same mechanisms, but one did not expect these 
mechanisms to produce the same manifest content or symptom 
corresponding to a given concealed thought, since the 
individual's unique experiences were the raw material out of which 
the structures were built. In his papers on the neuroses in the 
1980's, Freud made much of the revolution he was effecting in the 
nosology of the neuroses: his new classification was based on 
mechanism, not on symptomatology. (Freud, 1895, pp.90-1). 
Similarly; his theory of dreams rested on the delineation of the 
mechanisms of the dream-work, not on the superficial themes or 
common features shared by various dreams. To retreat back to 
classification by symptom and sign would in effect amount to 
losing everything that psychology had gained for pathology. 
(Forrester, 1980, p. 76). 
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In fact, the quotation which Ricoeur uses from Freud in order to justify his 
argument for interpretation rather than explanation itself undermines this 
distinCtion, and brings the necessity of explanation for interpretation to the 
fore: 
The aim which I have set before myself is to show that dreams 
are capable of being interpreted ... 11interpreting 11 a dream implies 
assigning a "meaning" to it - that is, replacing it by something 
·which fits into the chain of our mental events as a link having a 
validity and importance equal to the rest. (Freud, 1900, p.96, cited 
in Ricoeur, 1978, p.300, italics inserted). 
Now clearly, if "interpreting" a dream or assigning a meaning to it means, as 
Freud argues, "replacing it by something which fits into the chain of our 
mental events as a link having a validity and importance equal to the rest" 
(ibid), then the distinction between interpretation and explanation, or 
translation and causal explication, cannot be justified. 
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Conclusion 
Ricoeur's contention that, 11psychoanalysis is interpretation from beginning -
to end" (1977, p.66), is predicated on a linguistic model in many respects 
inappropriate to the material it is Intended to subsume, and which results in 
unfortunate repercussions for the possibility of achieving epistemic certainty 
in the clinic. 
This is because regardless of whether Ricoeur is arguing merely for 
negotiable interpretation, or for a generalization of the interpretive field in 
terms of a regular connotative field, his argument logically undercuts the 
necessity for the particular causal explanations instantiated in the case 
histories. To read the whole of Psychoanalysis on a linguistic model is either 
to deny the role of causai explanation in Psychoanalysis entirely, or to take 
the role of sign-systems in the unconscious as a major expanded explanatory 
network. Either way, Ricoeur excludes not only the content of the case-
histories but in fact, the rest of the metapsychology. 
This circumscription is inevitable in view of Ricoeur's narrow characterization 
of the compromise-formation as a significatory event. This characterization 
(wittingly or unwittingly) elides what is both most consistent and significant 
about the psychoanalytic definition of its object - its status as the product of 
a defensive conflict between agencies, and its status as a regressive 
substitute affording the subject replacement satisfaction. (Freud, 1896, 
p.170; 1917, pp.358-359). 
If this is a consequence not strictly reiated to the epistemological concerns 
of this project, then it is nevertheless too significant not to receive at least 
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cursory mention. For, by defining psychoanalysis as an interpretive 
knowledge, Ricoeur is lead to account not only for the operations of 
disguise, but for the symptom in its entirety, on a linguistic model, i.e., "in 
terms of communication disturbances". (1981, p.24). In short, Ricoeur's 
. epistemological position leads him to maintain that not only the possibility for 
disguise, but in fact the very possibility for the symptom, can be explained 
on a linguistic or communicative model. 
In so doing, Ricoeur cannot do otherwise but undermine the entire 
psychoanalytic metapsychology (the topographies, economics and 
dynamics), in favour of a semantic and meaning problematic, and conclude 
that: 
Hence, psychoanalytic theory is inadequate to the discovery 
made in psychoanalytic practice when it proposes a purely 
energetic definition of desire in terms of tension and discharge ... 
And the theoretical model ignores language as well as the other 
person, since to speak is to address oneself to another person. 
(1978, p.296). 
If psychoanalytic theory O.e., the metapsychology), "ignores language as well 
as the other person" 0bid)., then Ricoeur has not done a proper job of reading 
it. But it is perhaps only in this way that he ever came to hold the opinion that 
"Psychoanalysis is interpretation from beginning to end. 11 (1974, p.66). 
By contrast, Dante gives us a formal explanatory account of the role of 
language in the structure or form of the symptom, in terms of the possible 
relations between words as significatory items and as material things, without 
resituating Psychoanalysis in consequence, as a purely interpretive 
knowledge. Likewise, Dante's account of the operations of language in the 
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formation of the symptom is one in which language provides the conditions 
of possibility for disguise, or for the form of the symptom alone. It is not an 
account in terms of which language or any other significatory and 
communicative system (its uses and abuses) is considered sufficient to 
account for the symptomatic per se. The role of language and interpretation 
in Psychoanalysis is thus not only other than Ricoeur would claim, it is also 
a great deal more circumscribed. It can account for the form but not for the 
origin of many psychical productions. 
It remains then to elaborate the structure of psychoanalytic explanation in 
other directions. In the next chapter, Donald Davidson's account of the 
conditions of possibility for the symptom in terms of the Freudian topography 
will therefore be explored. In particular, the way in which the topographies 
also problematizes the scientific and human-scientific bifurcation between 
interpretation and explanation will be demonstrated. 
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CBAPTERTWO 
REASONS AND CAUSES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The logical divergence between the human and natural sciences is, as is 
commonly recognized, predicated upon the understanding that since physical 
events are caused, whereas human actions are intended or motivated, 
events can be explained, whereas human action can only be interpreted. 
Arguments around the epistemological status of psychoanalysis as either 
explanation or interpretation therefore hinge, not only on the nature of the 
symptom as a linguistic phenomenon, but on the problem of the intentional 
status (or structure) of psychoanalytic symptoms. 
The view that symptoms are actions rather than physical events on the level 
- -
of the body alone inaugurates the psychoanalytic project. However, if Freud 
never concluded on this basis that symptoms must be interpreted by reasons 
rather than explained by causes, and that in consequence Psychoanalysis 
necessarily belongs to a discrete human scientific mode of explanation 
fundamentally divorced from all other natural sciences, then it is nevertheless 
this secondary implication which is currently more popular amongst 
defenders of Psychoanalysis. 
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Thus G. S. Klein, P. Aicoeur, H. Guntrip and S. Toulmin have privileged 
Freud's clinical theory over that of the metapsychology, which is seen to 
abandon the personalized clinical level and assume the impersonal and 
deterministic natural science language of energies, forces, systems and 
mechanisms. 
H. Guntrip, for example, criticizes the metapsychology for instantiating 
11
a 
study of the mechanisms of behaviour and not of the meaningful personal 
experience that is the essence of the purposive self11 • (1973, p.49, italics 
inserted). G. S. Klein commends psychoanalytic clinical theory for its 
attempt 'to state reasons rather than causes11 • (1976, p.56, cited in Grunbaum, 
1985, pp.83-91). P. Ricoeur writes that, 11an explanation through motives is 
irreducible to an explanation through causes... a motive and a cause are 
completely different11 • (1970, pp.359-360). And S. Toulmin contends that 
since "troubles arise from thinking of Psycho-analysis too much on the 
analogy of the natural sciences . . .. [Psychoanalysis] should re-emphasize 
the importance of 'reasons for action' as opposed to 'causes for action"'. 
(Toulmin, 1954, pp.134-139). (see also Guntrip, 1961, p.155; Schaffer, 1977, 
pp.12-13, 1976, pp.204-205; Gauld and Shatter, 1977, pp.9-10). 
This characterization of the psychoanalytic symptom as an intentional 
phenomenon which privileges the 11clinical 11 language of experience over the 
· metapsychology, and situates psychoanalytic epistemology within the field 
of interpretation appropriate to human action, rather than the field of explana-
tion appropriate to events, is clearly motivated, at least in part, by the desire 
to defend Psychoanaly~is from the consequences of what has often seemed 
to be its unfavorable comparison to the natural sciences. It is for.this reason 
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that Micheal Sherwood has designated this humanist-interpretive position, 
"the thesis of the separate domain". (1969, p.179). 
However the problematical status of the symptom as an irrational action, i.e., 
as an action (rather than a bodily event) but one which cannot be understood 
in terms of the agent's intentions, undermines the clear-cut traditional 
bifurcation between actions and events, and the attendant distinction 
between interpretation and explanation. 
It is therefore necessary to explore the possibility that the dichotomy between 
reasons and causes, and the attendant dichotomy between interpretation 
and explanation, is inappropriate to the psychoanalytic field - mistaken in 
principle. 
This possibility will be taken up in terms of a comparative analysis of three 
of the major critics of the human-scientific position in so far as it relates to 
the role of intentionality in human action, (hereafter referred to as the 
humanist-interpretive position). 
Adolf Grunbaum, Micheal Sherwood and Donald Davidson all criticize the 
characterization of human action as intentional rather than causal, and 
attempt to locate psychoanalytic epistemology within the framework of this 
debate centering around the nature of human action. All three can be seen 
to instantiate Kant's view that: 
It is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy to show 
that its illusion respecting the contradiction [between intentionality 
and causality] rests on this, that we think of man in a different 
sense and relation when we call him free, and when we regard 
him as subject to the laws of nature ... It must therefore show that 
not only can both of these very well co-exist, but that both must 
be thought as necessarily united in the same subject." (Kant, 
1909, cited in Davidson, 1986, p.225). 
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Of these three authors, however, Davidson's analysis is the most important 
in that it alone is successful in establishing the relation between reasons and 
causes in the psychoanalytic symptom in particular. Although Davidson's 
work on the analytical philosophy of action is well-known, ("Actions and 
Events1', 1980), Davidson's contribution to Psychoanalysis and its relation to 
this epistemological debate is limited to a single seminal paper, "Paradoxes 
of Irrationality". (1982). 
Davidson's account in 11Paradoxes of lrrationality 11 will be elaborated firstly, in 
order to explain how it is that the symptom can be subjected to causal 
explanation on the psychoanalytic account, without detracting from its status 
as action, (rather than event), and secondly, in order to elaborate why it is 
that the symptomatic in classical Freudian Psychoanalysis consequently 
appears to pivot across the fields of science and human science. Davidson 
allows us to implement a causal analysis across fields previously confined 
to either interpretive activities or causal explanation in the natural science 
model. The novelty of Davidson's position is therefore to establish a third 
term between natural and human science. 
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2.1 The Problem of Reasons and Causes in Psychoanalysis 
Both Grunbaum and Sherwood provide convincing critical analyses of the 
conceptual confusions which underlie the view that since actions are 
11motivated 11 rather than 11caused 11 , psychoanalytic epistemology must be 
construed as interpretive rather than explanatory. Both conclude that this 
humanist-interpretive position is misguided to the extent that reasons, 
despite their intentional status, are nevertheless causal. 
Thus Grunbaum writes that: 11Causal relevance is a matter of whether .X - be 
it physical, mental, or psycho-pQysical - MAKES A DIFFERENCE to the 
occurrence of Y, or AFFECTS the incidence of Y. 11 (Grunbaum, 1984, p.72). 
l 
Likewise, Sherwood maintains that: "Reasons ... are those causally relevant. 
factors which become causally relevant by virtue of the fact that they are 
taken account of consciously and acted upon by the individual in question." 
(Sherwood, 1969, p.162). 
However, when Grunbaum and Sherwood attempt to undermine the distinc-
tion between reasons and causes in Psychoanalysis more specifically, their 
analyses diverge in a way which makes it apparent that the fundamental issue 
at stake in the debate around the role of reasons and causes in 
psychoanalytic epistemology cannot be resolved so easily, i.e., by equating 
the two. 
This divergence between Grunbaum and Sherwood's analyses with regard 
to the inappropriacy of the humanist-interpretive position to Psychoanalysis 
devolves on their differential interpretation of the role of unconscious reasons. 
in psychoanalytic explanation. It will consequently emerge that the Freudian 
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field of unconscious reasons tor action retains its problematical status, as 
reason or cause respectively, despite the fact that both Grunbaum and 
Shervvood argue that logically, reasons qualify as causes. 
In 11The Logic of Explanation in Psychoanalysis 11 (1969), Sherwood main-
tains that unconscious reasons for action are not different, as causal factors, 
from conscious ones. Both unconscious and conscious reasons cause the 
behavior in which they result. 
Sherwood substantiates this argument with an example from the case-history 
of the Rat-Man, whose unconscious hostility towards his dead father caused 
him to engage in a nocturnal undressing ritual. In the event that his father's 
ghost might care to visit him, his (unconscious) desire to express his defiance 
would thereby be satisfied. (Freud, 1909, pp.203-204). Sherwood writes: 
Unconscious hostility is not different, as a causal factor, from 
conscious hostility. If hostility is a cause of, for instance, the 
patient's undressing ritual, then it is a cause whether or not the 
patient is aware of it .... It is possible, of course, for the patient to 
become aware of this hostility, in which case, by definition, it 
ceases to be "unconscious11 • This does not, however, mean that 
it necessarily ceases to be a causal factor or that it changes from 
a cause to a reason. On the other hand, this awareness itself might 
. well become a causally relevant factor in certain new behavior ... 
The X's we tend to designate as unconscious reasons are just the 
sort of X's which, in other cases, are reasons of the usual variety. 
Thus, by labelling Lorenz's hostility, which caused so much of his 
behavior, as 11 unconscious reason 11 , we emphasize that this is the 
sort of factor which in other cases could be a conscious reason 
for behaviour. (1969, pp.178-179). 
What Sherwood fails to recognize is that if the equation between reasons 
and causes is to be complete, then it is insufficient for unconscious reasons, 
like conscious ones, to qualify as causal factors. Unconscious causes, like 
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conscious ones, must also qualify as intentional factors. In failing to address 
this side of the equation, Sherwood seems to be taking it for granted. By 
demonstrating that unconscious reasons, like conscious ones, cause 
behavior, he seems to assume that unconscious reasons, like conscious 
ones, must likewise be intentional. In any event, he concludes that they are, 
"reasons of the usual variety". (ibid). The logic of Sherwood's argument thus 
prematurely closes this debate. 
And it is here that Grunbaum and Sherwood differ, because Grunbaum 
argues that unconscious reasons do not qualify for the notion of intentionality 
appropriate to the explanation of conscious reasons. Sherwood's assump-
tion regarding the intentional status of unconscious causes for action, or 
rather, his failure to address this issue at any length, thus exposes an 
important logical distinction between his own and Grunbaum's contrasting 
approaches. 
Grunbaum maintains that a reason, in order to qualify as such, must fulfill the 
following criteria: It must result in or cause an action because the agent 
believes that such an action will satis'fy or fulfill the reason which caused it. 
By defining a reason in this way, Grunbaum can demonstrate that 
unconscious reasons do not qualify as adequate or sufficient reasons for 
action in one essential way: there is no means-ends connection between 
unconscious reasons and the actions in which they result. 
Schreber, for example, does not unconsciou;;ly believe that his delusional 
persecutory thoughts will accomplish his homosexual "intentions". (Freud, 
1911 [1910], pp. 200-202 cited in Grunbaum, 1984, p.76). Or, to·remodel 
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Sherwood's example, the Rat-Man does not unconscjously believe that his 
11undressing 11 ritual shall eradicate or satisfy his hostile impulses. (Freud, 
1909, pp.203-204). 
Although both conscious and unconscious reasons qualify as causes for 
action, conscious causes alone qualify as reasons for actions in any coherent 
or meaningful sense. Grunbaum therefore concludes: 
It emerges that, in Psychoanalysis, the notion of intentionality 
appropriate to the explanation of premeditated actions - intended 
because 'Of the agent's belief in their conduciveness to his goals 
- typically applies at best in only a Pickwickian or metaphorical 
sense, if at all. Unconsciously, the agent is cognitively intent upon 
a certain desideratum, but he is hardly intent upon the behavior 
that is causally engendered by this yearning as an action toward 
that desideratum." (Grunbaum, 1984, pp. 79-80). 
And he contends that it is for this reason that: 
Freud does not regard psychopathological symptoms, 
slips (parapraxes), and manifest dream. contents as inten-
tional actions. Yet, quite compatibly, he did hypothesize the 
causes of these to be repressed 11intentions11 , and hence took 
symptoms, etc. to attest to the presence of unconscious strivings. 
(ibid, p. 77). 
Clearly there is something important at stake in Grunbaum's analysis of 
unconsciously motivated action as that sort of action in which reason 
explanations (or interpretations) are misplaced. 
Sherwood's description of the difference between conscious and 
unconscious reasons as a purely descriptive one (i.e., different only in so far 
as they are accessible to awareness or not) overlooks this causal peculiarity 
of unconscious reasons - that they lack a logical or rational means-ends 
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co.nnection to the actions which they cause. Likewise, his analysis ignores 
or glosses the fact that a symptomatic action would neither be of the same 
form nor, in fact, symptomatic, were the agent's reasons consciously 
available to him. 
This essential characteristic of unconscious reasons is recognized by Peter 
Alexander when he maintains that a condition for a belief as an unconscious 
reason for action is that it would not be a reason for that action if it were 
conscious. (Alexander, 19?3, cited in Danto, 1978, p.337). 
If Sherwood recognizes this problem then he can only account for it by 
maintaining that: 110n the other hand [conscious] awareness itself might well 
become a causally relevant factor in certain new behavior. 11 (1969, p.178). 
What Sherwood's premature equation of unconscious and conscious 
reasons fails to allow for is the fact that there is something about actions 
caused by unconscious reasons which brings these actions closer to the 
effect of a cause than to the effect of a reason. 
However, if Sherwood characterizes unconscious reasons for action as, 
11reasons of the usual variety", i.e., on an intentional model, somewhat 
prematurely (1969, p.179), then Grunbaum, by contrast, dismisses the 
possible intentionality of unconscious reasons a little too quickly, as applying 
at best, 11 in only a Pickwickian or metaphorical sense". (1984, pp.79-80). 
The relation of the psychoanalytic object to the intentional field must be not 
only clarified, but fully accounted for, or the psychoanalytic field will remain 
that of pure compulsion or reflex, i.e., irreclaimable for rationality or intentional 
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action, and unassimilable to description in mental terms at all. By failing to 
address the crucial question arising from his analysis - the question of how 
it is that a cause for action which is also a reason, comes to fail the criteria 
of an intentional model - Grunbaum lays Psychoanalysis open to the criticism 
that its object does not exhibit the necessary or distinguishing feature of the 
mental (i.e., intentionality) at all. 
Thus, although Grunbaum and Sherwood both insist that psychoanalytic 
explanation is necessarily both intentional and causal, it is questionable 
whether either adequately resolve the logical problems around the issue of 
reasons and causes at the heart of psychoanalytic explanation. 
Donald Davidson's analysis of classical Psychoanalysis, by contrast, does 
provide an analysis of how an action cause"d by a reason might nevertheless 
fail to qualify as a "reasonable" action, i.e., as an action on a properly 
intentional model. Since the logic of Davidson's argument in 11 Paradoxes of 
lrrationality11 (1982) is essentially formal, and explicitly relates to only the most 
fundamental psychoanalytic postulations, Davidson's argument.will not re-
quire detailed substantiation in terms of the classical psychoanalytic corpus. 
2.2 Davidson - Resolving the Paradox 
In "Paradoxes· of Irrationality" (1982), Donald Davidson approaches the 
problem of reasons and causes in Psychoanalysis from a more productive 
angle. Rather than directly addressing the question of whether Freudian 
explanation instantiates reasons or causes (or both), he looks at the problem 
---- ------------------------------------------
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which irrationality, or symptomatic action, poses for the reasons versus 
causes debate, or more generally, for the epistemological status of thoughts, 
actions or emotions, at least in so far as they are construed in intentional 
terms. 
According to Davidson, explanation in terms of reasons is essential to the 
idea of intentional action since it enables us to see actions (or thoughts and 
emotions) as rational from the point of view of the agent. The notion of 
irrational thought or action seems to be a paradoxical one, because it 
undermines the intentional status of such thoughts and actions, and thus, 
their status as thoughts or actions at all. (1982, p.289). 
To this extent, Davidson appears to agree with Grunbaum. Like Grunbaum, 
he points out that any explanation of intentional/rational action minimally 
requires two elements: a pro-attitude (i.e., a goal or desire) to be achieved 
and a belief (i.e., conviction), that this goal or desire will be fulfilled by way 
of a specific action. The action on the one hand, and the belief-desire pair 
which give the reason on the other, must also be related in two discreet ways 
if they are to yield an explanation. Firstly, there must be a logical relation 
between them. The belief-desire must explain the action in the way in which 
the belief in, for example, exercise as a means towards the desired goal of 
health explains the particular action of jogging. And secondly, "the reasons 
an agent has for acting must, if they are to explain the action, be the reasons 
on which he acted; the reasons must have played a causal role in the 
occurrence of the action". (1982, p.293). 
However, despite the fact that Davidson recognizes, as Grunbaum does, that 
irrational or symptomatic action as explained by Freud cannot fulfill these 
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requirements of normal intentional actions, he nevertheless also points out, 
as Sherwood does, that in most respects, unconscious desires and beliefs 
are not qualitatively distinct from conscious ones, to the extent that they do 
in fact retain their status as reasons for the symptomatic actions which they 
engender. It remains to show how Davidson reconciles these two seemingly 
contradictory positions. 
It must be pointed out in advance, however, that Davidson's elaboration of 
the problem of reasons and causes in Psychoanalysis in terms of the 
equivalent distinction between "actions" and "events", is intended only to 
distinguish between those.effects caused by reasons, and those which are 
not. "Actions" must therefore be understood to include all phenomena, 
whether physical or mental, which are explicable as the effects of intentions 
or, to put it another way, are caused by reasons. 
Davidson claims that it is only Psychoanalytic theory as developed by Freud 
which can in fact provide the conceptual framework within which to resolve 
the question of the logical status of action, especially in relation to the 
problem of irrationality. Consequently, his work is a defence of 
Psychoanalysis, or rather, "of a few very general doctrines central to 
all stages of Freud's mature writings". (ibid, p.290). It is important to 
remember that Davidson's formal account is concerned only with those 
metapsychological notions which are at the conceptual, rather than the 
clinical or empirical level. This distinction is crucial to Davidson's contribution, 
not only to th-e understanding of the concept of irrationality as it poses 
problems for philosophical analysis, but also to the understanding of the 
epistemological status of some of Freud's most fundamental doctrines. 
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Although Davidson's analysis neither makes use of classical Freudian 
terminology nor of Freudian examples, this exclusion must also be under-
stood to be deliberate, since it shows that the logic of psychoanalytic 
explanations is neither determined by the network of concepts specific to 
Psychoanalysis, nor by Freud's particular choice of confirmatory examples. 
Thus Davidson's analysis does not, for example, address the Freudian 
conception of unconscious mental states directly because he maintains that 
objections to the notion of unconscious mental states and events can be 
repudiated by showing that the theory is acceptable without them. As he 
points out, nothing in the description of irrationality requires that any thought 
or motive be unconscious. Irrationality is operative. in cases in which the 
agent knows what he is doing and why, and knows that it is not for the best, 
and why. He writes: 
If to an otherwise unobjectionable theory we add the assumption 
of unconscious elements, the theory can only be made more 
acceptable, that is, capable of explaining more ... The agent denies 
he has the attitudes and feelings we would attribute to him. We 
can reconcile observation and theory by stipulating the existence 
of unconscious events and states that, aside. from awareness, are 
like conscious beliefs, desires and emotions. (ibid, p.305). 
Davidson begins his analysis by identifying the underlying problem of 
explaining irrationality. He points out that much that is called irrational does 
not make for paradox or conceptual difficulty: "It is sensible to try to square 
the circle if you don't know it can't be done. 11 (ibid, p.290). The sort of 
irrationality which makes for conceptual difficulty is not the failure of someone 
else to believe or feel or do what we think reasonable. Rather, it is the failure 
within a single person of coherence or consistency in the pattern of their 
beliefs, attitudes, emotions and actions'. This distinction has important 
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implications for Davidson's definition of the irrational as a relational concept 
which only acquires its status - as the irrational - as a function of its structural 
incoherence, rather than as a function of any specific contents such as a 
belief in witches, or the desire to kill your father because he refused you 
ice-cream. 
Davidson turns instead to those examples of irrational action in which the 
agent acts counter to what he himself believes, or goes against his own best 
judgement, since he claims that even these manifest examples of irrationality 
are insufficiently explained in pre-Freudian analyses. 
He outlines what he designates as the Plato Principle, which stands at one 
extreme in the continuum of possible views, and exemplifies the paradox 
which irrationality presents for the explanation and definition of intentional 
act_ion. According to this doctrine, no one willingly acts counter to what they 
know to be best, and consequently, only ignorance can explain irrational 
actions. This view in effect denies the existence of irrational actions, because 
the irrational is ruled out by the logic of the concepts involved: There is a 
conflict between the standard way of explaining intentional action and the 
idea that such an action can be irrational. 
At the opposite extreme is the Medea Principle. This doctrine implies that 
irrational actions are not intentional, because they are the result of alien 
forces which overwhelm the agent's will. What the agent did had a reason, 
but the reason was not his. Instead, it was a passion or an impulse which 
overcame his better judgement, such that his action was not so much an 
action, as an event, or the effect of a cause. (This is what happened to Medea, 
who begged her own hand not to murder her children). 
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According to Davidson, there are situations in which both of these analyses 
can be seen to be appropriate. They do not, however, account for all those 
instances where the agent acts intentionally while aware that everything 
considered his course of action is not for the best. When the Medea Principle 
is at work, "intention is not presene, and in the case of the Plato Principle, 
"the agent is not aware of an alternative11 • (ibid, p.195). 
Davidson therefore attempts to resolve the problems and paradoxes of 
irrationality by isolating what these might be seen to consist in. 
If irrational reasons for actions do not fulfill the criteria of standard reason 
explanations of action, in which beliefs and desires bear appropriate 
relations, firstly to each othe·r, and secondly to the actions they cause, then 
this must mean that: "In the case of irrationality, the causal relation remains, 
while the logical one is missing or distorted." (ibid, p.298). 
Davidson demonstrates this with the example of wishful thinking, in which 
the understanding or belief that a state of affairs is desirable, becomes a 
reason to believe that it exists. (ibid, p.298). In short, the desirability of X 
causes the belief that X exists, despite the fact that the logical relation 
between the desire and the belief is clearly distorted, perhaps even missing. 
On these grounds, Davidson concludes that in the case of irrationality there 
is, "a mental cause that is not the reason for what it causes". (ibid, p.298, 
italics inserted). 
But he also insists that irrationality can be seen to be a concept which applies 
only to those kinds of E;vents where rationality may potentially operate. 
Irrational phenomena are mental in that they contain reasons which cause 
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effects caused by reasons in the instance of irrationality are not logically 
connected to each other, as they are in instances of rationality. 
If it is true to say that irrational effects are caused by intentions, then it is also 
apparent that we nevertheless remain outside the only standard pattern of 
explanation which applies to the mental - for that pattern of explanation . 
demands not only that a mental cause be a reason, but that it also be a 
reason for what it causes. Or, as Davidson puts it: 11 For an explanation of a 
mental effect we need a mental cause that is also a reason for this effect, 
but, if we have it, the effect cannot be a case of irrationality. Or so it seems. 11 
(ibid, p.300). 
Davidson thus turns to Freud, for he maintains that it is only on the basis of 
classical psychoanalytic theory, or more specifically, on the basis of the 
following three fundamental propositions, that this paradox can properly be 
accounted for: 
1. The mental consists of a number of semi-independent structures which 
all contain thoughts, desires and memories. 
2. Thoughts, desires and memories can combine from all of these struc-
tures, as intentional actions, to cause further events, both in the mind and 
outside it. 
3. When some of the thoughts, desires etc., in one substructure in the mind 
affect other such substructures, this inter-relation must be viewed on the 
model of physical dispositions and forces. 
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Davidson points out that these three Freudian propositions have met with 
criticisms of essentially two sorts. The first is that the idea of semi-
autonomous parts of the mind is unintelligible, since it requires that mental 
events be attributed to something less than a whole person, or agent. The 
second, though related, criticism concerns the underlying explanatory 
methodology behind these propositions. Thus it is claimed that Freudian 
propositions contradict each other, because they include both reason and 
causal accounts of the workings of the mind. Freud extends the reach of 
reason explanations by discovering intentions and desires not recognized 
before, thereby increasing the number and variety of phenomena to be 
viewed as rational, yet he also wants his explanations to yield causal 
accounts equivalent to those of the natural sciences. And since it is main-
tained that causal accounts are only operative in science because 
reason explanations are not, it is held that these irreconcilable tendencies in 
his work account for, but do not justify, Freud's application of metaphors 
drawn from other sciences such as neurology and mechanics to the mental 
sphere. (ibid, p.291 ). 
In order to repudiate these charges against psychoanalytic theory, Davidson 
simply points out it is only these denounced aspects of psychoanalytic theory 
which in fact make it possible to explain irrationality, i.e., "a mental cause that 
is not the reason for what it causes". T~is is because the only way one mental 
event qan cause another mental event without being a reason for it is when 
cause and effect are adequately segregated out, as when they occur in 
different minds. Davidson uses the following example: 
Wishing to have you enter my garden, I grow a beautiful flower 
there. You crave a look at my flower and enter my garden. My 
desire caused your craving and action, but my desire was not the 
reason for your craving, nor a reason on which you acted. 
(perhaps you did not even know about my wish). (ibid, p.300). 
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He suggests that if we are going to explain irrationality at all, then it is clear 
that this idea of segregated cause and effect must be applied to a single mind 
and person. In short, we must assume that the mind is partitioned into 
semi-independent, yet overlapping and interacting structures, in each of 
which there is a network of reasons, beliefs and desires- which conflict with 
and contradict those in the other structures or systems. It is important to 
note, however, that the competing desires and beliefs in these structures do 
not, in themselves, suggest irrationality. Rather, the possibility of a parti-
tioned mind leaves the field open to irrationality, and the explanation thereof, 
because it facilitates an account in terms of which one element can operate 
on another in the modality of non-rational causality. (ibid, p.301). 
On the basis of this elaboration Davidson contends that it is in fact only 
Freud's "mixture of standard reason explanations with causal interactions 
more like those of the natural sciences", and his postulation of semi-
autonomous yet interacting parts of the mind, which provides a coherent way 
_of describing and explaining irrationality. (ibid, p.304). For it is only in this 
way that it is possible to explain how thoughts or impulses can cause effects 
to which they bear no logical relation, (i.e., in a way more appropriate to the 
domain of non-intentional or purely caused effects), while at the same time 
retaining their status as reasons for those effects. 
Davidson's contribution to the understanding of the epistemological status 
of some of Freud's most basic doctrines can perhaps be summarized in two 
interlaced points: 
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The first of these concerns the way the Freudian topography problematizes 
the scientific and human-scientific bifurcation between reasons and causes 
and the attendant distinction between interpretation and explanation. And if 
this argument is followed from the bottom up, then it becomes apparent that 
a failure to recognize the extent to which psychoanalytic epistemology 
necessarily incorporates both interpretation in terms of reasons, and 
explanation in terms of causes, logically re~ults in the disavowal of the 
topography itself. 
The second contribution Davidson makes to an appreciation of 
psychoanalytic epistemology concerns the way in which the compromise-
formation, as that interagency product instantiating both reasons and 
causes, and requiring both interpretation and explanation, may in fact be 
known, i.e., both picked out and understood. These two points will be 
elaborated consecutively in the following two sections of this chapter. 
2.3 EXJ,llanation and Intentionality in Psychoanalysis 
Davidson argues that in symptomatic action, the logical means-ends 
connection between reason and action is distorted or elided, so that only the 
causal relation between them remains. Psychoanalytic explanation 
nevertheless allows us to account for the intentional aspects of these actions, 
by postulating· a number of semi-independent structures within the mind 
which, although interacting causally, nevertheless produce consequences 
which must be explained in terms of the reasons which caused them, i.e., 
on the principle of intentional actions. In this way, Davidson's analysis 
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reconciles Grunbaum's and Sherwood's alternative approaches to the role 
of reasons and causes in Psychoanalysis. 
Grunbaum and Sherwood both concur that rational actions can be explained 
causally because to explain an action is, quite simply, to understand the 
agent's reasons for doing it. 
However, Grunbaum recognizes that the principle object of the Freudian 
field, namely the symptom, is not causally explicable by way of this intentional 
model alone, i.e., by reference to the reasons which caused it. 
Davidson thus shows that the symptom is aberrant, not because it is 
non-intentional, but rather, because the form of the reason and the form of 
the action which is its result are logically unrelated therein such that, in 
symptomatic action, the agent's reasons do not amount to an explanation 
of that action.· 
What Sherwood's intentional construal of the symptom implicates, therefore, 
is the important recognition that Psychoanalysis allows for the extension of 
the range of phenomenon subject to explanation in terms of intention. 
Despite their differences, Grunbaum and Sherwood are correct on the one 
point over which they do agree: The psychoanalytic object can and should 
be described both in terms of reasons and causes, and Freudian 
epistemology must therefore be defended on this point. 
Intentional actions, to count as such, entail both logical (reason) 
explanations, and causal relations. This is so because it is only when a reason 
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explanation functions as a causal one, that a sufficient explanation for any 
action is obtained. In short, a reason is a rational cause. Like Grunbaum and 
Sherwood, Davidson thus refutes the logic of the humanist-interpretive 
position, which denies that a reason for action, which is teleological, can also 
be a cause of action, which is not: 
Noting that nonteleological causal explanations do not display the 
element of justification provided by reasons, some philosophers 
have concluded that the concept of cause that applies elsewhere 
cannot apply in the relation between reasons and causes, and 
that the pattern of justification provides, in the case of reasons, 
the required explanation. But suppose we grant that reasons 
alone justify actions in the course of explaining them; it does not 
follow that the explanation is not also - and necessarily - causal. 
. .. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it 
explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because 
he had the reason. (Davidson, 1986, p.9). 
Certainly if we turn to Psychoanalysis, we see that reason explanations alone, 
or what counts to the agent or patient as motive or intention, are wholly 
insufficient as explanations in·any case of symptomatic action. 
Freud distinguishes between reasons. and rationalizations on the grounds 
that rationalisations, however reasonable, are not in fact causally relevant 
factors for any particular action. Rather, they are, "a set of secondary 
motives11 put forward in order to account for those actions. (Freud, 1909, 
p.192). On these grounds alone it is apparent that a reason only counts as 
such precisely when it is causally relevant. 
The humanist-interpretive position, i.e., the view that human behavior is 
composed of actions and must therefore be interpreted by reference to 
I 
reasons, rather than explained by reference to causes, fails to recognize this 
necessity for causal (as well as logical) relations between a reason and the 
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action in which it results. Psychoanalytic epistemology must therefore be 
defended, not only against the criticisms addressed to it on the basis that it 
represents a misapplication of causal analysis, but also against the defence 
of it on the grounds that it contains no causal explanation at all. 
However, if Davidson vindicates classical Freudian epistemology on 
the grounds that its mixture of reasons and causes, interpretation and 
explanation, is both legitimate and necessary, then his contribution is in fact 
a great deal more substantial. 
What Davidson shows is that if psychoanalytic epistemology has always 
been at the center of the philosophical debate around the role of reasons 
and causes in human action, then this is because the psychoanalytic object 
of knowledge, i.e., the symptom, raises a fundamental question in relation 
to the wishes and intentions which cause it. This is because the symptom is 
that kind of mental event which both empirically and logically, takes on the 
character of a mere cause which lacks a logical or rational relation to its 
effects. 
And by exploring the nature of irrational or symptomatic action Davidson can 
insist that Freud's postulation of discrete structural agencies in the psyche 
does not so much problematize the relation between intentions and their 
effects, as resolve a problem already existing. For it is only the Freudian 
topography which can account for symptomatic action on an intentional 
model, thereby reclaiming irrational or symptomatic actions for the field of 
action from the field of events. This is because the topography provides an 
explanatory account of the possibility of error, i.e., of how an intention may 
come to lose its logical relation to the action it causes. 
/ 
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In short, Freud is not only correct in· assuming that ·human actions; to count 
as such, must entail both reasons and causes, but his postulation of discrete 
structural agencies in the psyche in fact explains how this may fail to be the 
case. 
Davidson does notdefend Freud's use of an energetic and dynamic model 
of the mind simply on the grounds that human actions are motivated by 
reasons and,. therefore, necessarily caused by them. He does .so in view of 
the fact that certain mental events may take on the character of mere causes 
for the actions they produce, which is what happens in the symptom. 
At the same time, however, Davidson undermines theattemptto define·the 
irrational or the symptomatic neurophysiologically alone, (thereby eliminating 
the need for an intentior:ial vocabulary): He poi.nts out tpat if the cause of a 
symptom is described in non-mental or non-intentional terms, we necessarily 
lose touch with what is needed to explain irrationality, which only ·appears 
when rationality is appropriate. This is so because irrationality, as "a failure 
in the house of reason", is to be distinguished from the purely non-rational. 
(Davidson, 1982, p.289, italics inserted). 
Mental or psychological events can be characterized as mental or psychic 
only under a certain description, so that, although these events can be 
redescribed as neurophysiological, and ·ultimately, as physical events, in 
which descriptions in terms of cause andeffect are appropriate and sufficient, 
descriptions in terms of cause and effect alone do not address the sort of 
logical relations which make for reason or its failure. (Davidson, ibid, p.299). 
The formulation of the·problem of the .irrational and the symptomatic on.a 
neurophysiological level· alone thus side-steps the very problem to ·be 
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under false pretences, deceptively achieving its goal without exposing its true 
designs, while the second compromises the first. The ego as mediator in 
particular, "too often yields to the temptation to become sycophantic, 
opportunistic and lying, like a politician who sees the truth but wants to keep 
his place in popular favour". (1923, p.56). 
it is for this reason that the end result of interagency relations cannot be 
viewed on an intentional model alone. By the time a strategic compromise 
between the agencies is reached, none have fully achieved their initial goals, 
and the outcome is in accordance with none of their original objectives. 
To use the example of the Rat-Man's compulsive running once again, it is 
notable how neatly the conflictual impulses of the Rat-Man's unconscious 
(Id) aggression towards his rival, and his consequent unconscious (super-
ego). impulse towards self-punishment, together combine to produce a 
consequence which partially satisfies both and in consequence, fully satisfies 
neither. (Freud, 1909, p.188-189). 
It is this problem, or more broadly, the very notion of a divided and conflictual 
psyche instantiated in the topography, rather than the problem of intentional 
as opposed to non-intentional phenomena, which is at stake in the debate 
around reasons and causes in Psychoanalysis. 
If Freud initiated Psychoanalysis and formulated his topographical account 
of the functioning of the psychic apparatus then he did so because it is only 
in this way that the symptomatic can in fact be accounted for along intentional 
or psychological lines, rather than on the purely causal (psychiatric) model 
of psycho-physical compulsion. 
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It is therefore ironic that the failure on the part of many of Freud's supporters 
to recognize the logical distinction between a symptom and an intentional 
action proper results, finally, in the repudiation of the very notion of a divided 
psyche. At the same time, however, it makes sense that if the symptom is 
viewed on an intentional model alone, then the necessity for explaining the 
symptom and the fact of irrationality in terms of interagency conflict (or in 
any way at all) is dispensed with, along with the symptomatic register itself. 
Overlooking the extent to which the symptom bridges both the intentional 
and causal registers has resulted in an attempt to distinguish between the 
11 impersonal 11 causal language of the metapsychology, and the more 
11personalized11 intentional language of clinical practice, in order to privilege 
the latter. This necessarily undermines Freud's structural theory of the mind 
in which component parts of the psychic apparatus are seen to interact 
causally, i.e., the very notion of a split psyche fundamental to the 
psychoanalytic explanation of the symptomatic. 
Thus Guntrip, for example, has explicitly revised Psychoanalysis into 11a 
personal theory of the active, purposive whole selfl'. (Guntrip, 1961, p.188). 
As Stephen Frosh points out, Guntrip's 11reiteration of the term 'personal', his 
use of the notion of the 'self', and his concentration on the 'experience of the 
individual' 11 , firmly aligns him with humanistic psychologies which emphasize 
and extend the notion of the ego as a potential unity. (Frosh, 1987, pp.95-
101). 
If this move has been made in the interests of saving psychoanalytic 
epistemology from dying the death Of an inadequate natural science, then it 
is also a move at the hands of which Psychoanalysis suffers a more ignoble 
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fate; rendered inadequate even to the logical definition of its object. In short, 
this broadly humanist-interpretive reconstual of Psychoanalysis, in so far as 
it is based on the failure to recognize that the symptomatic is that kind of 
intention which takes on the character of a mere cause, precipitates itself 
back into the paradoxes of the Plato and/or Medea principles. 
2.3.1 Concluding Remarks on Explanation and Intentionality in Psychoanalysis 
Davidson's analysis establishes that it is the Freudian topography alone 
which facilitates an account the symptomatic, (or of how it is possible for a 
reason to take a pathway to action other than the one it would rationally 
cause). The upshot of this analysis is that in contrast to normal intentional 
actions, the explanation of symptomatic actions cannot be limited to the 
intentions which truly caused them. 
Symptomatic behavior is only fully accounted for once the missing inter-
mediary relation between the intention/wish and its result is re-established. 
Thus, the Rat Man's compulsive running is not fully explained or accounted 
for by its true cause, i.e., the wish to get rid of his rival Dick, but also requires 
explanation in terms of the equation 11 Dick 11 (rival) to 11dick11 (fat). 
It becomes apparent that if Davidson gives us an account of the possibility 
for symptomatic action in terms of the three agencies (which can both pick 
out the class of the compromise-formation from the field of rational action on 
the one hand, and causal events on the other, and account for the role of 
both reasons and causes in psychoanalytic explanation), then Dante in effect 
supplements this account by providing us with an analysis of the conditions 
• 
of possibility fo_r disguise on a general level, or for the way in which in the 
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symptomatic action, the reasons for action can be elided in the actions which 
result. 
Dante supports and supplements Davidson's account of irrational action, as 
those actions in which the symmetry between wish/belief and action is 
misplaced, by showing that if irrational actions can nonetheless be 
interpreted, or the above connections re-established, then this is because 
the form that the action takes, and its relation to the original wish/belief is not 
an arbitrary one. In short, the relation between a reason and what it causes 
in symptomatic configurations can be re-established in terms of the relation 
between language as signification and language as picturing. 
Certainly, if Davidson's ac;:count of the symptom is combined with Dante's 
account of the mechanism's of disguise, it becomes clear that - to the extent 
that the means-ends connection between reasons and actions is elided 
through an operation of language - interpretation of the symptom is 
necessary if explanation of its intentional preconditions is to result. 
It is for this reason that Davidson is at pains to point out that a symptom is 
caused in so far as the descriptive identity conditions of a reason (a belief 
and a pro-attitude or wish), are not intact therein. Intentional phenomena 
which do not meet these particular identity-conditions may be characterized 
as symptomatic ones. However, to say that a symptom does not fulfill the 
identity-conditions of reasoned action is not equivalent to saying that a 
symptom is caused in the same way in which an event is caused. Rather, it 
is to say that, in so far as a symptom is not self-explanatory because it cannot 
be explained solely in terms of the agent's reasons for doing it, the symptom, 
unlike rational action, requires interpretation. 
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It is thus unavailing for proponents of the humanist-interpretive position to 
argue that because psychoanalytic symptoms express intentions, they are 
open to interpretation rather than explanation. Rather, it is because meanings 
or reasons cause symptomatic actions in which these meanings or reasons 
are not expressed, that symptomatic action requires 11interpretation 11 at all. 
The symptom, as that anomalous object midway between intentional action 
and caused event, requires explanation not only on the level of content - but 
also on the level of form. 
2.4 Explanation and Knowled~e in Psschoanalysis 
Davidson's first contribution to psychoanalytic epistemology has been to 
show that the symptom is that kind of intentional phenomena which requires 
explanation. His second inter-related contribution concerns the way in which 
the symptomatic, defined in this way, may be known. For clearly, it is one 
thing to appreciate that the symptomatic (once recognized as such) requires 
explanation and another thing to pick out any. given instance of the 
symptomatic in the first place. In short, Davidson's second contribution to 
psychoanalytic epistemology concerns the way in which a symptom may be 
picked out from amongst all the true actions and real events in the world, 
and recognized as a slippage between them. 
In establishing the particular identity-conditions for distinguishing the 
symptomatic - as a structural discrepancy between actions and the wishes 
they satisfy occurring on an interagency site - Davidson implicitly excludes 
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the possibility of recognizing the symptomatic on the basis of any distinguishing 
content or distinctive manifest feature. 
This definition of the symptom places the necessary emphasis on Freud's 
account of the symptom, not as the mere existence of an unconscious wish, 
but as the failure of repression, i.e., as an unconscious wish manifesting 
itself against, or through, its repression by other agencies. It is not the 
unconscious wish in itself but the relation it takes to the ego, and its 
subsequent status as a compromise-formation, which is defined by Freud -
as symptomatic: "One part of the personality champions certain wishes, while 
another part opposes them and fends them off. Without such a conflict, there 
is no neurosis." (Freud, 1916-1917(1915-1917] p.341). 
Thus, although clearly some wishes, i.e., wishes in the infantile field, are 
inherently unrealizable, it is only in so far as such wishes take a route to 
satisfaction or realization and are thus implicated in dynamic conflict that they 
can be defined as potentially symptomatic. In short, it is neither symptomatic 
nor irrational to have a wish which is impractical, but it is symptomatic to try 
to fulfill it. Moreover, it is often perfectly practical wishes which, according to 
Freud, take on an irrational form and symptomatic consequences. It is for 
this reason that Davidson insists that a proper description of irrationality must 
be able to account not only for wishes which are necessarily impractical, 
such as the wish to impregnate ones father, but also for wishes which are 
not, such as the wish to impregnate one's daughter, or sister-in-law. 
What is at stake in this account of the symptomatic as that which arises 
between agencies, is the extent to which it undermines any characterization 
of the Freudian unconscious or the unconscious wish as irrational per se. 
I 
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(An explanation of error, of irrationality and of the symptom, is not an 
explanation of the unconscious.) Equally, no action is, in and of itself, 
necessarily symptomatic. One and the same action can, under different 
circumstances, be either symptomatic or non-symptomatic. It is therefore 
impossible to pick out the symptomatic either on the basis of its external 
features, or by virtue of the inherent features of the reason which caused it. 
Rather, it is the structural relations between an action and the reasons which 
caused it which define that action as a symptomatic or a non-symptomatic 
one. 
Freud formulates the purport of the topographic model with precision when 
he writes that in symptomatic configurations: 11The appearance of an 
incorrect function is explained by the peculiar mutual interference between 
two or several correct functions. 11 (1901, p.278). 
Conclusion 
If the symptomatic cannot be known on the level of the content of the reasons 
which cause it or on the level of the features of the action which results, then 
it is clear that the symptomatic cannot.be picked out (or explained as such) 
in advance, i.e., on the basis of a regular set of distinctive qualities. It is for 
this reason that the metapsychology accounts for the possibility of the 
symptomatic (in terms of the topographic, economic and dynamic registers) 
on a general or formal level but does not, in and of itself, provide the means 
by which to pick out any particular action as symptomatic or not in all 
instances. Likewise, the metapsychology does not provide the grounds on 
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which to explain why any one particular wish has taken an indirect or 
symptomatic route to satisfaction, in any one particular individual. Instead, 
what the metapsychology suggests is that the symptom is both that which 
must be explained, and that which cannot be explained on a general level 
alone. 
It therefore remains to demonstrate how particular explanatory accounts of 
specific symp~oms are possible. And in the next chapter, it will be maintained 
that it is the psychoanalytic clinic, or rather the case-history, which alone 
facilitates an account of an individual's reasons for symptomatic action, 
thereby recovering the relation wish/intention to action. 
In other words, if Davidson provides us with an account of the symptom as 
that essentially open class which is neither rational action nor caused event, 
and Dante provides us with an account of how this slippage is achieved (in 
terms of another open class of slippages which is neither representation nor 
perception, word or image), then it rem~ins to demonstrate how particular 
instances of these classes may be recognized as such, for it is only in this 
way that epistemic validity, both in the clinic in particular and in 
Psychoanalysis in general, may potentially be achieved. 
CHAPTER THREE 
NARRATION AND HISTORY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Introduction 
It still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write 
should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack 
the serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the 
reflection that the nature of the subject-matter is evidently respon-
sible for this, rather than any preference of my own. (Freud 
1955(1895], p.660). 
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As the last two chapters have suggested that the symptom is that which must 
be explained, yet cannot be explained on a general level alone, this chapter 
must show how explanatory . accounts of particular symptoms may be 
achieved. Because the characteristic genre of the Freudian clinic, the case-
history, attempts to account for the symptom by way of an individual history, 
the status of Psychoanalysis as a knowledge would seem to depend upon 
its ability to produce a unique and particular causal series to explain the 
symptoms of any given analysand. Psychoanalytic epistemology therefore 
finally devolves upon the potential validity of a historical method for achieving 
veridical explanation in the case. 
However, the status of history as an explanatory knowledge is itself not 
unproblematical. In fact, if the antinomy between explanation and interpreta-
tion is as we have seen focussed around the issues of language and action, 
then the third area in which this antinomy is foregrounded is in the theory of 
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history. This is hardly surprising because the epistemological status of 
history as an objective knowledge poses a problem on two levels. 
By concerning itself with human actions, the explanatory force of history is 
jeopardized by the widely accepted doctrine that intentional actions cannot 
be causally explained but only interpreted. Furthermore, because these 
, actions are in addition in the past, historical epistemology is said to be doubly 
confounded by its tenuous evidential base. History can neither verify its . 
factual hypotheses by designating events as they occur, nor can it reproduce 
the antecedent conditions for those events, thereby justifying the postulation 
of causal connections between anterior events and their effects. By locating 
its subject-matter in the past, history can neither observe, nor experimentally 
reproduce it. 
These epistemological liabilities traditionally open out onto the broader 
debate around the role of general laws in history, as opposed to science. 
This debate centers on C. G. Hempel's contention that if events are to be 
causally explained (i.e., related as cause and effect), then they must also, 
by implication, fall under strict deterministic faws. It is thus the presence or 
absence of assertions of regularity, or general laws, which, according to 
Hempel, is considered to ground 11explanation 11 , as opposed to 11under- · 
standing 11 or 11interpretation 11 in histor1 as in the natural sciences. (Hempel, 
1942, cited in Dante, 1985, p.203). 
The status of historical epistemology is thus usually seen as contentious, to 
the extent that history does not seem to involve the use of general laws. It 
concerns itself instead with singular, non-repeatable actions and events 
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which occurred in the past, and fails to instantiate the predictive value which 
general laws are expected to entail. 
This fundamental difference between historical and scientific method -
concerning the role of general laws and the associated role of prediction in 
each - has contributed, either to the privileging of scientific over historical 
epistemology, or, to the view that since the epistemological validity of 
historical explanation along natural scientific lines is suspect, historical 
explanation must be re-classified as historical interpretation and valorized as 
such in terms of an alternative human-scientific epistemology. 
In the classical psychoanalytic case-history, issues of this kind endemic to 
the epistemic status of a history can be seen to be crystalized. In so far as 
the case-history constitutes an attempt to retrieve the strictly causal 
determinants for pathology in an individual's psychic history, the 
psychoanalytic method can, and often has been, condemned as incapable 
of satisfying its own, legitimate and necessary, criteria of epistemic validity. 
Alternatively, the logical status of the psychoanalytic case-history as a 
necessarily ~ausal analysis can be undermined. Thus, it can be maintained 
that if the case-history does not fulfill the criteria of an explanatory causal 
analysis, then it is these criteria, rather than Psychoanalysis itself, which must 
be replaced. 
Donald Spence's argument in "Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning 
and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis" (1982), clearly demonstrates this latter 
position. Spence contends that Freud's historical or "archaeological" 
method, in so far as it implicates a form of causal explanation more 
appropriate to the natural sciences, constitutes a fundamental 
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misunderstanding of the methodology appropriate to psychoanalytic 
investigation. 
By recasting Psychoanalysis as a 11narrative11 technique, Spence therefore· 
attempts to relocate Psychoanalysis outside the bounds of the natural 
sciences and more specifically, outside the form of causal explanation which 
they instantiate. 
On the basis of Arthur Dante's work 11 Narration and Knowledge 11 (1985), it will 
be argued that although Spence is correct that the psychoanalytic case-
history is best construed as a narrative technique and contrasted to the 
natural sciences, a narrative construal does not entail the exclusion of 
Psychoanalysis from the field of causal explanation. Although narrative 
procedures can and should be distinguished from those of the natural 
sciences, this distinction must be seen to turn on issues quite distinct from 
the relative entailment of causal explanation in natural scientific, as opposed 
to narrative, operations. 
3.1 Creative Narrative as Interpretive Closure 
The question of whether Psychoanalysis can satisfy its own criteria of 
validation, or the question of whether, and how, Psychoanalysis can achieve 
veridical historical explanation, is dependent upon the primary question of 
whether the psychoanalytic case does, in the first instance, instantiate a 
legitimate and coherent form of causal explanation. 
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Jn 11Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in 
Psychoanalysis" (1982), D.P. Spence contends that it does not. He argues, 
not only that verification in the psychoanalytic clinic is liable to multiple 
epistemological objections, but that Freud's very endeavor to achieve 
historical reconstruction can be rejected wholesale, in favour of a pragmatic 
commitment to clinical effect. Spence therefore argues that the problem for 
explanation inherent in psychoanalytic epistemology can be rendered 
innocuous, in terms of the overarching abandonment of narrative as an 
epistemological question, in favour of narrative construed in terms of its 
pragmatic effect. 
Rather than merely exposing unfortunate uncertainties in the evidential field 
of the clinic, Spence's work constitutes an overarching denial of the -very 
possibility of eliciting. an explanatory account of the patient's psychic history 
on the basis of his words and interactions during therapy. He contends that 
all psychoanalytic interpretations and constructions are like artistic 
productions which have no more provable correspondence to reality than a 
painting or a piece of music. (ibid, p.275). Thus, although Spence marshalls 
a medley of unrelated objections to verification in the clinic, such as the 
impossibility of translating thoughts, feelings and images, especially dream 
- images, into words, and the unreliable nature of the patient's memory, as 
well as of the analyst's interpretations, to his cause, his contention is not 
simply that psychoanalytic constructions are unfalsifiable or lacking in criteria 
of validation, but rather, that Freud's archaeological model misconstrues the 
psychoanalytic case as an explanatory history in the first place. In other 
words, Spence argues that the archaeological method of Psychoanalysis 
which requires the reconstruction of the individual's veridical history is not 
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only impossible, but unnecessary. Consequently, Spence proposes a total 
reformulation of Psychoanalysis, both as theory and as practice. 
In the forward to Spence's book, Wallerstein outlines this reformulation: 
The logic of all this leads us (if we are willing to follow Spence in 
all his complexly ramifying argument) to a whole series of trans-
formations of our usual analytic thought conventions: of 
reconstruction into (new) construction, of acts of discovery into 
acts of creation, of historical truth into narrative fit, of pattern 
finding into pattern making, of veridical interpretation into creative 
interpretation, of all interpretation into a species of (more or less) 
inexact interpretation, of analysis essentially as a science of 
recovery of the past into a science of choice and of creation in the 
present and future, and of psychoanalyst as archaeologist and 
historian, into psychoanalyst as poet, artist, and aestheticist. (ibid, 
pp.11-12). 
Spence's 11complexly ramifying argument11 (ibid) can be unravelled into two 
main strands. The first of these constitutes Spence's epistemological 
objections to the psychoanalytic case in so tar as it is construed as a 
veridical history, and the second constitutes his alternative construal of the 
psychoanalytic case as creative interpretation. 
3.1.1 Spence's Epistemological Objections to the Psychoanalytic Case as 
Veridical History 
Spence argues that the archaeological conception of Psychoanalysis which 
requires the reconstruction of the patient's veridical history imposes criteria 
which it is impossible to satisfy on the basis of the following epistemological 
objections: Firstly, because the past cannot be corroborated 11objectively11 • 
Secondly, because, even if it could be, the meanings and/or causes of 
actions cannot be observed per se, and must therefore be interpreted - there 
is no way of verifying these interpretations. (ibid, pp.287-297). And finally, 
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because the archaeological method presupposes the general laws of the 
metapsychology which are, if not invalid, extremely questionable. Each of 
these objections will be elaborated in turn. 
1. Spence maintains that the truth-claims of Freud's archaeological/histori-
cal method, or the grounding of psychoanalytic explanations in terms of past 
(actions and) events, is illegitimate because past events cannot be verified 
objectively. The analyst must rely on the patient's memories which, 
according to Spence, 11are not always real 11 • (ibid, p.186). Spence therefore 
claims that 
From the standpoint of evidence alone, we seem on firmer 
ground when we base our interpretations on what happens in 
the hour 'in plain sight' as compared to what is reported by 
the patient, often unsupported by other witnesses. (ibid, p.186). 
2. Spence maintains that even if past events could be verified 11objectively11 , 
their causal determinants would remain oblique, and subject to interpretation . 
alone, because there is no means by which it is possible to systematically 
work backwards from effect to cause. 
Spence elaborates the distinction introduced by W.H. Walsh (1958) between 
11plain 11 and 11significanf' historical narrative, in order to substantiate his claim 
that it is impossible to ascertain the actual causal determinants of past events. 
According to Walsh, a 11plain 11 description may be verified because it is, "a 
description of the facts restricted to a straightforward statement of what 
occurred". However, the validity of a 11significant" narrative, which elaborates 
the connections between events cannot, by contrast, be validated because, 
11the connections between events are not open to inspection in the way 
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events themselves are ... Causal language is of a different logical order from 
observation language". (Walsh, 1958, cited in Spence, ibid, p.291). 
Spence maintains that a psychoanalytic narrative exemplifies a significant 
rather than a plain narrative. It therefore exceeds "historical" truth and, as a 
result, "can never be verified by pieces of the past". (ibid, p.292). This is 
because psychoanalytic narrative is concerned to demonstrate the connec-
tions between events which are not open to inspection, Spence concludes 
that psychoanalytic narrative, rather than being properly explanatory, is 
dependent upon the analyst's interpretive system, and upholds Gergen's 
view that: 'The observer must bring to the event a conceptual system through 
which behavioral observations may be rendered meaningful. There is no 
means of verifying a 'mode of interpretation'". (Gergen, 1981, p.335, cited by 
Spence, ibid, p.292; cf. Spence, ibid, p.162). 
3. Spence refutes the validity of the archaeological/historical method on the 
grounds that it is dependent upon the validity of the general laws of the 
metapsychology which he considers to be extremely questionable: 
Case-histories also rely heavily on general laws, which form the 
backbone of psychoanalytic theory ... As metapsychology has 
tended to come under attack, clinical reasoning, as represented 
in clinical reports, tends to depend more and more on narrative 
fit. The aesthetic quality of the case-history has tended, as a result, 
to pre-empt the use of general law. Narrative truth has tended to 
supplant historical truth. Now we are in a position to identify one 
of the current problems in psychoanalytic thought. As general 
laws, particularly those contained in traditional metapsychology, 
become less persuasive, we are tempted to turn to narrative fit as 
a guiding criterion for what is true. (ibid, pp.185-186). 
Although Spence neither directly criticizes the metapsychology himself, nor 
elaborates the manner in which he considers archaeological reconstructions 
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to involve or "rely heavily" on metapsychological laws, he clearly argues that 
because general metapsychological laws have "become less persuasive ... 
we are tempted to turn to narrative fit as the guiding criterion for what is true". 
(ibid, p.186, italics inserted). And clearly, Spence is not resisting temptation. 
This is because Spence is not concerned to distinguish the "general laws" 
which he considers the Freudian metapsychology to instantiate from 
"historical truth", but merely to "pre-empt" and "supplant" both. (ibid). 
Because Spence construes the role of both the general laws of the 
metapsychology and of historical explanation in the case to be the production 
of a veridical history, he dismisses both on the grounds that neither in fact 
fulfill this purpose. In any event, Spence dismisses both the viability of 
historical explanation in the case and general laws in the metapsychology 
at the same time and on approximately the same grounds. Both contribute 
to his repudiation of the possibility of acnieving veridical historical explanation 
in psychoanalysis. 
3.1.2 Spence's Alternative Construal of the Psychoanalytic Case as Creative 
Interpretation 
For Spence the necessary repudiation of the truth-claims of Psychoanalysis 
is, however, unproblematical, because a narrative construction or creative 
interpretation is effective in Psychoanalysis, not because it is true, or because 
it can account for or explain anything in a causal sense, but because it gives 
the patient's life-story "a kind of linguistic and narrative closure". (Spence, 
ibid, p.137). Spence therefore argues that: "The very process that allows the 
analyst to understand the disconnected pieces of the hour, when extended 
and amplified, enables the patient gradually to see his life as continuous, 
coherent, and, therefore, meaningful." (Spence, ibid, p.280). 
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What is important for Spence about a construction is therefore not its 
truth-value, but rather, its use-value for the patient. (ibid, p.168). The 
construction of a coherent narrative is not only 11reassuring 11 because it 
facilitates self-coherence (ibid, p.171), but it allows the patient 11to 'see' in a 
new way". (ibid, p.166). In fact, it is 11designed primarily to bring about a 
change in belief'. (ibid, p.280). 
Thus a particular construct may "enable the patient to discover and 
construct new meanings ... either by destroying an attachment to an 
object ... or by releasing him from a permanent and unnecessary restricting 
commitment to a fixed moral system 11 • (Loch, 1977, pp.245-246, cited in 
Spence, ibid, p.171). 
On these grounds, Spence argues that the problem for epistemology 
inherent in psychoanalytic technique can be rendered innocuous in terms of 
the wholesale rejection of Freud's endeavor to achieve veridical historical 
reconstruction, in favour of a pragmatic commitment to clinical effect. In 
short, Spence argues tor the substitution of the criterion of historical truth 
in Psychoanalysis tor what he calls "narrative truth 11, or "the truth of being 
coherent and sayable. 11 (ibid, p.173). Thus Spence maintains that: 
Once we give up our concern for historical accuracy, we can not 
only abandon the archaeological model but we can also become 
more comfortable with the flawed nature of the clinical data. We 
no longer need to be embarrassed by our "archeology of descrip-
tions". (ibid, p.276). 
He also points out that: 
Along with the shift from discovery to creation, we also have a shift 
in our approach to .time. Working with the archaeological model; 
Freud reasoned that the past had priority and represented the 
proper subject matter of Psychoanalysis. Reconstructions were 
devoted to rearranging fragments of the patient's early 1life; 
symptoms were supposed to have their source in infantile conflict; 
dreams were assumed to require an infantile wish simply to come 
into being. But if we assume, with Viderman, that interpretation 
is creative and that something may become true simply as a 
consequence of being stated, then we necessarily shift our focus 
from past to present. (ibid, p.177, italics inserted). 
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Three aspects of Spence's project are central: Firstly, Spence repudiates the 
archaeological or historical tradition of the classical Freudian case in so far as he 
shifts the focus of the psychoanalytic case from the past to the present. He 
argues not,only that veridical reconstruction of the patient's past is epistemically 
impossible, but also that it is clinically (i.e., technically) unnecessary. 
Secondly, although many post-Freudians, for example, Kleinian analysts, are 
critical of Freud's emphasis on the technical necessity for historical 
reconstruction per se, it is important to notice that Spence is not arguing for 
an alternative procedure for actualizing the past or accessing its effects on 
the present, i.e., in the form of the transference-neuroses. (cf. Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 1985, pp.462-463; M. Klein, 1952, pp.201-202). Rather, Spence's 
assertion that historical reconstruction is technically unnecessary to the 
psychoanalytic clinic is based upon the contention that, "something may 
become true simply as a consequence of being stated". (ibid, p.175). Thus 
the notion of "narrative truth", or "the truth of being coherent and sayable" 
(ibid, p.173), comes to play a crucial role in the practice of psychoanalytic 
cure. 
Finally, Spence uses this conception of "narrative truth" not only to undermine 
the psychoanalytic notion of veridical historical explanation which constitutes 
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the basic rationale for the classical psychoanalytic case-history, but also to 
undermine or render irrelevant the Freudian metapsychology. 
3.2 Historical Narrative as Causal Explanation 
In contradistinction to Spence's attempt to negate the possibility and devalue 
the role of veridical historical reconstruction in Psychoanalysis, it is clear that 
Freud's own position was that such reconstruction is both technically 
necessary and epistemically possible. Although it is necessary to concede 
that Freud modified his views on this point over time (Freud, 1937), it remains 
the case that Freud consistently construed the classical psychoanalytic 
case-history as a form of causal explanation which is radically contingent, 
and necessar!ly dependent upon an understanding of the individual's unique 
past. This point is generally acknowledged and does not, perhaps, need to 
be defended. What does however need to be defended in general, and 
against Spence in particular, is the possibility that such an explanatory 
operation can achieve epistemic validity. To this end, Dante's work on the 
epistemology of narrative explanation in 11 Narrative and Knowledge 11 (1985), 
will be elaborated. 
Dante describes history as a true narrative and his defence of history 
therefore takes the form of a defence of narrative as a discreet epistemology 
which can pertain to the status of veridical description and causal explana-
tion. Although Dante's defence of narrative epistemology as potentially 
veridical historical explanation does not address the psychoanalytic case in 
• 
particular, it can nevertheless be seen to provide an understanding of the 
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role of history in Psychoanalysis and of the grounds on which historical 
operations in Psychoanalysis may achieve epistemic validity. 
Danto points out that if history is that which takes past events as its object, 
{ 
then the role of narrative is a broader one, because narrative operations are 
not wholly confined to the description of entirely past, i.e., historical events. 
In countless instances, our capacity to pick out objects existing in the present 
in fact presupposes a surreptitiously narrative procedure. 
Danto illustrates this in terms of the seemingly present-tense descriptive 
predicates "scar11 and 11father11 • To call something a "scar" is to describe a 
"white mark" as the effect of a past event, i.e., an injury. While to call someone 
a 11father11 , rather than simply a 11man 11 , is to implicitly refer to a past event in 
which that man conceived a child. Clearly, much of our so-called present-
tense descriptive apparatus presupposes, not just past events, but past 
events which constitute implicit causal explanations for what they describe. 
And, as Danto points out, it is in fact impossible to produce strictly present-
tense descriptions of what would amount to the same things, without using 
such surreptitiously past-referring terms. A descriptive apparatus consisting 
of present-tense predicates alone would be reduced to such incomprehensible 
statements as: 11Where is that child's man?" (Danto, 1985, pp.71-72). 
If our apparently present-tense description of objects and people is often in 
fact past-referring, then our descriptions of events and human actions is even 
more so. Actions and events are irreducibly temporal and our capacity to 
characterize them, as events or actions, is always dependent upon the 
narrative language of cause and effect. 
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By demonstrating that narrative is a pre-requisite for describing and explaining 
a world anything like the one we habitually inhabit Dante is concerned, not 
only to undermine a supposedly secure descriptive phenomenology of the 
present, but also to show that narrative description, even on the simplest 
level, entails the postulation of causal links between prior and subsequent 
events. In this way, Danto lays the ground-work for his defence of narrative 
description as an inherently explanatory operation. 
Danto defends the view that narrative already is, in the nature of the case, 
that form of causal explanation which can be defined as 11historical 11 , by 
showing what it is that narrative entails .. 
He argues that a narrative or story is an account of the events which lead up 
to the event in question. Thus, according to Dante, all that explanation is, in 
historical contexts, is narrative, since 11a correct explanation of Eis simply a 
true story with E as a final episode 11 • (1985, p.202). 
Dante gives the following example of a narrative which simultaneously 
satisfies the demands of both telling and explaining what happened: 
The car was driving East behind a truck; the truck veered left; the 
driver of the car thought the truck was making a left turn, and 
proceeded to pass on the right; but the truck then sharply veered 
to the right, for it had gone left to make a difficult right turn into an 
intersection which the driver of the car had not seen; and so there 
was a collision. (Dante, ibid, p.202). 
Dante points out that were anyone to persist, after this, in saying he knows 
what happened, but still wants an explanation, we should justifiably be 
puzzled. 
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The fact that narrative or historical description only occurs, or is required, 
when what is described is not simply an event, but a process or change, 
instantiates this analysis of narrative description as explanation. If there were 
no change there would be nothing to be explained, and if narration is 
invariably about change, then clearly narrative is only implicated in those 
instances in which the need for explanation is felt and fully satisfied by a true 
story. Narration 11set(s] the stage for the action which leads to the end, the 
description of which is the explanation of the change of which the beginning 
and the end are the termini 11 • (ibid, p.248, italics inserted).· 
The important contribution which Danto then makes to our understanding of 
history in particular, is that a history is that kind of knowledge which describes 
events by establishing the singular causal connections between them. This 
necessarily entails the organization of events into a temporal series or, in 
other words, into a continuous narrative structure. It is for this reason that 
Danto describes history as a narrative knowledge. But it is also for this reason 
that he defines history as explanation, because the location of events within 
a narrative series is equivalent to the establishment of its causal relation to 
other events in the same series. 
If a history both describes and explains events by establishing the causal 
connections between them, then the question of whether such an 
explanatory operation can achieve epistemic validity, while clearly a 
legitimate one, nevertheless remains to be answered. 
In order to dispel what he considers to be the mythic privilegin9 of scientific 
over historical method, Dante does not deny that there is an important 
specificity to the forms of criteria for historical knowledge. Rather, Dante 
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demonstrates precisely where this specificity both is and is not located, such 
that the criteria cf validation for historical knowledge can properly be 
delineated. Dante's defence of history as a valid explanatory knowledge 
which is no more or less subject to relativistic factors than science turns on 
three central demonstrations wnich will be elaborated consequtively in the 
following sections. In brief, Danto points out that: 
1. Unlike science, historical knowledge necessarily locates its object in the 
past. 
2. As in science, there can be no distinction between plain and significant 
narrative in history. 
3. Unlike science, historical knowledge cannot rely on the use of general laws 
to sustain prediction. 
3.2.1 Against a Secure Ontology of the Present 
Perhaps the major criticism of historical knowledge stems from the belief that 
accounts of the past are somehow less secure and valid than those of the 
present. Dante therefore begins his defence of history by focussing on the 
accepted fact that a history is that which takes past events as its object and 
is therefore written after the occurrence of the events it describes. He points 
out that if histories are written even when the past events they describe have 
already been recorded at the time of their occurrence, then this is because 
a history is a different form of knowledge of the events in question than that 
which could have been achieved during or immediately after they occurred. 
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Even the most detailed description of any event as it occurs is limited because 
we cannot, as eye-witnesses, characterize events in terms of later events 
which although subsequent to it, nevertheless modify our understanding of 
the initial event in question. We cannot, for example, describe a heavy 
snow-fall as either 11the heaviese or "the last11 snow-fall of winter, until summer 
has come around. Likewise, it is impossible to attribute causal significance 
to an event without knowing not only what earlier, but also what later 
occurrences that event may be related to. Thus, Dante refutes Descartes 
claim that the knowledge that the historian must painstakingly search out 
could have been known as a matter of course to the contemporary 
eye-witness. The Roman servant girl could not have known, for example, that 
the events she witnesses would bring about the decline of the Roman empire. 
It is this sort of knowledge which is available to the future historian alone. 
(ibid, p.356). 
In contrast to an eye-witness account, a history describes a past event with 
reference to its full temporal context: Not only with reference to those events 
which precede it, but also in the light of those which, although past to the 
historian, nevertheless antecede the event in question. 
What this narrative conception of history entails is the understanding that 
history is that form of knowledge which must necessarily locate its objects 
in the past because it is a knowledge which describes any given event in 
terms of the later events it is related to. There is a certain sense, the historical 
sense, in which we can only give the meaning to events which have already 
occurred, because it is only in the light of latar events that its historical 
significance may be assessed. (Dante, ibid, pp.8-11). 
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By illustrating that there is a class of descriptions of any event (i.e., historical 
descriptions) which cannot be witnessed, Dante demonstrates that there is 
a sense in which the description of any given event may become richer over 
time without that event 11itself11 changing at all. (ibid, p.155). This negates the 
view that nothing marks the difference between what the historian and the 
eye-witness may know. (ibid, p.344). Historical descriptions are those 
descriptions which have as truth conditions and hence as part of their 
meaning, events that occur later than themselves. 
Danto argues that historical knowledge is therefore one in which 11the 
cognitive privileges, as it were, are distributed differently than the 
commonplace epistemology· allows11 , because historical knowledge, unlike 
scientific knowledge, is available to the later historian alone. (ibid, p.346). As 
a result, historical knowledge is neither equivalent to, nor subject to the same 
criteria of validity as, sci~ntific knowledge. 
Dante therefore undermines what is probably one of the major epistemological 
objections to historical knowledge: The objection that the historian's subject 
matter, being in the past, cannot be 11seen", and that scientific knowledge is 
therefore necessarily more objective than historical inquiry. 
Danto does not labour the point that scientists also do not, as a general rule, 
have access via direct observation to their subject-matter, or reiterate the 
now commonplace assertion that observation, even where available and 
appropriate, is clearly 11theory-laden 11 • Instead, he simply observes that the 
historian's incapacity to fulfill the role of objective contemporary eye-witness 
cannot be construed as detrimental to his enterprise, since to describe and 
explain an event historically necessarily entails the pastness of the event in 
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question. On these grounds, Dante undermines the very applicability of 
verifiability criterion of this kind to historical inquiry: 
For strictly speaking, in historical sentences, there are no 
experiences which verify that sentence, if, by verification here, we 
mean experiencing what the sentence is about under the descrip-
tion of it given by the sentence. Verifiability, then, is not an 
adequate criteria of meaningfulness as far as these historical 
sentences are concerned. The philosophical importance of these 
sentences, then, is this. If there are true descriptions of events 
under which those events cannot have been witnessed, our 
capacity to witness those events has, with this class of descrip-
tions, no bearing whatsoever. For even if we could witness them, 
we could not verify them under these descriptions. (ibid, pp.61-2, 
italics inserted). 
What Dante's analysis demonstrates is that the retrospective aspect of 
historical technique is mistakenly attributed solely to the pastness of the 
events in question. In fact, a historical or narrative analysis offers information 
inaccessible at the time of the occurrence in question, and offers, therefore, 
a different sort of knowledge to that provided by an eye-witness account; a 
knowledge informed by events later than the event in question. In short, a 
narrative knowledge. 
3.2.2 Against Plain Narrative 
W. H. Walsh distinguishes between 11plain 11 historical narrative which 
describes an event or establishes a fact, and 11significant1' historical narrative 
which also establishes the connections between facts and, in consequence, 
cannot be verified. (1951, cited in Dante, 1985, p.119; cf. Spence, 1982, 
p.291). Against Walsh, Dante argues that events in themselves are no more 
open to "objective" inspection than the causal connections between them 
are. 
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There is no description of any historical event which can be construed as 
"plain" as opposed to "significant" narrative because an event is always 
something u(lder a certain (i.e., limited) description. And there is no such 
thing as a full description of any event. A total or 11plain 11 description of an 
event is neither possible or desirable, as it would imply that the description 
of, for example, a court trial, would have to include accounts of the number 
of flies in the room, what·the doorman was doing with his daughter, how 
many particles of dust there were in the room, what they were composed of, 
and a (theoretically at least) infinite number of other factors. 
A narrative description is therefore by definition a structure imposed upon 
reality, a selection and grouping of aspects of what occurred together as 
relevant to that "event", and an exclusion of other aspects of that same 
occurrence as lacking relevance. And since all descriptions leave things out 
and connect events there can be no logical distinction between a "plain" and 
a "significant° description. Likewise, there can be no logical distinction 
between the "interpretation" and the "explanation" of an event in terms of the 
distinction between the activities of merely observing and describing, and 
the activities of selecting and connecting, such events. 
In both history and in science, our descriptive apparatus necessarily singles 
out aspects of the real world, and is not just a simple reflection of reality itself. 
For if our descriptive apparatus were wholly reflective, we would have 
recourse to nothing but a continuum of sensory data, all equally meaningful 
or meaningless. The "meaning" of events is thus endemic to the concepts in 
terms of which we pick those events out of the continuum of experience, as 
discreet "events", in the first place. The necessity of respecting "facts", as 
opposed to arbitrary historical "interpretation", thus cannot consist in the 
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mere reproduction of occurrences as they occur, without any ordering 
principle of selection. Dante therefore maintains that: "The difference 
between history and science is not the fact that history does and science 
does not employ organizing schemes which go beyond what is given. Both 
do11 • (ibid, p.111 ). 
Since both history and science presuppose criteria of relevance in 
accordance with which things are included and excluded and cannot there-
fore be logically distinguished or epistemically judged on these grounds, 
Dante attempts to locate the distinction between them in terms of the fact 
that the criteria of relevance which each appeals to are differential. 
According to Danto, the differential criteria of relevance between science and 
history can be located in terms of the fact that history, as opposed to science, 
attempts to represent and explain reality in its SPECIFIC non-repeatable 
individuality. By contrast, the primary aim of all theoretical concepts in 
science is the formation of GENERAL concepts, i.e., laws, in terms of which 
muitiple phenomena can be subsi.imed: described, explained, and 
predicted. Danto therefore turns to the question of the role of general laws, 
and the associated question of the role of prediction, in history as opposed 
to science. 
3.2.3 Against General Laws and Prediction 
. The question of the role of general laws in history has traditionally been 
approached in terms of the problem of the role of general laws in the 
explanation of human action as opposed to in the explanation of natural 
events. 
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Thus Hempel, the exemplary candidate for an acceptable analysis of historical 
explanation insists that, since an adequate explanation must in all instances 
include at least one general law, historical explanation is only epistemologically 
valid in so far as it appeals to general laws and can entail prediction. Hempel 
therefore contends that explanation has exactly the same structure regardless 
of whether it has to do with human or non-human behavior. (cited in Dante, 
1985, pp.203 -204). 
Croce, Dilthey, and Collingwood, on the other hand, argue that because 
psychical life is "free", in contrast to causally determined nature, it is incapable 
of being subsumed under laws, because the concept of conformity to law 
contradicts the concept of freedom. Since explanation entails general laws, 
historical events which involve human agents can only be understood or 
interpreted, and not explained. (cited in Dante, ibid, pp.205- 206). 
By demonstrating that the .formal distinction between scientific and historical 
epistemology does devolve upon the relative role of general laws in each, 
but is not derived from the demarcation between psychical life and the 
physical world, Danto simultaneously undermines both of these positions. 
Dante argues that the question of whether an historical event can be 
subsumed under a general law and hence, predicted, is dependent upon the· 
level at which the event is described. It is not so much "things" in themselves, 
but rather, how and to what end they are described, which determines 
whether they do or do not presuppose general laws. It is therefore not the 
presence or absence of general laws which can serve to differentiate 
between historical explanation, and mere historical interpretation. (ibid, 
p.217). Likewise, the presence or absence of such laws cannot serve to 
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differentiate between causally determined, as opposed to freely chosen 
actions: 
P.henomena as such are not explained. It is only phenomena as 
covered by a description which are capable of explanation, and 
then, when we speak of explaining them, it must always be with 
reference to that description .... A phenomenon can be covered by 
a general law [and predicted] only in so far as we produce a 
description which contains no uneliminable particular designation 
of it. Or briefly, we can cover an event with a general law only 
once we have covered it with a general description. 11 (ibid, 
pp.219-220, italics inserted). 
It is important to notice that by drawing attention to the fact that the question 
of general laws is connected with the question of how phenomena and events 
are described, Dante is not arguing that all descriptions are logically vacuous 
or indeterminate, but rather, that some descriptions logically prevent 
phenomena from being covered by general laws, while others do not. More 
specifically, it is only the abstract, and not the concrete explanatum, which 
serves to put phenomena under a general law. 
Danto uses the example of the last tete nationale mone 'gasque, during which 
the streets were decorated with national flags. Side by side with the flags of 
Monaco were American flags. No other national flags were displayed. (ibid, 
pp.220-224). According to Dante, the .presence of American. flags in the 
streets of Monaco can be described and explained in two ways, only the first 
of which entails the use of a general law, and the possibility of prediction: 
1. Whenever a nation has a sovereign of a different national origin it will on 
appropriate occasions honour that sovereign in some acceptable fashion. 
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2. The Prince of Monaco, Rainer Ill, married an American actress, Grace 
Kelly, and the mone'gasques chose their fete nationale mone'gasque as an 
opportune day on which to honour their new sovereign of American descent, 
by displaying the American flag alongside their own. 
Although both of these are accurate descriptions which explain the event in 
question, the first instantiates a general law, whereas the second gives us a 
great deal of additional specific information, i.e., that Prince Rainer Ill married 
the American actress Grace Kelly, and that the mone 'gasques therefore 
displayed American flags at their fete nationale mone'gasque. 
Dante points out that even were the facts of Prince Rainer's marriage known, 
the general law instantiated in description number one could not have been 
used to predict either how, or when, the mone'gasques would honour their 
sovereign, (at least not without recourse to further specific evidence, such 
as the plans for the event). It could only have generated the prediction that 
this sovereign would be appropriately honoured in some way at some 
appropriate event. 
It is therefore apparent that although under certain descriptions, events in 
' 
history can not only be explained but predicted as well, laws in history can 
only cover general descriptions, and can only be used to predict the general 
class of events likely to occur, they can never be used to predict specific 
events. 
This is because those laws which function as elements of explanation in 
history cover a class of instances which is both open and non-homogeneous. 
Although it is perhaps in terms of some covering law that we can both explain 
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and predict that sovereigns marry foreigners and that these foreigners are 
consequently honoured, there are nevertheless an open set of different ways 
in which they may or may not have done so, and to what effect. Likewise, 
although we can both explain and predict that parents produce children and 
that children quarrel with their parents, there are also innumerable ways in 
which they may or may not have done either. 
The fact that the form of an explanation in history can be achieved in terms 
of general laws, but that general laws cannot determine the specific 
instances indifferently covered by the same explanatum, has two related 
consequences for the question of explanation and prediction and their 
relation to general laws in history. 
Firstly, in relation to the past, we cannot explain a specific past event simply 
by covering it with a general law, because the same general law covers too 
many distinct cases to account for one specific occurrence in particular. In 
order to fully explain the occurrence of a specific event, recourse to 
documentary or other forms of specific evidence is therefore necessary. 
Secondly, in relation to the future, our predictive knowledge can never be 
more than, at best, general and abstract, because, in relation to the future, 
we have no recourse to specific evidence. The role of general laws in history 
is thus limited to a heuristic device, a kind of methodological directive in 
terms of which the type of event we are looking for can be delimited. 
However, Dante argues that historical description, unlike scientific descrip-
tion, does not in fact intend to subsume events into types or under general 
concepts and laws. Rather, a history is concerned to designate and explain 
events in their unique specificity. It is therefore apparent that if historical 
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descriptions do not produce prediction then this is not because they do not 
causally explain events, but because they do not explain them in terms of 
general concepts, and we can predict only what is general in reality. 
In "Science and History: A Critique of Positivist Epistemology" (1962), 
Heinrich Rickett also maintains that the only valid epistemological distinction 
to be drawn between science and history is that the primary aim of all science 
is the formation of general concepts under which various particular 
phenomenon can be subsumed: 11What is essential in things and events, 
then, is whatever features they have in common with objects falling under 
the same concept; everything purely individual is "unessential" and as such 
has no place in science." (1962, p.40). 
It is this rigid designation of only those properties of events relevant to the 
formation of general concepts which gives science its predictive edge, but it 
is also this generality which, as Rickett points out, 11constitutes in every case 
the ultimate limit of concept-formation in the natural sciences 11 • (1962, 
pp.45-46). Thus science, or general concepts alone, necessarily fail to give 
us much of the information about events which, from a historical perspective 
we would want, because such information cannot always be stated in the 
abbreviated language of scientific theories. 
It is now possible to see why Dante's re-structuring of the question of the 
role of general laws in history simultaneously undermines all major 
contenders in ·the debate around general laws in history as it is currently 
constituted. 
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Hempel claims that an adequate explanation, in history as in science, must 
necessarily entail at least one general law. This claim is logically related to 
Hempel's insistence that explanation and prediction are of a piece. (i.e., the 
thesis that if we can explain an event on the basis of its antecedent conditions, 
then we must be able to predict this effect on the basis of its antecedent 
conditions too.) 
Dante argues, by contrast, that although historical explanations may contain 
and appeal to general laws, such laws are not essential to historical explana-
tion. This is because it is not so much things in themselves, but rather how 
they are described, which determines whether they do or do not logically 
presuppose general laws. Moreover, Dante maintains that because laws in 
history can only cover general descriptions, they can never be used to 
predict specific events. 
Croce, Dilthey and Collingwood maintain that because psychical life is 11free 11 , 
in contrast to causally determined nature, it cannot be subsumed under 
general laws, in so far as conformity to law contradicts the concept of 
freedom. These theorists thus conclude that since explanation entails 
general laws, historical events which involve human agents can only be 
interpreted and not explained. (Dante, ibid, pp. 205-206). 
Dante argues, by contrast, that if science always appeals to general laws 
whereas history does not, then this is not because of any ontological 
distinction betWeen "nature" and 11spirit11 , or "reasons" and "causes" inherent 
in their subject matter. Rather, it is because of a difference in our purpose 
when describing an event historically as opposed to scientifically. (Dante, 
1985, p.178). 
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This view that the free will debate has no bearing whatsoever on the question 
of the role of general laws in history is also supported by Rickett, who writes 
that even if history "dealt with nothing but puppets, history would always have 
to show what individual and particular strings set in motion here these and 
there those historically important puppets". (1962, p.111 ). Historical explana-
tion cannot rely on general laws alone, regardless of whether human actions 
are causally determined or not. 
Although science and historY can be distinguished in terms of the criteria of 
relevance in terms of which they describe and causally explain events, they 
can not be differentiated in terms of the distinction between the explanation 
of causally determined events as opposed to the interpretation of teleological 
or 11free 11 actions. If science stands in sharp contrast to history, or to the 
description and explanation of the non-repeatable particular, then this is by 
virtue of its abstract generality alone. 
If Dante's model for the philosophy of history is taken into account, then it 
must be concluded that a history is that form of causal explanation, or 
knowledge, which, .in order to achieve epistemological validity must: 
1. Necessarily locate its objects in the past. 
2. Necessarily determine its object in accordance with historical criteria of 
relevance. 
3. Necessarily describe nnd explain its objects in terms of their specific 
causal preconditions rather than in terms of general laws, regardless of 
whether such objects be physical or psychical in nature. 
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It remains to be shown that the Freudian case-history demonstrates these 
necessary features of a history and can therefore pertain to the criteria for 
epistemological validity relevant to a historical knowledge. 
3.3 Narrative Epistemology and the Psvchoanalytic Case 
Three major aspects of Dante's work are central to an understanding and 
justification of the Freudian case-history. Broadly, Dante's argument that the 
description of an action by virtue of its position in a narrative series is 
necessarily a form of causal explanation makes it possible to defend the 
psychoanalytic case-history as an explanatory rather than an interpretive or 
aesthetic activity. More specifically, Dante's demonstration that the descrip-
tion of an action is in an- important sense dependant upon its position in a 
series provides an epistemological underpinning for the Freudian under-
standing that the capacity to identify and explain any particular symptom 
depends, not on its observable features or its aetiological preconditions, but 
rather on its position in an individual history. And finally or by extension, 
Dante's account makes it apparent that to the extent that a particular 
symptom can only be picked out and explained in relation to its position in 
a historical or narrative series, the symptom is by definition an object which 
can never be determined or predicted in advance on the basis of general 
laws. 
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3.3.1 Historical Narrative As Causal Explanation in Psychoanalysis 
What a psychoanalytic history attempts to provide is a coherent narrative, 
or, in other words, a full case-history. To this end, it must explain those 
aspects of a patient's behaviour·and experience which act as breaks in a full 
narrative. If the overall field of evidence in the psychoanalytic case is the 
patient's speech in the form of free-association in general, and the symptom, 
dream and parapraxes in particular, then this is because these are significantly 
not narrative structures. Instead, these are operations which cannot easily 
be appropriated by narrative or causal explanation - gaps or fractures in the 
mental which must be explained if a coherent psychic history is to be 
produced. In the first two chapters, the question of the way these 
symptomatic operations at first resist, but can finally be reclaimed for, 
explanation has already been broached. Precisely because the symptom, 
dream and parapraxis are actions, affects, words or thoughts which, as 
disguised and compromised forms, do not appear to have reasons as their 
causes, the analyst's attempt to produce a full history must entail the 
reclaiming of these phenomena for narrative explanation, i.e., their re-alignment 
to the reasons which caused them. 
Freud's understanding of the role of the historical series in the psychoanalytic 
explanation of the specific symptom is explicated in section E of his "Notes 
upon a case of Obsessional Neurosis". (1909). Here Freud argues that the 
interpretation and explanation of obsessional ideas: 
... is effected by bringing the obsessional ideas into temporal 
relationship with the patient's experiences, that is to say, by 
enquiring when a particular obsessional idea made its first 
appearance and in what circumstances it is apt to recur ... We can 
easily convince ourselves that, once the interconnections between 
an obsessional idea and the patient's experiences have been, 
discovered, there will be no difficulty in obtaining access to 
whatever· else may be puzzling or worth knowing in the 
pathological structure we are dealing with - its meaning, the 
mechanism's of its origin and its derivation from the preponderant 
forces of the patient's mind. (1909, pp.186-187). 
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Freud illustrates his point with the example of the Rat-Man's ostensibly 
senseless obsessional running, which could only be accounted for as a 
meaningful or motivated action, in terms of the history of the Rat-Man's 
tendency towards self-punishment, in conjunction with the history of his 
relations with his love-object and his potential rival for her affections, Dick. 
(1909, pp.188-189). 
In order to finally explain both the form and the meaning of the Rat-Man's 
symptom, Freud provides a comprehensive narrative account on the events 
leading up to the Rat-Man's compulsive running and simultaneously, a full 
causal explanation for this behavior. The wish to be rid of a rival, the 
conflictual guilt (or wish to be rid of this wish), and the resulting slippage 
across the word "Dick", together constitute a causal explanation of the 
Rat-Man's pathological running. 
Freud, like Dante, demonstrates that historical narrative is both a legitimate 
and necessary explanatory operation because it involves establishing the 
causal connections between events which are essential to describing 
particular actions both meaningfully and accurately. In both a Dantonian and 
a Freudian narrative, telling what happened and explaining what happened 
are done simultaneously, such that narrative description and historical 
explanation are of a piece. 
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If Freud's method is a pre-eminently narrative one, however, then this is not 
only because it is in terms of a historical or temporal account that any given 
action is causally explained. It is also in terms of its temporal location that 
any given action is picked out and classified as symptomatic or not, in the 
first place. 
3.3.2 The Symptom and the Series 
In the last chapter, it was contended that no actions are, in and of themselves, 
necessarily symptomatic. One and the same action can, under different 
circumstances, be both symptomatic and non-symptomatic because wh~t 
makes an action symptomatic or. not is neither the reasons which cause it, 
nor the actions which result, but rather, the relations between a reason and 
the action which results. What this implies is that the identity-conditions of 
an action as normal or pathological depends on its position in a temporal 
series, rather than on either, firstly, its manifest features as an action or, 
secondly, its aetiological preconditions. These two points will be addressed 
consecutively: 
1. The recognition that the ascription of symptomatic status to any given 
action depends upon its position in a temporal series rather than on its 
manifest characteristics, is instantiated in multiple and diverse ways in 
Psychoanalysis. 
On the simplest level, it is apparent that while some actions may be extreme 
or unusual enough on an observable level to suggest their symptomatic 
status, this is not usually or necessarily the case. The Rat-Man's jogging or 
putting of stones in the road, for example, cannot be recognized as 
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pathological on the basis of the direct observation of those actions alone. 
Certainly, if the· jogging of the Rat-Man and an Olympic runner, or the stone 
locations of the Rat-Man and a farmer, can be distinguished, then this is not 
on the basis of any general account of jogging or stone-laying behavior as 
symptomatic or not. It is impossible to know on the basis of observation 
alone, for example, that the Rat-Man was not using stones to mark an exact 
location in the road, but planning to upset his lady-friend's carriage. (Freud, 
1909, pp.116-117). This is becausE;! it is not an action in and of itself, but 
rather, its relation to its causal determinants, which determines its status as 
symptomatic or not. 
This is not to argue that the actual historical determinants of an individual's -
actions must be understood in each instance, before particular actions may 
be classified as symptomatic or non-symptomatic ones. The Rat-Man may 
or may not know why he spends his time jogging or re-locating stones but 
he knows full well that his actions are nonsensical and undesirable precisely 
because he cannot fully explain them rationally. And even if it may be possible 
for individuals at times to rationalize symptomatic actions to themselves, it 
remains the distress caused by these actions which, at least in part, brings 
the patient to analysis in the first place. 
Thus the phenomenological or conscious experience of subjects as they 
report it, for example, in an interview, is often quite sufficient to determine 
whether the actions they describe are symptomatic or not. However, if 
individuals can spontaneously perceive their actions or thoughts to be 
symptomatic ones, then this is because they recognize these actions or 
thoughts to be in an unsatisfactory relation to what they consider to be 
rational or desirable determinants for them. In short, it is because the 
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symptom functions as a gap in narrative or as an anomaly in the series, that 
it is experienced as inexplicable or undesirable. Thus it remains the case that 
the pathological can only be both picked out and experienced as such on 
the basis of its position in a causai or temporal series. No-one merely 
watching the Rat-Man jogging could have known, without prior knowledge 
or having been told, that this behaviour was pathological. A symptomatic 
action cannot be recognised as such on the basis of its manifest observable 
characteristics alone. . 
A similar but more substantial version of this argument is presented by Freud 
in 11 Mourning and Melancholia11 (1917(1915]). Here Freud is clearly con-
cerned to demonstrate that what distinguishes a non-symptomatic mourning 
response from a symptomatic melancholic one is not necessarily explicit on 
any manifest level. Thus both mourning and melancholia may be precipitated 
by the actual loss of a love-object: 
The exciting causes due to environmental influences are, so far 
as we can discern them at all, the same for both conditions. 
Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, 
or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of 
one ... In some people the same influences produce melancholia 
instead of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a 
pathological condition. (Freud, 1917(1915], pp.243-244). 
The only distinguishing features between mourning and melancholia are, in 
such instances, firstly, the persistence of those reactions attendant upon 
grief, (i.e., its prolonged position in the series), and secondly, the subjective 
sense of worthlessness and guilt which defines melancholia alone. Thus 
Freud writes that, 11only the disturbance of self-regard is absent in mourning; 
but otherwise the features are the same 11 • (ibid, p.244, italics inserted). 
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Clearly, it is the absence of any actual determinants for this disturbance of 
self-regard in melancholia, regardless of whether a loss has or has not 
occured, which allows for its char?cterization as a pathological condition, as 
opposed to mourning. And only a history can determine whether an event 
justifying this disturbance has occured. Although two mothers may both feel 
guilty about the loss of their sons, one may through negligence or intent have 
in fact caused his death, whereas the other had not. It is a history alone which 
can determine whether the mechanism characteristic of melancholia alone, 
whereby aggressivity towards a lost object is internalized, is operative or not. 
In all other respects, as Freud points out, the characteristics of mourning and 
melancholia may be the same. (Freud, 1917(1915]). 
2. In psychoanalysis the extent to which pathology is construed in terms of 
a fundamentally narrative epistemology is, however, more extensive. For it 
is not only in terms of past determinants, but also in terms of future effects, 
that the symptomatic must be both defined, and explained. 
Danto reveals that it is mistaken to believe that it is the status of its object as 
past, which is alone significant to a characterization and understanding of a 
historical knowledge. A knowledge is a historical one in so far as it entails 
not only those events which preceded the events in question but those which 
succeeded it. It is for this reason that it is only possible to do a history of the 
past. Just as in a conventional history, the retrospective explanatory technique 
is attributed, mistakenly, to the pas~ness of the events in question alone, so 
too in Psychoanalysis, the rationale for Freud's historical method is attributed 
solely to his conviction that the psychoneuroses, unlike the actual anxiety 
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neuroses, are a distinctive structure with aetiological determinants from the 
past. 
On the basis of Dante's analysis it would seem, at first sight, advantageous 
to argue instead, that what renders Psychoanalysis a necessarily narrative 
technique is, rather, that like other past events, unconscious psychic events 
whether historically real or fantastical, are, by definition, inaccessible to 
eye-witness (or even introspective phenomenological accounts), and 
therefore require a distinct epistemology. And this is true. 
However, if the cause of the neurosis is, a priori, inaccessible in the present 
tense, then this is not only .. because it is practically in the past, or 
unconscious, and therefore inaccessible but also, because it is that kind of 
cause which is accessible - but by way of its effects or derivatives alone. It 
is this understandil")g that makes Freud's analysis of the determining factors 
of pathology a fundamentally historical or narrative type of causal analysis. 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1980) substantiate this aspect of narrative 
epistemology in Psychoanalysis by recognizing the concept of deferred 
action to be a major and consistent part of Freud's conceptual apparatus. If 
the concept has been ignored by many psychoanalytic theorists and 
clinicians, and brought into focus as a central mode of psychoanalytic 
explanation predominantly by J. Lacan (1953-1955, 1977, 1979), then the 
reasons for this comparative omission, and re-appropriation, are clearly 
instructive. (J. Mitchel, 1986, pp.25-26). Equally illuminating are the 
permutations through which both the meaning, and the developmental 
location, of the concept have passed in Freud's original writings. 
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For our purposes, however, it is perhaps sufficient to point out that with the 
notion of deferred action, Freud insists that past events can be, not altered, 
but "rearrange[d]", "transcribed". (Freud, 1950(1892-1899], p.233, cited in J. 
Laplanche & J.B. Pontalis, 1980, p.112). As Laplanche and Pontalis point 
out, this understanding of retrodiction or deferment should not be taken to 
suggest an existential-type Psychoanalysis, i.e., a view whereby conscious-
ness constitutes its past and alters its meaning, nor, on the other hand, 
should it be taken as a matter of the delayed discharge of accumulated 
tension due to the temporal gap between stimulus and response. Rather, 
deferred action is, quite specifically, the repression of a memory from the 
past which has only become traumatic after the event. It is only in this sense 
that it may be said that in Psychoanalysis memories may be altered, receive 
new meaning, and become effective, as a function of new experiences, or of 
the arrival of a different stage of development. (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1980, 
pp.111-114). 
The notion of deferred action clearly presupposes two events separated in 
a temporal series, the first of which becomes, retroactively, a traumatic or 
significant one. Thus the concept forecloses a reductive conception of the 
history of the subject as a linear determinism involving only the action of the 
past on the present. Instead, it highlights the way in which a cause can 
become operative, as cause, long after its actual occurrence. The concept 
of deferment implies the recognition that one cannot pick out the cause 
of the symptom without knowing its future. A psychic event acquires its 
identity-conditions, as pathogenic or non-pathogenic, not only by virtue of 
what caused it, b·Jt equally, by virtue of what effects it has. An explanation in 
Psychoanalysis is necessarily a narrative description of events: It consists in 
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filling in the temporal end-points of a change. Both beginning and end, or 
cause and effect, are necessary in explaining a given symptomatic action. 
In this respect, there is something of knowledge which is uniquely available · 
to the future analyst which cannot have been observed by the eye-witness, 
since part of the identity conditions of the pathological must always depend 
on the nature of its effects. Thus, in Psychoanalysis, as in all historical inquiry, 
"the cognitive privileges, as it were, are distributed differently than the 
commonplace epistemology allows". (Dante, 1985, p.346). 
If the status of something as pathogenic or not cannot be picked out on the 
basis of either what caused it, (i.e., its aetiological preconditions), or its 
manifest features, then the ascription of symptomatic status to any given 
action depends upon its position in an individual history. It is likewise for this 
reason that it will now be argued that the symptomatic can never be 
determined or predicted in advance, in accordance with general laws. 
3.3.3 The Role of General Laws and Prediction in Psychoanalysis 
It has been argued so far that an individual history or what amounts to the 
same thing, the patient's phenomenological experience of the symptom as 
somehow anomalous in his life, is required not only to explain any partic;:ular 
symptom, but in order to determine whether it is in fact a symptom at all. 
Attendant upon this is the delimitation of the role of general laws in 
Psychoanalysis, or more specifically, in the psychoanalytic explanation of the 
symptomatic in particular instances and in particular individuals. 
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Clearly, it is the Freudian metapsychology which emerges as the strongest 
candidate for the case in favour of general laws in Psychoanalysis. Certainly, 
it has often been claimed that the Freudian metapsychology, to the extent to 
which it makes general statements about the (topographic, dynamic and 
economic) nature and functioning of the psychic apparatus in both pathological 
and non-pathological configurations, instantiates the use of general laws. On 
this basis it is also often maintained that the metapsychology is determinist 
and excludes the necessary role of intentionality in human action. (Guntrip, 
1973, p.105). This criticism is based on the assumption that general state-
ments about the nature of the psychic apparatus amount to general laws 
which entail exact/specific prediction and hence, exclude the possibility of 
freedom of choice. 
In order to refute the notion that general metapsychological statements about 
the psychic apparatus in fact constitute the kind of laws which allow for 
prediction it is necessary only to point out that no specific symptom, nor in 
fact any action or compromise-formation in general, can be either explained 
or predicted in accordance with general metapsychological statements or 
laws, regardless of whether these occurrences are construed in terms of 
absolute causal conditionality or not. 
If the metapsychology constitutes a general account which explains human 
behaviour, then this is only on the level of its most general preconditions. A 
metapsychological account can neither explain nor predict specific actions 
or symptoms. 
It is for this reason that Freud points out that the explanation of symptoms 
such as obsessional ideas is, "effected by bringing the obsessional ideas 
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into temporal relationship with the patient's experiences". (1909, pp.188-
189). A particular causal history of the Rat-Man's relations to his acquaintances 
must be re-traced if his obsessional running is to be explained. A general 
metapsychological law of the type: "a wish under sufficient super-ego 
injunction will be repressed and seek an indirect route to satisfaction", is not, 
in and of itself, an explanation of the Rat-Man's particular running behavior. 
It is an explanation of no more than how behaviour of this very general, i.e., 
indirect or symptomatic kind, is possible. But it cannot locate the particular 
wish involved, nor the nature of the super-ego injunction which caused its 
repression. Furthermore, even ifthe nature of the repressed wish was known, 
and the symptomatic status of the action established, the form of the 
symptom as it manifests itself - in compulsive running - would still remain to 
be explained. 
The causes of the symptomatic in any given instance are thus never defined 
a priori. The explanation of any specific symptom is, rather, always radically 
contingent and specific. The. upshot of this is therefore that the symptom as 
it is construed in classical Psychoanalytic terms is not syndromic; its form 
can never be determined, nor its future predicted in advance, in accordance 
with general laws. 
If the classical metapsychology can appeal to general laws, then this is 
because in the metapsychology what is purely individual falls into the 
background - as at most an example of some broader principle or· 
characterization, usually of a set of possible relations, for example, between 
agencies. It is thus necessary to locate the Freudian metapsychology on a 
different epistemological level to the narrative epistemology of the Freudian 
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case-history, in so far as the narrative epistemology instantiated in the case 
is both radically contingent and specific. 
Thus if Freud can readily describes the metapsychology as replaceable, as 
a 11speculative superstructure 11 (1925(1924], pp.32-33), then this is because, 
as Dante allows us to see, explanation can be produced without it, at least 
on the level of the particular if not on the level of the general or abstract. 
However, there are also general statements in Psychoanalysis (firstly, about 
the aetiological preconditions, secondly, about the operation and function, 
and thirdly, about the classification of the symptom) which, although not 
necessarily "metapsychological 11 in the strict sense, nevertheless seem to 
instantiate general laws. For the purposes of this argument, however, it is 
necessary only to point out that these general statements on the more clinical 
side of the psychoanalytic spectrum parallel metapsychological ones, in so 
far as they too never entail the explanation or prediction of the specific 
symptoms of individuals in particular instances. In short, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that although there are general characteristics which can be 
ascribed to groups of symptoms or, for that matter, to all symptoms alike, 
these general characteristics do not operate as general laws in so far as 
general laws entail prediction. 
1 . It has already been pointed out that there are no aetiological predeterminants 
which operate as sufficient conditions for the prediction of pathology in 
Psychoanalysis. Although constitutional or hereditary factors such as the 
strength of libido or the quantity of the drive, as well as actual traumatic events 
in the world such as seduction by a parent in early infancy or the experience 
of frustration or deprivation, may well play a part in the precipitation of 
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neurosis, there is no regular or necessary relation between such factors and 
the incidence of neurosis. This aspect of Freud's thought is so consistent 
across his work that almost any text, for example, "Heredity and the Aetiology 
of the Neurosis'., (1896b, p.147), "My Views on the Part played by Sexuality 
in the Aetiology of Neurosis11 (1906(1905], p.276), through to "An outline of 
Psychoanalysis" (1940b[1938],pp.183-184), all make this point quite clearly. 
In chapter VII of 11An Outline of Psychoanalysis 11 , Freud points out that general 
laws, although explanatory, cannot be used to pick out the 11neurotic 11 from 
the 11non-neurotic11 constitution in any given circumstance, but only allow us 
to "pick out the 'weak points' in a normal organization" which are operative 
in, but not sufficient to account for, the generation of a neurosis. Such 11weak 
points" are thus not general laws in the traditional or full predictive sense, but 
rather, the conditions of possibility for, any given neurosis. This is because 
although generalities such as the developmental weakness of the ego during 
childhood, the biological preconditions of the drive, the nature of the sexual 
constitution, and the possible occurrence of traumatic real events, facilitate 
and therefore explain neurosis in general, they cannot account for its 
occurrence in particular individuals as opposed .to others. For such an 
account, a particular interaction of causes, rather than a general theory of 
mental illness, is required. (1940b[1938], pp.183-184). 
Freud's recognition of the fact that the presence of pathogenic preconditions 
for the symptomatic can never justify prediction, and his consequent 
appreciation of the necessarily narrative or historical structure of the 
psychoanalytic explanation of any particu:ar symptom is again made explicit 
in a lengthy section of 11The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a 
Woman 11 , in which he writes: 
So long as. we trace the development from its final outcome 
backwards, the chain of events appears continuous, and we feel 
we have gained an insight which is completely satisfactory or even 
exhaustive. But if we proceed the reverse way, if we start from the 
premises inferred from the analysis and try to follow these up to 
the final result, then we no longer get the impression of an 
inevitable sequence of events which could not have been 
otherwise. We notice at once that there might have been another 
result, and that we might have been just as well able to understand 
and explain the latter. The synthesis is thus not so satisfactory as 
the analysis; in other words, from a knowledge of the premises 
we could not have foretold the nature of the result .... Hence the 
chain of causation can always be recognized with certainty if we 
follow the line of analysis, whereas to predict it along the lines of 
synthesis is impossible. We do not, therefore, mean to maintain 
that every girl who experiences a disappointment such as this of 
the longing for love that springs from the Oedipus attitude at 
puberty will necessarily on that · account fall a victim to 
homosexuality. On the contrary, ... (Freud, 1920, p.167). 
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2. Although there are many general characteristics above and beyond 
aetiological factors which Freud ascribes to all symptoms in general, none 
of these generalities allow us to determine either the form or the course that 
a_ny one symptom will take in advance. 
Thus although a// symptoms are the disguised satisfactions of repressed 
wishes, and operate in terms of thing-presentations rather than word-
presentations, this neither allows us to extrapolate from the fact that a wish 
has been repressed that a symptom will occur, nor to determine what 
particular form of thing-presentation that particular compromise-formation 
might take. 
3. In the same vein, it is impossible to determine, on the basis of the 
classification of symptoms or constellations of symptoms into classes (such 
as conversion hysterias, anxiety hysterias, and obsessional neuroses), the 
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particular form, course or outcome of any one (somatic, paranoid or 
obsessional) symptom in particular. 
On a general level, conversion hysteria can be distinguished from anxiety 
hysteria to the extent that in conversion hysteria, a libidinal wish is satisfied 
through somatization rather than through phobia. Likewise, both forms of 
hysteria can be distinguished from obsessional neurosis in which it is the 
relative strength of a super-ego injunction which results in disorders on the 
level of thought and action. The fact remains, however, that these broad 
distinctions hardly delimit the almost infinite plenitude of forms any one type 
of neurosis may take, or determine the temporal unfolding (i.e., course or 
outcome), of any one particular symptom. It is for this reason that Freud 
relates Dora's case or the Rat-Man's case in detail, rather than merely 
outlining a hysterical or obsessional configuration alone. The description of 
a type of pathology on a general level can never account for the form, nor 
predict the result, of any one symptomatic configuration in particular. 
Perhaps even more crucially, if general laws entail the regular relation 
between cause and effect, then such Freudian taxonomies can never operate 
as general laws in so far as they do not entail aetiological discriminations. 
No particular causal preconditions account, let alone sufficiently account, for 
one general class of symptom rather than another. Although Freud describes 
obsessional neuroses as those neuroses which entail a disproportionate 
super-ego strength in relation to the other agencies, he never argues that 
certain aetiological factors cause obsession rather than either conversion or 
anxiety neurosis. In fact, the process whereby one type of psychoneurosis 
rather than another is decided is so indeterminate that it is described by 
Freud as the "choice of neurosis". (Freud, 1913, pp.318-319). 
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As Laplanche and Pontalis point out, in consistently describing this process 
as a "choice 11 Freud is clearly suggesting that, 11an act on the subject's part 
is required if the various historical and constitutional determinants which 
psycho-analysis brings out are to become meaningful and attain the force of 
motivating factors". (1985, p.69). 
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Likewise, the distinction Freud draws between all psychoneurosis alike on 
the one hand, and psychosis on the other, is clearly distinguished by him 
from any aetiologically determined classification. Thus Freud writes that, "the 
aetiology common to the onset of a psychoneurosis and a psychosis always 
remains the same". (1924(1923), p.151). 
The distinction between the use of general classifications and the explanation 
of specific particular symptoms is again made explicit by Freud in a brief 
paper entitled 11 Libidinal Types 11 (1913). Although Freud classifies libidinal 
types into the erotic, the narcissistic, and the obsessional varieties, he 
makes it clear that these psychoanalytic taxonomies neither explain the 
presence, nor the "choice", of neurosis and cannot, therefore, entail 
prediction. He writes: 
It must be required of all such types that they shall not coincide 
with clinical pictures. On the contrary, they must comprehend all 
the variations which according to our practical judgement fall 
within the limits of the normal. . . . [Thus) the setting-up of these 
libidinal types throws no new light upon the genesis of the 
neurosis. Experience shows that a// these types can exist without 
any neurosis. (ibid, p.217, italics inserted). 
Freud's analysis of libidinal types is thus emphatically distinguished from an 
analysis of the aetiological or causal preconditions of specific neuroses. In 
fact, it is also distinguished from a syndromic analysis of types (or choice) 
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of neurosis. Thus Freud points out that although it would seem easy to infer 
choice of neurosis from libidinal type, "these inferences, too, share the 
uncertainty which I have just stressed". (ibid, p.220). 
It may be concluded that although general accounts and classifications can 
describe and even explain classes of actions on a general level, they cannot 
be used to explain or predict instances of these classes. It is for this reason 
that the case-history is an essential, and partially discreet, part of 
psychoanalytic epistemology. Likewise, it is for this reason that the last two 
chapters have been devoted to the ~xplanation of the symptomatic and its 
conditions of possibility on a general level alone. It is necessary to argue for 
a narrative epistemology in the Freudian case-history, as the prerequisite for 
explaining any particular given symptom. A different epistemological opera-
tion is necessary to achieve knowledge of a particular symptom, as opposed 
to the general conditions of possibility for the class of things called 
"symptoms11 per se. 
If Freud did not explicitly defend narrative epistemology in contradistinction 
to the ep.istemology of the natural sciences, then it is nevertheless true that 
he did recognize that one of the major consequences of the necessary 
explanation of the symptom in terms of the past is that this mode of 
explanation does not admit of projection into the future, because the 
symptomatic cannot be explained or predicted in accordance with general 
laws. Dante's contribution to Freudian Psychoanalysis is, then, only to show 
that it is in this sense alone (albeit a crucial one), that the structures in 
accordan:::e with which narrative or historical explanations are effected are 
not like scientific theories. 
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3.4 Narrative Ex;planation versus Narrative Interpretation in the 
Psychoanazytic Case 
If Dante's narrative conception of history sheds an important light on the 
classical psychoanalytic method in the case, then it also provides the basis 
for specifying some of the criteria of validation for that method. It is now 
possible to return to Spence's major objections to the validity of Freud's 
historical method, and to argue that these objections are grounded in certain 
basic epistemological misconceptions. 
Spence's argument against Freud's archaeological method has been seen 
to include three major contentions: 
Firstly, that psychical events which occurred in the past cannot be cor-
roborated and cannot, therefore, legitimately be used in an attempt to 
construct an accurate causal analysis. 
Secondly, that even if these past events could be corroborated, their 
meaning would remain dubious, and the particular meaning or significance 
attributed to them can therefore pertain to the status of an "interpretation" 
alone. 
And finally, that to the extent to which the archaeological method depends 
upon the legitimacy of the general laws of the meta-psychology, this method 
is extremely suspect and open to valid criticism. Spence's objections will be 
addressed consecutively. 
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1. Spence argues that the truth-claims of Freud's archaeological method -
the grounding of psychoanalytic explanations in terms of past events - is 
illegitimate because past events cannot be verified. Thus he claims that: 
From the standpoint of evidence alone, we seem on firmer ground 
when we base our interpretations on what happens in the hour 'in 
plain sight' as compared to what is reported by the patient, often 
unsupported by other witnesses. (1982, p.186). 
Spence's argument for the construal of Psychoanalysis as a non-historical 
narrative technique is clearly based on the failure of the historical method to 
fulfill the criteria of the natural scientific model of verification. As Dante points 
out, however, this scientific model is inappropriate to historical epistemology 
in the first place. Historical methodology cannot, therefore, be held liable on 
such grounds. The whole point of history is not to know about actions as 
witnesses might, but as historians do, in connection with later events and as 
part of temporal wholes. Historians have the unique privilege of seeing things 
in temporal perspective, i.e., in ways that could not have been witnessed at 
. the time. The historical method of Psychoanalysis must therefore be 
recognized, not as a limitation, but rather, as a defining advantage. A 
narrative technique iri fact sheds more light on the causal construction of the 
symptom than the strictly positivistic approach which Spence considers to 
be the hallmark of causal explanation. 
It is only Spence's construal of the archaeological method along the lines of 
a positivist verificationist model which leads to his failure to recognize that 
there is more at stake in the psychoanalytic case tha,n a simple duality 
between observable fact and negotiable interpretation. More specifically, 
Spence fails to recognize that the construal of Psychoanalysis as a narrative 
133 
technique does not; as he assumes, preclude it from the field of causal 
explanation. 
Where Spence defines narrative in the psychoanalytic case in contradistinction 
to a causal history, Dante allows us to recognize them as identical operations. 
And where Spence concludes that psychoanalytic narrative must therefore 
be interpretive, Dante allows us to conclude that psychoanalytic narrative is, 
in the proper sense, explanatory. 
Certainly, Dante's location of the historical method as an alternative 
epistemology facilitates the recognition that the historical method of the 
psychoanalytic case requires criteria of validation distinct from those of a 
natural science; and more so, from those of a pure science of observation. 
For natural science itself does not in fact demand that its theoretical 
propositions necessarily be ontologically realizable (i.e., observable) but 
rather, that secondary statements generated or derived from the theory be 
amenable to experimental observation, usually in a predictive sense. In short, 
the unobservability of subject-matter is too common a feature of scientific 
work for it to raise, in and of itself, any special problems for Psychoanalysis. 
What is fundamentally incoherent about Spence's argument for the 
justification of narrative interpretation on the basis of what happens in the 
present during the clinical hour is, however, that it does not in fact address 
the problem of validation in psychoanalytic epistemology. It is of no avail to 
re-locate the evidential field of Psychoanalysis within the present rather than 
the past because, to the extent that events in the clinic are construed as 
evidential, they necessarily go beyond what is observationally given. As 
Danto points out: 
Just to apprehend something as evidence is already to have gone 
beyond the stage of merely making statements about it: to count 
something as evidence is already to be making a statement about 
something else, namely, that for which it is taken as evidence. And 
taking E as evidence for 0 is already to see E differently from the 
way we would if we had no notion at all about 0 ... (Dante, 1985, 
p.91). 
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Unless events during therapy are construed, not simply as events in them-
selves but as an evidential field, then the phenomenon of the 11transference 11 
could not be understood as such, and the words of the patient could not be 
understood to shed light on anything, except his or her momentary whim. 
But to the extent that events during therapy are construed as an evidential 
field, they are no more verifiable or less suspect as evidence, than are the 
memories of the patient. To re-locate the evidential field of Psychoanalysis 
within the hour does not, therefore, address the problem of validation in 
psychoanalytic epistemology. 
If Spence privileges present experience over memory, then this is because 
he argues that present factors shape and distort our memories of the past. 
He fails to recognize, however, the fundamental psychoanalytic proposition 
that past factors shape and 11distort11 our experiences in the present. 
Moreover, Spence's concern with historical accuracy in terms of supporting 
eye-witness reports (as well as the 11reality 11 of memories), constitutes a 
fundamental failure to recognize the subject matter of Psychoanalysis as 
psychic reality, as opposed to the intersubjective reality available to outside 
observers. In other words, Spence fails to appreciate the legitimate status of 
fantasy events as historically operative psychic determinants. It was Freud's 
fundamental recognition that it is only the consequentiality of an event which 
determines its status as pathogenically causative and hence, explanatory. It 
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is for this reason that Freud was concerned to describe and explain any given 
symptom historically, that is, retrospectively and in terms of its full temporal 
context, rather than on the basis of its inherent features in the present 
(including its status as fantasy or reality). 
Far from being problematic, the recognition of the role of fantasy is, rather, 
of unquestionable significance in Psychoanalysis. (Laplanche, J, Pontalis, 
J.B., 1968). Without upholding fantasy as a legitimate causally efficacious 
aspect of psychic reality, Freud could never have conceived of the super-ego 
itself, as that agency which punishes us not merely for our actions but 
similarly, for our thoughts, desires and dreams, i.e., those hopes and wishes 
which never took a pathway to action at all. 
Like real events, fantasy events may or may not act as pathogenic causes. 
The criterion of external corroboration for the legitimation of the analysand's 
memories is thus clearly another positivist misconstrual of the psychical field 
in general, and of the symptom and its determinants in particular. 
2. Spence's second objection to the archaeological method of classical 
psychoanalysis is that even if remembered past events could be verified 
objectively their meaning or causal significance would remain oblique, 
amenable to subjective interpretation alone. 
This is because the unconscious (and even conscious) determinants which 
motivate human action are invisible and therefore not open to inspection or 
verification in the same way that events are. (Spence, 1982, p.291). Spence 
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concludes that: "To a significant degree, the narrative that emerges from 
analytic work can be regarded as a kind of theory, and to an important extent, 
theories remain independent of facts." In consequence, psychoanalytic 
narrative or the historical method is "a mode of interpretation", and not an 
explanatory procedure as Freud claimed. (ibid, p.292). 
If there are crucial differences between interpretive activities and explanatory 
ones, Spence manages to elide them here. This curious fact is perhaps again 
best explained in terms of Spence's erroneous conception of what objective 
explanation might consist in, which leads him to conclude that there are 
inherent defects in the explanatory method of Psychoanalysis which have 
nothing corresponding to them in the more "objective" sciences. 
If the determinants of human action are not open to inspection then neither 
are the determinants of events. Even clouds cannot be seen to mean rain. 
They do not wear signs saying: "When you see me take out your umbrella. 
I cause rain. 11 Causality is an attribute which we must, necessarily, always 
infer. Events in the present may well be directly available to perception in a 
visual parade but causes, in and of themselves, can never be witnessed as 
causes. 
In this regard, Spence is correct that theories remain independent of facts 
and necessarily go beyond what is observationally given. But he is wrong to 
conclude on these grounds, that Psychoanalysis is interpretive rather than 
explanatory. Or; if he is correct, then he is correct not only about 
psychoanalysis, but about science, and for that matter, about the whole 
structure of empirical knowledge. Spence's prejudice in favour of what we 
can see over what we must infer (i.e., what Spence calls "theory"), is not an 
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objection which can legitimately be levelled against Psychoanalysis in 
particular. While there can be little doubt that observation is an essential feature 
of empirical knowledges, it is by.no means the whole of it. As Duhem writes: 
It is impossible to leave outside the laboratory door the theory that 
we wish to test, for without theory it is impossible to regulate a 
single instrument, or interpret a single reading. (Duhem, 1954, 
p.182, cited in Dante, 1985, p.101). 
Danto likewise points out that: 
Were a physicist to take seriously the idea that there is some 
incompatibility between his desire for objectivity and his use of 
theories, it is not easy to see how, except by finding employment 
elsewhere, he could continue to regard himself as an objective 
person. He had better not seek employment as a historian, 
however. (Danto, 1985, p.102). 
It is for this reason that Dante argues that even Walsh's distinction between 
"plain" and "significant" narrative is a fallacious one. Even a specific descrip-
tion, like a general theory, is a structure imposed upon reality. And if there is 
no such thing as a "plain" narrative then for the same reasons, there can be 
no such thing as a "plain" science. In any discipline there are implicit 
guidelines for the selection of what counts as significant or relevant to a 
phenomenon or event, and attendant criteria for the selection of what counts 
as evidence for that event. In short, the relation of theory to evidence is, in 
the final instance, always overdetermined. 
Spence's discrimination between the psychoanalytic case-hlstory and veridical 
causal explanation is grounded upon the misguided assumption that the causal 
determinants of natural events, unlike those of human actions, are open to 
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observation, and that the explanation of human actions alone is therefore 
independent of observable fact or a structure imposed upon reality. 
3. Spence's third objection to the archaeological method concerns what he 
perceives to be Freud's conflation of clinical happenings and general laws: 
Freud failed to make a distinction between clinical happenings and 
general truths, and we have tended to follow in his footsteps; one 
·time insights tend to be inflated into general laws. If we confuse 
narrative truth with historical (and, more generally, with 
theoretical) truth, we will never make the necessary distinction, 
and our theory will never rise much above the level of metaphor. 
(1982, p.33). 
Freud explicitly theorized the distinction between these two epistemological 
levels in his work. For what Freud's historical method entails is the fundamental 
recognition that the description and explanation of any action, be it 
symptomatic or not, depends upon its position in a radically contingent and 
specific narrative series. And what Freud's historical method therefore 
logically excludes is the description, explanation, and prediction of the 
symptomatic in terms of a priori general laws. 
By juxtaposing "narrative truth11 with 11historical (and, more generally, with 
theoretical) truth", it is Spence rather than Freud who fails to appreciate these 
distinctions. In the same vein, Spence supports George Klein (1973) for 
arguing for a 0 renewed emphasis on the clinical theory in favour of the 
metatheory - an argument, in our terminology, in favour of narrative truth over 
historical truth". (Spence, ibid, p.185). Thus Spence concludes that not only 
the archaeological method, but also the metapsychology, should be 
discarded, in favour of the criteria of "narrative fit11 : 
As metapsychology has tended to come under attack, clinical 
reasoning, as represented in clinical reports, tends to depend 
more and more on narrative fit. The aesthetic quality of the 
case-history has tended, as a result, to pre-empt the use of 
general law. Narrative truth has tended to supplant historical truth. 
(ibid, p.186). 
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Spence's blurring of the epistemology of general laws in the metapsychology 
and the epistemology of historical reconstruction in the case is clearly 
unfounded. Freud would never have bothered with the case-history if every-
thing could be established in advance on the basis of general laws. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the clinical reports Spence invokes in fact 
construe themselves as aesthetically pleasing narrative fictions, rather than 
as legitimate explanations, as he claims. (ibid). For at the very least, it must 
be assumed that the words of the patient constitute the raw material from which 
a veridical psychical reality may be reconstituted. Without the metapsychology, 
but with this basic presupposition, it remains feasible to proceed. And yet, it 
is this fundamental premise which Spence claims can, and has been, denied. 
In any event, Spence's spring-cleaning of the psychoanalytic edifice is so 
hasty that no time is expended on discrimination between disposables. To 
use another metaphor, it might be said that the metapsychological baby 
sinking (almost indiscernably) with the archaeological bath-water is of no 
concern to Spence. 
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Conclusion 
Spence's rejection of the historical method of classical Psychoanalysis in 
"Narrative Truth and Historical Truth" (1985), is based on the dual contention 
that veridical causal reconstruction- of the patient's past is not only, firstly, 
epistemologically impossible but also, secondly, unnecessary to 
psychoanalytic technique. 
Although only the epistemological aspects of Spence's work are, strictly 
speaking, relevant to this thesis, the critical upshot of his reformulation of the 
Psychoanalytic case-history as a pragmatic (albeit aesthetically pleasing and 
rhetorically persuasive) narrative fiction are perhaps too important to omit 
mentioning entirely. For it is on this basis that Spence argues for the 
reconstrual of the psychoanalytic process of the cure as a form of interpretive 
closure in which the only possible form of truth is, "the truth of being coherent 
and sayable". (1982, p.176). Spence also uses his conception of narrative 
interpretation rather than narrative history in order to undermine, or render 
irrelevant, the Freudian metapsychology. 
To address this last point first, Spence's repudiation of the metapsychology 
is hardly surprising in the light of his reconstrual of Psychoanalysis as a form 
of "linguistic and narrative closure 11 • (ibid, p.137). This is because if 
psychoanalytic technique could be reconstrued as a narrative interpretation 
rather than as a narrative history, then not only Freud's archaeological 
method in the case-history, but also his topographic, dynamic and economic 
conception of the mind would be rendered incomprehensible, irrelevant and 
in fact, spurious. In its stead would be a theory of the mind in terms of which 
' 
psychic reality is divested of its power; open to revision as easily as the 
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unpublished drafts of a book and in which the persistence of neurosis in the 
first place would make little sense. 
Secondly, and in relation to the question of cure, what Spence's 
reformulation of psychoanalytic technique fails to properly appreciate is not 
only Freud's fundamental understanding of the psychic apparatus as that 
which bears the indelible, if distorted, imprint of its own developmental 
history, but also, the very notion of the unconscious and of a divided psyche 
and the attendant necessity for the overcoming of resistances and the lifting 
of repressions. In other words, if cure via 11narrative fit11 alone were possible, 
then the psychoanalytic endeavor would be rendered incomprehensible. 
Spence's apparent reworking and justification of the notion of narrative in 
and for Psychoanalytic theory and practice would no longer pertain to that 
theory and practice at all but would rather, undermine its very justification. 
Minimally, it is only if the aetiology of neurosis can convincingly be 
disconnected from the past, that Spence's argument for the superfluousness 
of veridical construction would assume coherence. But Spence does not 
argue that the psychoanalytic construal of the origins of neurosis in the past 
is incorrect, he simply chooses to ignore its implications. 
Although many post-Freudian clinicians have argued, like Spence, against 
the technical necessity for actual historical reconstruction in its original 
classical form, such arguments are predicated upon the understanding that 
there are alternative means for the reclaiming of the past, most specifically 
in terms of its actualization in the transference. Unlike Spence, such clinicians 
do not, therefore, deny the fundamental necessity for re-accessing the 
veridical past altogether. 
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Finally, it has been argued in this chapter that Spence's fundamental or 
primary contention that the historical reconstruction of the patient's past 
along classical psychoanalytic lines is epistemologically impossible, and 
therefore not legitimately explanatory, can be repudiated. 
In short, both Spence's claim that the historical method of Psychoanalysis 
is not legitimately explanatory, and his consequent reconstual of 
Psychoanalytic technique as a form of creative interpretation alone, are the 
consequences of an insufficient command of the logical content of 
Psychoanalysis and of what may consequently constitute both confirmatory 
evidence, and potential curative efficacy. 
It therefore remains to return to Dante's alternative construal of narrative as 
history, or more specifically, as causal explanation of the historical kind. 
Danto argues that narration describes an event which is ongoing in time from 
its beginning to its end, thereby establishing connections between causes 
and effects and explaining the changes which occurred during the course of 
that event. A narrative history therefore necessarily takes the form of a causal 
explanation. 
By exploring Dante's work on the epistemology of narrative explanation and 
its possible intersections with classical psychoanalytic epistemology, 
psychoanalytic epistemology in the case has been defended as narrative, 
but against Spence's construal of it, on three important points: 
1. Since any particular symptom in the classical psychoanalytic case is best 
described on the basis of its position in a narrative or temporal series, the 
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description of any one symptom necessarily takes the form of a causal 
explanation. 
2. Since the explanation of any particular symptom depends on its position 
in a narrative series the symptomatic can only be explained in terms of the 
past. Psychoanalytic epistemology in the case-history must therefore be 
defended against positivistic criteria of present-tense verification proce-
dures. Psychoanalysis necessarily takes a differential relation to evidence 
from the purely observational sciences. 
3. Finally, since the explanation of the symptom depends on its position in a 
series, no particular symptom can be explained in Psychoanalysis a priori. 
The explanation of a particular symptom is always radically contingent and 
specific. The symptom as it is construed in psychoanalytic terms is therefore 
not syndromic, i.e., its occurrence can never be predicted in advance, or 
even fully explained retrospectively, on the basis of general laws alone. It is 
for this reason that a different epistemological operation is necessary to 
achieve knowledge of a particular symptom, as opposed to the general 
conditions of possibility for that class of actions/events called symptoms in 
general. 
Crucially, it is not because Psychoanalysis does not fulfill the criteria of the 
natural scientific model that it must be construed in terms of an alternative 
narrative epistemology, but rather because its concern, unlike that of the 
natural sciences, is to explain particular actions or compromise-formations 
with reference to the specific temporal or historical series in which it is 
situated. It is for this reason that the explanatory procedure of 
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Psychoanalysis necessarily takes the form of a case-history; a history of 
particular "errors" in the field of past actions. 
By locating historical knowledge as an epistemology which must be 
contrasted not only to the natural sciences in so far as it is radically particular, 
but also to the interpretive sciences in so far as it is causally explanatory, 
Danto provides the grounds not only for locating psychoanalytic explanation 
in the case as a legitimate form of narrative epistemology but also, for 
formulating the relation of the metapsychology to the case, as two logically 
discreet . epistemological levels which cannot be made to do the same 
explanatory work. If the metapsychology explains the possibility for the 
symptomatic on a general level, then the case-history alone picks out the 




What this dissertation addresses is the question of what sort of knowledge 
classical Psychoanalysis might be. This inquiry hinges on the nature of the 
psychoanalytic description of its primary object, the symptom. This is 
because it is only in terms of Freud's constual of the nature and status of his 
object of knowledge, that it is possible to assess the method appropriate to 
its study, or more broadly, to establish the logical features of psychoanalytic 
explanation. 
It is suggested that Arthur Danto and Donald Davidson together provide an 
account of the Freudian symptom which is both coherent, and faithful to the 
original Freudian texts. On the basis of their account, it is argued that a 
construal of Psychoanalysis in terms of an interpretive or human-scientific 
epistemology is both inappropriate to the classical Freudian texts, and 
problematical in its own right. Certainly, Freud's own characterization of the 
symptom makes it clear that it is an object logically requiring explanation 
rather than interpretation. 
However, it is also asserted that the necessary explanation of any particular 
symptom can never be achieved a priori, on the basis of general laws. To 
this extent, Psychoanalytic explanation is characteristic of a historical rather 
than a natural scientific knowledge. 
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The status of Psychoanalysis as a knowledge is, in consequence, best 
understood (and assessed) in terms of a third alternative, that is, neither as 
a natural science nor as an interpretive scienGe but as a separate historical 
epistemology. And since the psychoanalytic method in the case in fact 
instantiates all those characteristics appropriate to a historical method, it is 
argued that the status of Psychoanalysis as a coherent form of "explanation" 
rather than "interpretation" can be defended, while the case against 
Psychoanalysis as a natural science is nevertheless granted. 
At the same time it is maintained that understood as a historical knowledge, 
the relation of the case-histories to the metapsychology is clarified. For what 
a historical epistemology entails is the understanding that the explanation of 
particular actions, events or symptoms must be achieved in each instance 
through a specific history rather than in relation to any predetermined 
definition of what the symptomatic is, in the first place. Psychoanalytic 
formulations and conceptions at a metapsychological level must then be 
understood not as laws of which particular instances are merely examples, 
but rather, as a partially discreet account of what the psychic apparatus must 
be to make such instances possible. 
In concluding a study of this kind however, it is as important to make it clear 
what has not been argued as it is to give some idea of what has, hopefully, 
been achieved. 
If Psychoanalysis has been subjected to rigorous criticism in recent years 
then this has been predominantly on two levels. Firstly, although theorists 
such as Carl Popper (1962) and Hans Eysenck. (1963) have argued that 
psychoanalytic theory is "unfalsifiable" or not open to refutation, 
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psychoanalytic theory has nevertheless been substantially criticized on the 
basis that its fundamental tenents, usually described as "metapsychological", 
can be invalidated. (Timpanaro, 1976; Grunbaum, 1984). Secondly; 
Psychoanalysis has been criticized because its clinical or curative procedure 
is not widely believed to be efficacious. {Fischer & Greenberg, 1985, chap. 
8). It is therefore important to emphasize that this dissertation has attempted 
both to define and defend Psychoanalysis as a form of knowledge without 
implicating a defence of either of these two areas. 
1. Although the logical coherence of Freud's explanatory model of the 
symptom on a general level has been defended, this dissertation is not a 
defence of the fundamental tenents of Psychoanalysis themselves by way of 
an examination of how they relate to evidence. Thus although it has been 
argued that psychoanalytic postulations, for example, regarding the 
compromise-formation and its status as the satisfaction of the wish, do not 
function as general laws which can either fully explain, or predict, any one 
symptom in particular, the empirical or factual status of fundamental 
psychoanalytic postulations such as the symptom, the parapraxis, the 
unconscious, the transference, and the Oedipal complex, has not been 
explored. 
This is because the establishment of Psychoanalysis as a body of knowledge 
which is (a) coherent and (b) capable of being operationalized in a method 
is not equivalent to an inquiry which involves the empirical legitimation of its 
fundamental tenents. In short, to establish that Psychoanalysis can support 
on its own terms what counts as its evidential field, and why this evidential 
field rather than another is appropriate, is not to establish that the fundamental 
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tenants of Psychoanalysis are 11true 11 , but only to determine the relevant 
criteria in terms of which they may or may not be invalidated. 
2. Finally, it remains to point out that a defence of Psychoanalytic 
epistemology is not a defence of Psychoanalysis as a curative procedure. 
This is because Psychoanalysis is not only a knowledge of its object but a 
practice upon it, and these two aspects of Psychoanalysis, although 
interdependent and overlapping, are not entirely equivalent. 
Although Freud insisted on the necessity for the reconstruction of the 
patient's lost history and the attendant explanation of his or her symptoms 
as a prerequisite towards the possibility of cure, he nevertheless never 
construed historical explanation as a sufficient condition for curative efficacy. 
In fact, if knowledge of the origin of the neurosis were all that were at stake 
in the process of psychoanalytic cure, then psychoanalytic technique need 
never have deviated from its original roots in hypnosis. For it was Breuer's 
discovery that hypnosis could be used, not only for the purposes of counter-
instruction and suggestion, but also for the uncovering of the origins of the 
symptom in the past. (Freud, 1914, p.16). 
In 11Constructions in Analysis 11 , Freud makes it clear that cure exceeds 
reconstruction when, after comparing psychoanalytic reconstruction to 
archaeological excavation, he concludes that, 11our comparison to the two 
forms of work can go no further than this, for the main difference between 
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them lies in the fact that for the archaeologist the reconstruction is the aim 
and end of his endeavors while for analysis the construction is only the 
preliminary labour11 • (1937, p.260). 
The capacity to explain how something came .to be the case, and took the 
form it did, is not equivalent to the capacity to intervene in, or alter, what 
exists. A knowledge of the unconscious alone has, as Freud puts it, 11as much 
influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a distribution of menu-cards 
in a time of famine has upon hunger11 • (Freud, 1910, p.302). 
However, the fact that the psychoanalytic process of the cure does not 
implicate the operation of narrative in an explanatory position alone, is not 
to say that an epistemologically grounded account of the curative proce-
dures which Freud does support could not be produced. It is also not to say 
that a knowledge of the symptom achieved in the clinic does not facilitate an 
understanding of how cure can be effected, but only that the production of 
a full explanation (i.e., case-history) is not in itself curative. A defence of 
psychoanalytic treatment entails the capacity to produce a full history, but is 
not reducible to it. To this extent, it is important that the defence of 
Psychoanalysis as an explanatory history and as a curative procedure should 
not be confused. 
Alexander, P. (1963). 
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